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ABSTRACT
Computer viruses pose a very real threat to this technological age. As our dependence 
on computers increases so does the incidence of computer virus infection. Like their 
biological counterparts, complete eradication is virtually impossible. Thus all computer 
viruses which have been injected into the public domain still exist. This coupled with 
the fact that new viruses are being discovered every day is resulting in a massive 
escalation of computer virus incidence.
Computer viruses covertly enter the system and systematically take control, corrupt and 
destroy. New viruses appear each day that circumvent current means of detection, 
entering the most secure of systems. Anti-Virus software writers find themselves 
fighting a battle they cannot win : for every hole that is plugged, another leak appears.
Presented in this thesis is both method and apparatus for an Anti-Virus System which 
provides a solution to this serious problem. It prevents the corruption, or destruction 
of data, by a computer virus or other hostile program, within a computer system. The 
Anti-Virus System explained in this thesis will guarantee system integrity and virus 
containment for any given system. Unlike other anti-virus techniques, security can be 
guaranteed, as at no point can a virus circumvent, or corrupt the action of the Anti- 
Virus System presented. It requires no hardware modification o f the computer or the 
hard disk, nor software modification of the computer's operating system. Whilst being 
largely transparent to the user, the System guarantees total protection against the spread 
of current and future viruses.
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CHAPTER 1 
COMPUTER VIRUSES 
AN 
INTRODUCTION
1.0 : DEFINING A COMPUTER VIRUS
A Computer Virus is a self replicating section of code which attaches itself to a program 
or an operating system. When the infected program is subsequently executed, the virus 
within it activates. Once activated it either continues in its course of self-replication or is 
triggered by some means into executing its main functional routine. These routines vary 
from the benign, such as a message displayed on the screen asking for world peace, to 
vicious attacks on either specific files or the computer system in general Bl.
Adleman provides us with a more rigourous definition :
A virus Is a map from programs to 'infected* programs
where an infected program on each ’input' makes one of three choices :
[1] Injure : Ignore the intended task and compute another function chosen by the virus.
[2] Infect : Infect other programs, then perform the ’intended’ task.
[3] Imitate: Neither injure nor infect : preform the ’intended’ task without modification, 
where :
'input' is considered as all accessible information such as : user input, 
system clock or files, and
'intended' task is the one the uninfected program would have performed for that input.
1.1 : CATEGORISING VIRUSES
Al-Dossary provides us with a series of definitions that can be used to categorise 
computer viruses, and these are presented in the following sections.
1.1.0 GENERAL CONTAGION AGENT MECHANISM (GCAM)
A virus in this category attaches itself to any file which is capable of 
perpetuating the existence of the virus.
Most viruses mentioned in this work are of this type.
1.1.1 SPECIFIC CONTAGION AGENT MECHANISM (SCAM)
A virus in this category attaches itself to a specific program, set of programs, or 
type of program.
This type of virus will spread slower than a GCAM virus as less files will be 
infected. It can, however, be made less detectable as the virus programmer will 
use his intimate knowledge of the target program to further limit the chance of 
detection.
1.1.2 GENERAL TARGET ACTION OR RESULT (GTAR)
A virus o f this category will, when 'triggered', attack indiscriminately. The 
action it takes and the result of this action will not be dependent on the type of 
data, drive or terminal. Examples o f this include : reformatting the hard disk ; 
corrupting the FAT tables (tables which DOS uses to keep track of which disk 
sectors belong to which file) ; or scrambling ascii characters on the screen.
Since the actions which can be taken by this category are limited, and it is likely 
that these actions can be generalised, detection and removal is more likely than a 
STAR virus.
1.1.3 SPECIFIC TARGET ACTION OR RESULT (STAR)
A virus in this category attacks a specific target. It is also likely that a virus of 
this type w ill have a specific purpose. Examples might include 
alteration/corruption of accounts data or attacks on anti-virus programs.
This type of virus may prove hard to detect : it may complete its task and 
destroy itself upon completion. Anti-virus programs checking for general virus 
behaviour are unlikely to detect a virus of this type unless it checks for it 
specifically.
An example of a STAR virus is the 2000 byte variant of the Dark Avenger DOS 
virus written in Bulgaria If the string "(c) 1989 by Vasselin Bontchev" is 
found in any executed file, the virus hangs the machine making it seem as if the 
Bontchev program was the cause. Vasselin Bontchev is a Bulgarian Anti-virus 
software writer. This is a deliberate attack on a specific piece of software hence 
it comes into the STAR category.
Using these categories we can split viruses into one of the following combinations : 
GCAM-GTAR, GCAM-STAR, SCAM-GTAR, or SCAM-STAR.
In actual fact some more complex viruses may be categorised as both GTAR and STAR 
as the action the virus takes may be largely general but may take a more specific action 
if certain criteria are met.
1.2 : ANATOMY OF A VIRUS
1.2.0 PROPAGATION MECHANISMS
Viruses can be further categorised by the techniques they use to enter and infect the 
system. There are two main types of DOS virus:
[1] Boot Sector virus
Within the Boot Sector of a disk resides a small section of code known as 
bootstrap code, which is executed when the machine attempts to boot from the 
disk, and is responsible for loading the operating systeni into memory and 
executing it.
A Boot Sector virus 1^ 1 modifies the code within the boot sector of a disk. The 
virus usually replaces the bootstrap code with virus code which will load the 
virus and then run the original bootstrap code which the virus has relocated. 
The virus is therefore memory resident and active before DOS is even loaded.
On a formatted floppy disk a single boot sector exists at logical sector 0. This 
sector will contain code whether the disk has been formatted as a boot disk or 
not. If it has, a bootstrap loader for the operating system will be present within 
this sector. If not, then it will contain code to print ’non-system disk' on the 
screen to inform the user of his error. Therefore both boot and non-boot disks 
are susceptible to infection as both contain code that would be executed if  an 
attempt was made to boot from the floppy disk.
A hard disk contains two types of boot sector. The DISK Boot Sector exists 
within the first physical sector of the disk and contains the partition table which 
includes information as to the location and size of all partitions on the disk. It #
also contains all the code necessary to check the partition table for a bootable 
partition, load the PARTITION boot sector and transfer control to it. The 
PARTITION Boot Sector exists within the first logical sector of a partition and 
contains all code required to bootstrap the operating system files with that 
partition. Either of these boot sectors are susceptible to infection.
During the Power On Self Test (POST) sequence which is executed before the 
operating system is loaded, a table is created at the base of RAM, and filled, 
which contains the JUMP addresses to the start o f all software interrupt 
routines. This is referred to as the Interrupt Vector Table. An infected boot 
sector will load the virus into memory and alter an address in the interrupt 
vector table so that it addresses the start of the virus in memory. This means 
that the virus will be activated for every CALL to that interrupt. The original 
address, replaced within the Interrupt Vector Table, is transferred to the virus 
so that the virus can transfer control to the requested interrupt routine when it is 
finished. Most viruses intercept INT 13H so that they become active when any 
application attempts disk access. Once the virus is loaded the original boot 
sector is usually loaded into memory and executed.
When the virus intercepts an INT 13H request, it will check the disk to which 
the request is made for infection. If the disk is not infected then the virus will 
infect the disk. Thus infection will occur during the first access of a new 
floppy disk.
One of the very first DOS viruses was of this type, the BRAIN virus [6.7.8]^  
which infects the floppy disk bootstrap sector. Another such virus is the 
ITALIAN 'Bouncing Ball' virus which infects both the floppy disk 
bootstrap sector and the hard disk partition bootstrap sector.
This type of virus should be considered as a special incidence of the SCAM 
category of viruses as it infects only one specific piece of code, the bootstrap 
sector, or sectors. No other executable code is infected within the system. A 
virus of this type may be either GTAR or STAR.
[2] Parasitic virus
A Parasitic virus infects executable files within the system, usually by 
prepending or appending their code to the code section of the program being 
infected.
The most common way that a virus integrates itself into the file being infected is 
to alter a Jump instruction, usually the initial JMP, within the original code to 
jump to the beginning of the virus code.The virus, once executed, in turn jumps 
back to what would have been the destination of the jump it altered.
Clearly there are other means but the effect is usually the same. One brute force 
method involves the overwriting of the beginning of the file thus rendering the 
original program inoperable. This, although simple to implement, ensures that it 
is detected early on and reduces the spread.
This type of virus can be further divided into two distinct groups:
[i] Resident
When a virus of the Resident Parasitic type is activated it loads itself as a 
memory resident piece of code. Once resident it will remain there until the 
machine is switched off. It is common for a virus of this type to infect the 
COMMAND.COM which is executed as part of DOS loading sequence. This 
would cause the virus to be resident once the machine has booted. Advantages 
of this method include the ability to introduce STEALTH techniques, which are 
explained later. Being resident also means that any further calls to OPEN, 
CLOSE, CREATE or EXECUTE a file can be a source of infection. For 
example the command :
COPY A.COM B.COM 
could result in both files being infected even if  neither were before the 
command’s first execution on the computer.
[ii] Non-resident
A Non-resident Parasitic virus will spread during the execution of the program 
to which it is attached. It will infect a file, or set of files, by searching the 
directory for suitable candidates. Once a candidate is found the virus will infect 
it and mark it in some way so that it does not attempt to infect it again. If a virus 
does not mark infected files, then it may repeatedly infect a file, thus alerting a 
user due to significant increases in file size and increased likelihood of 
malfunction of the file when executed.
An example of this type is the DOS VIENNA virus [9] ; each time it is activated 
it looks for a single file to infect in either the current directory or any directory 
mentioned in the PATH. The majority of files are simply infected, but an 
occasional file is overwritten with code at the start which causes a jump to the 
BIOS initialisation routine ( a warm start ).
A third type o f virus has emerged recently which fail to fall into the Parasitic virus 
category because they do not alter the original file in any way :
[3] The Companion Virus
A Companion virus B l^ may be considered by some as a special case of the 
Parasitic type. It makes use of a special feature o f the MS-DOS operating 
system : namely, if two executable files with the same filename exist, but one 
has a .EXE extension and the other a .COM, then the .COM program executes 
first. An infecting virus will search for an .EXE file and create a .COM file of 
the same name with its own virus code within. It places the new .COM file in 
the same directory as the .EXE and makes it hidden. When the user tries to 
execute the .EXE, the .COM file executes first : the virus then activates, mns to 
completion, and then runs the .EXE. The user is entirely unaware that this has 
happened and the virus has been activated without any changes to the .EXE 
file. As the .COM file is hidden and the size o f the .EXE has clearly not been 
changed, the virus can not be detected by the DIR command. Utilities such as 
CHKDSK would however identify an increased number of hidden files.
1.2.1 A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
(i) Non-resident Parasitic Virus
The functional behaviour of such a virus can best be outlined by the following 
pseudo-code :
program virus
function continue.to.infact : boolean 
begin
(Dependent on result will attempt infect one or many files} 
end
procedure infect 
begin
find.a.file
i f  no. file ex it procedure
i f  marked.infected then infect
else beginmark.infected - append.virus.to.file 
end
end
function trigger : boolean 
begin{Check if time to Trigger & return result} 
end
procedure trigger.event 
begin
{Execute the trigger sequence} 
end
MAIN
begin
while continue.to.infect do infect 
i f  trigger do trigger.event 
jump__to file, start 
end.
This pseudo-code applies to a parasitic virus which does not go memory 
resident. The contents o f the function continue. to. infect will define 
whether the virus infects only one, many, or all uninfected files. The procedure 
infect will search for a file and, if  it is not infected, it will infect it, then exit.
If it is infected it will search for another file and repeat. If no file is found then 
the procedure exits. The search for a suitable file is done by find. a . file and 
the criteria it uses will decide whether the virus is a SCAM or GCAM virus. 
The function trigger decides whether it is time to execute the viruses action 
sequence. The criteria for triggering is covered later. The code placed in the 
procedure trigger. event will determine whether the virus is a STAR or 
GTAR virus. Once all this is done the virus will then jump to the start of the 
code for the program it is attached to.
(ii) Resident Parasitic Virus
The functional behaviour of such a virus can best be outlined by the following 
pseudo-code :
program virus2
procedure membit
function trigger : boolean 
begin{Check-if time to Trigger & return result} 
end
procedure trigger.event 
begin{Do the trigger sequence} 
end
procedure infect.file 
begin
i f  not(marked.infected) do 
beginmark.infected append.virus.to.file 
end 
end
begin
i f  trigger then trigger.event 
else infect.file return.control 
end
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d
procedure make.memory.resident 
begin
generate.space
place.procedure.membit.in.space re-route.interrupts 
end
MAIN
begin
i f  memory.resident 
then do.nothing 
else make.memory.resident 
jump__to file, start 
end
This type of virus, when executed from within an executable file, checks if it 
exists in memory with the function memory.resident, and if it does not, then 
loads the procedure membit into memory as a TSR (terminate and stay resident) 
code using the procedure make .memory, resident. Once this task is complete 
the virus will return control to the executable file to which it is attached.
The procedure re-route, interrupts alters the addresses within the software 
interrupt table to point to the virus code which has been placed in memory. The 
original address is stored within the virus code so that the virus can pass back 
control to the function that was originally being called using return. control. 
Therefore every time the software interrupt is made, the virus in memory will 
be activated.
Once activated it will test for a trigger event using the function trigger and 
execute the trigger sequence in trigger .event if the testis positive. As for 
non-memory resident viruses the code placed in the procedure trigger. event 
will determine whether the virus is of type STAR or GTAR. If the virus does 
not trigger then it attempts its other function, that of propagation with 
infect.file.
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(iii) Boot Sector Virus
The functional behaviour of such a virus can best be outlined by the following 
pseudo-code :
program virus3
procedure membit
function trigger : boolean
begin {Check if time to Trigger & return result} 
end
procedure trigger.event
begin {Do the trigger sequence}
end
procedure infect.floppy 
begin
i f  not(marked.infected) do 
beginmark.infected add. virus.to.boot 
end 
end
procedure infect.hard.drive 
begin
i f  not(marked.infected.hard) do 
beginmark.infected.hard 
add.virus.to.boot.hard 
end 
end
begin
if  trigger
then trigger.event
else i f  hard.drive then infect.hard.drive
else infect.floppyreturn.control 
end
procedure make.memory.resident 
begingenerate.space
place.procedure.membit.in.space re-route.interrupts 
end
MAIN
begin
if  memory.resident then do.nothing
jump_to file.start end
else make.memory.resident
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This type of virus is similar, functionally, to the memory resident parasitic type 
of virus. It differs in that it searches for disks to infect, not files. When 
executed, during a boot, it goes TSR (terminate and stay ready), as explained in 
the previous section. Once in memory, the virus will be activated on disk access 
software interrupts. If the disk to which the request refers is not infected, the 
virus will infect it using infect.hard.drive or infect. floppy before 
passing control to the interrupt that was originally called by the application with 
return.control.
1.2.2 A STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION
In this section we will consider the structure of infection within programs. In MS-DOS 
there are two distinct types of executable file and therefore they are covered separately. 
In MACOS this is not the case and therefore the structure can be generalised. Finally 
boot sector viruses shall be treated as a special case f^ l.
[1] Parasitic Virus - MS-DOS (.COM) executable files
A .COM file contains just binary code and is therefore the simplest to infect. 
This type of executable whilst being compact and fast to load, is limited to 64K 
Bytes for the combination o f program code, stack and data.
Three groups can be distinguished : overwriting, appending and prepending.
The first viruses to overwrite used a primitive version of this method due to its 
simplicity fi l^. The virus would simply overwrite the file from the start. This 
rendered the original .COM file entirely inoperable. The rate of infection was
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exceedingly low as detection was immediate. More advanced viruses which use 
this method store the section of the original file, which they overwrite, at the 
end of the file. The virus can then restore the original code after the infection 
routine has been executed.
Appending viruses are the most common. They overwrite the first few bytes of 
the file with a jump to the start of the virus code. The virus code is then 
appended to the end of the original file. The original values of the bytes 
overwritten at the start are placed somewhere within the body of the virus.
Prepending viruses place their code at the start of the file and shunt the original 
code along to make room. As this is slightly more complex than appending, 
viruses of this type are less common.
[2] Parasitic Virus - MS-DOS (.EXE) executable files fi l^
Executable files of type .EXE are not pure binary code like .COM files. The 
code within a .EXE is prepended by a header which contains information which 
permits the program to use the full capabilities o f the 80x86 series of 
microprocessors. Unlike .COM files, .EXE files may contain multiple 
segments, each 64K Bytes in length. The first two bytes of the header contain a Æ
signature which identifies the program, to MS-DOS, as an .EXE file. The 
following entries in the header include : the number of 64K Byte pages the file 
occupies ; the number of bytes occupied in the last page ; size of the header ; 
minimum space required in addition to the space required for the program image 
in order to run ; the maximum space required - the value the program requires in 
order to run most efficiently ; the initial values to be loaded into the 80x86 
registers ; a checksum field (unused) ; and finally a relocation
14
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table to facilitate relocation (entries are pointers to addresses requiring the 
segment start address added to them). Infection of .EXE files requires that this 
header be modified. Some modify more than others but they all replace the code 
segment instruction pointer, CS:IP, initial register values to pass control to the 
virus, and store the original so that control can be passed back when the virus 
has completed its task. Some viruses also alter the system segment stack 
pointer, SSrSP, initial register values to provide an internal stack whilst the 
virus executes. This prevents the original stack from possibly overwriting the 
virus code.
[3] Parasitic Virus - MACOS executable files
The MACintosh Operating System structures its executables as a series of 
resources which exist as objects pointed to from the resource fork within the 
application. When first executed the program uses the jump table in the resource 
CODE 0 to find the address o f the initialisation routine for the application. 
Introducing a virus is simple : a new code resource is added and the jump table 
in CODE 0 altered to point to the new virus resource. The original jump value is 
stored so that control can be returned.
Infection of the System File can often be made more potent by the inserting the 
virus as an INTT resource, as each INTT segment is executed at boot time,
[4] Boot Sector Virus
A Boot Sector Virus replaces the original boot sector with virus code which 
first loads the virus into memory, and then loads and executes the original boot
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sector. Viruses of this type rarely fit within the single sector which they are 
replacing. As most viruses continue normal operation after the virus has 
executed and been loaded into memory, the original boot sector must be stored 
somewhere as well as any virus code 'overspill'. Many different solutions have 
appeared to this problem :
(i) Mark desired clusters as 'BAD' so that the operating system will not use 
them. With this method the partition remains the size desired, but the available 
space is reduced by the number of sectors thus marked
(ii) Move the partition boundaries to accommodate the extra code at the end of 
the partition. With this method the partition effectively shrinks by the number of 
required sectors. This method is only usually adopted for floppy disks as hard 
disks may have multiple contiguous partitions where making boundary changes 
would be more complex.
(iii) Use sectors near the end o f the disk, without allocation or moving of 
partition boundaries, as the end of the disk will only be used when the disk is 
nearly full. As space is not allocated locating, and therefore detecting, the virus 
is made more difficult. The drawback is that the virus may be overwritten.
(iv) Use the remainder of track zero. This space is rarely used for anything but 
the boot sector. The remaining sectors are usually free. Again allocation is not 
required so the virus will not be detected by CHKDSK, for example. However 
it is a common place for viruses to reside and such a small area of the disk can 
easily be checked.
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(v) Small viruses may use the last sector o f the root directory, if only one extra 
sector is required. This will only be overwritten if the directory is nearly full 
which, for floppy disks in particular, is unlikely.
(vi) It is possible to format an extra track on a Floppy disk above those 
formatted by the operating system. This is ideal in that no allocation is required, 
and no overwriting is possible. Detection is also unlikely
(vii) On many hard disks the last physical track, the outer one, is used for 
parking the heads and, although available, is never used. A virus could also be M
placed here without allocation.
All the methods outlined above are fallible. It is possible to detect a virus which uses 
any one of tlie methods above. However, no anti-virus programs to date check all these 
locations, and if they did virus writers would find new 'hide-outs' for their code.
1.2.3 TRIGGER MECHANISMS
The event which will cause a virus to trigger is usually based on one of two criteria.The 
virus may be programmed to trigger at or after a specific time or date. For example it 
may activate on April 1st and display a message. Alternatively it may trigger when a 
count is reached, for example after 10 executions o f the infected file, or after the 
infected file has infected 20 other files.
Viruses of the STAR category may however trigger on a more specific basis. For 
example if the virus is designed to corrupt data files of a certain database, it may trigger 
on the existence of the database application.
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1.2.4 TRIGGER ACTION SEQUENCES
The action a virus may take on triggering cannot be defined. As mentioned before the 
action may be categorised into either specific or general : GTAR or STAR. The action 
itself could be anything ranging from the innocuous to the malicious. Listed below are 
some examples that have been found in real viruses :
STunes B?]
AIDS tni
Chooses a tune from 8 possible tunes and plays it.
Prints "Your computer now has AIDS" on the display and 
halts machine.
Armagedon P?! Attempts to dial the speaking clock in Crete if a Hayes- 
Compatible modem is installed.
Datacrime F'9,i8] Ffrst 9 tracks of the hard disk is low level formatted. If the 
drive signature is within this area then the drive will not even 
be recognised by the system and may have to be returned to 
the manufacturer. Also if partitions exist these wiU disappear.
Dyslexia Occasionally transposes two adjacent characters on the screen.
Fu Manchu Checks keyboard buffer for occurrence of politicians names
and appends derogatory comments to them.
Jerusalem ['7.9,18] ^  section o f the screen is scrolled up two lines leaving a black
window. A time wasting loop is also inserted.
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1.2.5 MARKING AN INFECTED FILE
There are many ways by which a virus can ascertain whether a file is already infected. i
The most obvious method would be for the virus to check for the occurrence of a 
certain byte sequence within the sector of a file where the virus would exist if the file 
was infected. If this sequence is found then the file is infected. Other methods have 
appeared, two of which are listed below :
[1] The addition of 100 to the Year stamp of the file. As the DIR command only 
displays the last two digits 2091 is displayed the same as 1991 and therefore the user 
is unaware of the alteration
[2] Similarly the placement o f a number greater than 60 in the seconds field of the time 
stamp [20]^  This requires that stealth functions (explained later) retiim this value to less 
than 60 so that for example the DIR command does not alert the user.
1.2.6 TRANSMISSION MEDIUMS
[1] Boot Sector Viruses
This type of virus requires the interchange of physical disks to propagate. Under MS- 
DOS, these discs need not be formatted as system disks, as explained earlier in section 
1.2.0, infections may exist within the 'boot' sector of non-system disks. Infection 
occurs when attempting a bootstrap from an infected floppy or removable hard disk.
[2] Parasitic Viruses
This type of virus is not constrained to spreading via physical medium. Although 
propagation via infected disc is common, so is downloading software from bulletin 
boards via a modem link. Networks are also an ideal medium for propagation. Many 
viruses are capable of infection from file server to individual PC or vice-versa.
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1.2,7 FINDING SPACE
Memory Space has to be found for all viruses which go memory resident. These 
include Memory Resident Parasitic Viruses and Boot Sector Viruses. There are various 
means of doing this :
[1] Locate at the top of memory and reduce the space available to MS-DOS. 
This is done by altering the value held at location 0040:0013 in memory. This 
means that DOS has 640K bytes available to it minus the length of the virus. 
This is the favoured mechanism for Boot sector viruses. This allocation can be 
detected by utilities such as CHKDSK or Antivirus programs 0^49]
[2] Allocation above 640K in memory. This will involve the virus searching for 
suitable free RAM space. The likelihood of detection is not high.
[3] Use the MS-DOS TSR functions to place the virus code as resident so that it 
is not overwritten. This is the simplest method but is easily detected by 
Antivirus monitors Ufi.
[4] Use the first Disk I/O buffer used by MS-DOS and remove it from the I/O 
chain. These buffers are 512 bytes long which is often enough for a virus. 
Being an unusual approach this is unlikely to be detected [20,22]
20
1.3 : FIRST GENERATION COMPUTER VIRUSES
The first, purely experimental virus was injected into a contained environment at the 
University of Southern California in October 1983. It was written by Fred Cohen, to 
be run on a VAX 11/750 running UNIX. It was capable of taking over the entire 
system in less than 30 minutes. File to file infection took much less than a second and 
was therefore not detectable by a user. It was written purely as a demonstration and 
never allowed to spread beyond the system mentioned above.
Early examples of computer viruses released into the public domain were probably 
written as irresponsible jokes. It was late 1987 when the first DOS viruses appeared. 
First was the BRAIN virus, closely followed by the LEHIGH and JERUSALEM  
viruses.
BRAIN 1^ 7,8] is a boot sector virus which attached itself to 360K floppy drives only. It 
claims both the boot sector, and a further 3 clusters (6 sectors) which it marks as 
'BAD' in the FAT. It stores the original boot sector within the extra sectors it allocates 
itself, which it calls once the virus is installed. It occupies 7k of memory when 
resident. It gets its name because each infected disk has its label changed to '(c) Brain'. 
This was the first recorded DOS virus and was also the first to exhibit 'stealth' 
capabilities (which are explained later) : The virus intercepted any requests to read the 
boot sector and redirected them to the original sector if they occurred. Thus the virus 
hid itself from the user. Its source was Lahore in India and its range went as far as 
Delaware and Washington Universities in the USA, a Midlands University, a Leicester 
consultancy, and a major Insurance company on the South Coast. This virus is a 
SCAM type as it infects only boot sectors.
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LEHIGH H7,23] ig a parasitic virus which becomes memory resident. Unlike BRAIN, 
this virus is far from benign, it trashes a disk after it has been infected four times by 
overwriting the first thirty two sectors of the disk. It infected several hundred machines 
causing severe loss of data before it was detected, and several hundred more were 
infected before a cure was found. It is estimated that it infected 600 disks within just 
two days. It originated in Lehigh University in the USA, hence its name, and the 
damage it caused was fairly centralised. The reason for this was the virus triggered 
after infecting only four files. This meant that detection was quick : it is estimated that if 
this number was much higher, then tens of thousands of machines world-wide would d
have been affected. This is a SCAM-GTAR virus as it only infected a specific file, the %
COMMAND.COM, yet its target action is general.
JERUSALEM 17,24] ]g  ^ memory resident, parasitic virus. It infects all .EXE and 
.COM files in the system upon execution. After thirty minutes the virus triggers and the 
system slows down by a factor of five and an area of the screen from row 5 column 5 
to row 16 column 16 scrolls up two lines. All programs executed on Friday the 
thirteenth are also deleted. It is estimated that at its peak 10 000 to 20 000 machines 
were infected. This virus is of the GCAM-GTAR type.
These viruses were simple in design and required only limited skill to write. They were 
simple to disassemble and analyse. Detection and removal o f these viruses was also 
reasonably simple. However this was not the case for very long.
1.4 : NEW GENERATION COMPUTER VIRUSES
Over 400 DOS viruses exist in the world today and this is increasing at the rate of over 
1 per day I s^i. Other types of machines such as those running MACOS are similarly 
affected, although the number in existence and the rate of growth are proportionably 
smaller than for the PC. Reasons for this probably include the simple fact that there 
are far more PCs in the world today and that they have been in existence longer. DOS 
is also a far more open and documented operating system than its Macintosh 
counterpart. Mainframe viruses such as VAX and SUN have also been suffering from 
infections but these machines have proved to be more immune from attack, at least for 
the moment.
Analysis of the viruses that are currently appearing indicate that virus infection is, and 
is going to continue to be, a very real problem within the computing community. As a 
steady flow of new viruses are released day by day it becomes obvious that a group of 
highly motivated individuals, or even companies, from all around the world are actively 
developing virus code.
Eradication of these infections is becoming more and more necessary as they increase in 
complexity, sophistication, and of course number.
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1.4.0 FEATURES FOUND IN NEW GENERATION VIRUSES
New viruses are appearing with code which is self-protecting, self-encrypting, self­
modifying and self-correcting. This makes discovery and removal increasingly hard 
for the user, and indeed the anti-virus software programmer. One virus programmer 
stated the following about his virus MOTHERFISH or WHALE :
".... the Motherfish is not just a virus, it is a virtual living, breathing entity that is 
capable of teaching itself its pursuers techniques and then increasing its code level 
sophistication as its environment becomes increasingly hostile..," [26]
These claims are largely exaggerated but they clearly indicate the arrogance and pride 
that the programmer has for his creation. It should be noted however that as yet there is 
no scanning program which is capable of identifying this virus, giving considerable 
concern to the anti-virus software developers.
Below are descriptions of techniques which have appeared in the more recent viruses :
[1] Self-Encryption
Viruses are appearing which have a pseudo-random encryption routine [26.27] 
so that each new copy of the virus would consist of an entirely different series 
of bytes. This makes the code unrecognisable. Such viruses have been coined 
"Armoured" viruses.
Obviously the decryption routine would have to be present for the virus to be 
decrypted before execution, and this routine could not itself be encrypted. Other 
techniques deal with this problem, but even without them encryption 
complicates disassembly and analysis for the anti-virus software developers.
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[2] Self-Modifying code
Viruses such as the 1260 [28] (named after its size in bytes) use self-encryption 
and they also make the decryption routine self-modifying such that the largest 
sequence of unchanging bytes is 3. This makes searching for recognisable 
patterns impossible. This type of virus is often referred to as a 'Chameleon' 
virus.
[3] Self-Correcting code
Viruses such as the VACSINA HI (Bulgarian for vaccine) have, incorporated 
within them, self-correcting Hamming code such that any alteration to the virus 
of up to 16 bytes will have no effect as the virus will 'repair' itself [22], This ‘A
reduces the probability of mutations appearing due to hacking by second 
parties.
[4] Clandestine Memory Allocation
Viruses of the 'parasitic-resident' type require a copy o f themselves to remain in 
memory. New viruses are appearing which avoid the obvious methods of doing 
this so that they are more difficult to detect [22]. Examples include :
[i] EDDIE n  M directly manipulates the memory control blocks.
[ii] 666 [20] (The Number of The Beast virus) uses the first DOS disk 
buffer (after removing it from the 'available' list).
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[5] Surviving the High Level Format
Boot sector viruses such as the NEW ZEALAND B?! are not destroyed by the 
DOS FORMAT instruction. In order to remove this virus one must do a low  
level format of the disk in question. This format process overwrites the Master 
Boot Sector which contains the virus.
[6] Surviving a Warm Boot
The JOSHI virus re-vectors the INT 9H DOS software interrupt to trap the 
<ctrl><alt><del> (warm boot) key sequence to ensure that it manages to remain 
intact during the subsequent boot sequence.
[7] The Anti-Virus Virus
The YANKEE virus 129] contains code to search for the viruses ITALIAN 19] 
and CASCADE 19]. On finding either o f these, YANKEE will remove it : Write 
a virus to catch a virus!
The programmer's reason for this insertion seems to be to remove older 
generation viruses which are 'clogging' up the system and replace them with a 
new 'improved' one. As virus infection spreads this may prove to be a required 
feature of a virus : they will be so prolific that they literally have to fight each 
other for control.
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[8] The Anti- Anti-Virus Virus
As mentioned previously the 2000 byte variant of the DARK AVENGER virus 
1^1 specifically targets Anti-Virus software produced by a software developer in 
Bulgaria 122]_ This may be only the beginning : viruses could be designed to 
disable, by-pass or destroy such software. A war has been waged between 
virus writers and the anti-virus software writers and there is no reason to 
suppose the virus writers won't play dirty!
[9] Multi-Partite Viruses
Viruses are appearing which are able to spread by infecting both the boot sector 
and program files This type of virus, if  loaded into memory from an 
infected boot sector, will infect programs as they are executed. If, however, the 
virus is activated by the execution of an infected program then it checks if  the 
virus is already active in memory. If it is not then the virus firstly installs itself 
into memory and then attempts infection of the boot sector. The FLIP MS-DOS 
virus 130] is an example of this type.
[10] Random Insertion Virus
It is expected that viruses will either append themselves to the beginning or to 
the end of a file it is infecting. An IBM virus exists which chooses a pseudo­
random point, by using the machine's timer, as an offset within the file to place 
its code. This makes scanning particularly, difficult as the offset for the 
signature is different each time. Anti-Virus scanning software is explained in 
section 1.7.0.
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[11 j No increase in Filesize after Infection
One problem the virus writer had to solve in order to avoid his virus from being 
detected was that a virus requires disk space to store its code. This space must 
be safe from overwriting by the operating system and yet not appear obvious 
by examination of the directory entries 1221. in general virus writers attempted to 
keep their viruses as small as possible to reduce the likelihood of detection but 
this was not sufficient against checking by anti-virus programs.
The '666 - Number of the Beast' MS-DOS virus l^ O] manages to attach itself to 
a .COM file with no increase in length whatsoever. It does this by finding files 
which are between 512 bytes and 64K bytes long with at least one free sector 
between the end o f the file and the end of the last allocated sector. The reason 
this is possible is that, under MS-DOS, all disk space is allocated in multiples 
of fixed quanta known as clusters. These clusters are a whole number of 
sectors, the number depending on the size of disk or disk partition. Sectors 
themselves are 512 bytes in length, although this value is theoretically variable. 
For example if a file is 300 bytes long and the cluster size for the disk is 2 
sectors then the file occupies 2 sectors on disk even though the latter part of the 
first sector and the whole of the second sector are empty. Thus any user or anti­
virus program will fail to detect the virus unless the actual content of files is 
inspected. The cluster size is dependent on the size o f disk partition : the larger 
the partition the greater the cluster size. Therefore the larger the partition, the 
greater the number o f files there will be which do not occupy their full 
allocation o f space and can be infected. Also, with increased cluster size, small 
files will leave larger areas of unused space allowing larger viruses to make use 
of this method.
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[12] 'Stealth'Techniques
As anti-virus programs became more sophisticated and more abundant, some 
virus writers retaliated with viruses which went to considerable length to evade 
detection and the result is the 'stealth' virus [io,26]^
A virus can often be detected by viewing the contents of the infected file. 
Memory resident viruses have found a way around this problem. If a virus is 
resident in memory then it can intercept a request to view an infected sector and 
replace it with a request to elsewhere where the virus has carefully saved the 
original uninfected sector.
An example of this is the 4K Virus another MS-DOS 'new generation’ 
virus, which intercepts the INT 21 function 14H (sequential read), function 
21H (random record read) and function 27H (random block read). If the 
request corresponds to a read request from the start of an infected füe where the 
virus is stored, then the virus returns the original contents as they were before 
infection. The Read function (3FH) operates in much the same way : the virus 
disinfects the file as it is read thus it appears unmodified. The Write function 
(40H) is also altered so that when writing to an infected file it is disinfected, 
only to be re-infected on Closing. This virus also uses an alternative method to 
avoid the sizes of infected files changing and alerting the user. This method 
works only when the virus is memory resident : all functions which return the 
file size, such as function 23H (File size), function 1IH (find first matching 
file) and function 4EH (find first), have their file size decremented by 4K, the 
size of the virus. Also function 40H (Lseek) is intercepted so that when a 
program seeks to the end o f an infected file, the reported value o f the file 
pointer is decremented by 4k.
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The MS-DOS boot sector virus JOSHI ^6] also adopts these techniques. It 
intercepts any attempts to read, write or verify the Master Boot Sector and 
redirects tliem to the original uninfected version.
To summarise, if you are infected by a stealth virus then it may circumvent 
many of the Anti-Virus products available today. As the data within a file, once 
read into memory, will be identical whether the disk version is infected or not, 
many programs will fail to identify the viruses presence. If the system is booted 
from a virus free system then, as the virus will not be resident in memory many 
of the stealth features will not be active and detection is more likely.
[13] Disabling User Alerts
Another way to prevent Anti-virus programs from informing the user of a virus 
is implemented in the 666 virus f20] ; it re-vectors the INT 24H which is the 
Fatal Error Handler. The result of this is that any error reporting is disabled. 
The virus may then attempt to infect a floppy disk, for example, and should no 
disk be present, the user would not be informed of the attempt, unless the 
hardware disk activity light was noticed.
[14] Inter-Vims Co-operation
Viruses exist which contain knowledge of other viruses and their mutual 
existence may trigger certain co-operation between the two H2], For example 
the ANTHRAX virus (MS-DOS), a boot sector virus, leaves an extra copy of 
itself on the last track of the infected disk. If the disk is subsequently 
disinfected and later infected with the 2100 Bulgarian vims (MS-DOS), then 
this vims will detect the extra copy of ANTHRAX and reactivate the dormant 
code causing the re-infection of the boot sector.
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[15] Generation Code
The WHALE vim s creates new generations of itself. It does this by 
scrambling the order of the subroutines within itself and changing both the 
encryption ’lock' and ’key'. It thus creates a new version of itself, entirely 
dissimilar to the parent, which it places in the file being infected.
1.5 : VIRUS CASE EXAMPLES
Every major computer manufacturer in the U.S.A. admit their machines have sustained 
attacks. Most of them have publicly stated that these attacks have been successful and 
that no solution currently exists Examples include :
1.5.0 THE AIDS TROJAN HORSE
A particularly malicious instance occurred when an "AIDS Introductory Diskette" was 
distributed using mailing lists of computing magazine publishers by the PC Cyborg 
Corporation H2], This diskette contained not a virus, but a Trojan Horse, a program 
which when executed performs a function which is unexpected by the user. This is 
further explained in a later section. Although this was not strictly a virus it was a clear 
example of unauthorised code entering and affecting a system. Its operation was far 
from benign. It was in fact intended to extort money from users across Europe which is 
exactly what it achieved.
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The disk purported to contain a database of AIDS information and a program which 
assessed a persons risk of catching AIDS. This disk came with a license agreement 
which indicated that one should not use these programs unless one was prepared to pay 
for them. Its install program printed an invoice for the software and created an invisible 
subdirectory, within which it placed an executable file. It then renamed the 
AUTOEXEC.BAT file and created a new hidden one which executed the file within the 
hidden directory before running the old AUTOEXEC.BAT. The executable file set a 
counter to 90 and each time thereafter when the machine was rebooted this count was 
decremented. When the count reached zero, the screen displayed the following 
message;
"The software lease for this computer has expired. If you wish to use 
this computer, you must renew the software lease. For further 
information turn on the printer and press return"
It then printed the following :
"If you are reading this you software lease from  PC Cyborg  
Corporation has expired. Renew the software lease before using this 
computer again. Warning do not attempt to use this computer until you 
have renewed your software lease"
It then continued to print a demand for payment : $189 for 365 uses or $378 for the 
lifetime of the hard disk. The payment to be sent to a post office box in Panama.
For the next hour the machine, after a "do not switch o ff’ message, performed a task 
which involved intensive disk activity. After which time the main directory entries had 
been encrypted and made invisible. Also, all the free disk space had been allocated as a 
hidden, indexed sequential database filled with blanks.
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Two files were also added: a visible CYBORG.DOC - a copy of the registration and a 
hidden CYBORG.EXE, a file which was executed after every DOS function call to 
inform the user that he risks losing all his files by continuing to use the machine.
To the user it appeared as if all his files had disappeared to be replaced by one file, 
CYBORG.DOC, and the disk had shrunk to the size of this file. In actual fact all the 
data remained unaffected so, if  the directory was restored, all returned to normal. As 
the original entries existed within the CYBORG.EXE file this was possible.
Over 7 000 corporations in the UK, France, West Germany, Italy and Sweden were hit 
including large institutions such as the London Stock Exchange and the British 
Ministry of Defence. It was clever and required significant expertise. It was costly : 
over $100 000 were spent before its launch. It was malicious and its sole purpose was 
to extort money from naive institutions.
1.5.1 GERMAN STRIKE VIRUS’
A German company was the victim o f a virus attack which was perpetrated by 
disgruntled employees [23], Before going on strike they introduced a virus which 
gradually slowed down the system until it ground to a complete halt. A previous 
backup was re-installed but it ground to a halt again. In the end several weeks of work 
were abandoned in order to restore the system to an uninfected state.
It should be noted that if the delay before triggering of a virus of this type is many 
months then it is likely that no backup will be uninfected, possibly leading to 
catastrophic results.
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1.5.2 DATACRIME II - MS-DOS VIRUS
Datacrime I I 133]  ^ non-resident, parasitic virus of type GCAM-GTAR. Its code is
encrypted and the decryption section contains self-modifying code. It is therefore 
difficult both to analyse and to detect. This virus differs from many new generation 
viruses in that it is far from benign in nature. It triggers if the date is later than October 
the 12th in any year. A positive result will cause a low level format of track zero. This 
destroys the Disk Boot Sector, the first copy of the FAT, and most of the second copy 
of the FAT. Thus the contents of the disk will be largely irretrievable, although in 
theory the information still exists on the drive.
1.5.3 WHALE OR MOTHERFISH : MS-DOS VIRUS
The WHALE virus Hi] is the first truly armoured virus to be found in the wild. It is 
also by far the largest assembled virus in existence, weighing in at lOK. The virus falls 
short by the fact that its detection is almost immediate, the machine slowing down by 
over 50% when the virus is active. The vast majority of the code ensures that the code 
itself is difficult to disassemble and attempts to disinform and confuse the analyst. 
WHALE uses multiple levels of encryption plus a series of anti-tamper measures. For 
example the virus implements checksumming on the BIOS data area and its own code 
to detect use of a debugger or breakpoints. If interference is detected then the virus wiU 
attempt to remove itself to prevent any analysis. In memory the virus decrypts an area it 
is about to process and recrypts the areas with which it is finished. Thus only a small 
window of the virus's code is visible in memory at any given point. This prevents 
detection by pattern matching. The virus also mutates itself into 30 possible generations 
of itself when infecting a file, as mentioned previously. The virus is a memory 
resident, parasitic virus of the GCAM-GTAR type, as it infects .COM and .EXE files 
indiscriminately and, upon triggering, merely prints messages to the screen.
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1.6 : POSSIBLE VIRUSES OF THE FUTURE
The viruses appearing now are becoming increasingly difficult to detect. It is 
reasonable to assume that most future viruses will be like this, as primitive viruses will 
be detected and removed from systems early on in their infection phase.
What may change is the reason for a virus’s existence. Current viruses seem to be 
written because they are a challenge to the writer and often the trigger is benign or non­
existent. This is likely to change : viruses will appear which have a specific and 
malevolent purpose.
1.6.0 BLACKMAIL
With the advent of the AIDS Trojan Horse H2] mentioned in the previous section we 
may have been offered a frightening but realistic insight into what is to come. Viruses 
may appear which disable or corrupt systems with the purpose of extortion, offering to 
undo damage only if some payment is made to the perpetrator. The cost o f re-installing 
a system after such an attack may be enormous and therefore victims of this form of 
attack may be forced to make the payment
1.6.1 COVERT PROCESSING
In his paper entitled " Covert Distributed Processing with Computer Viruses" H4]^  
White outlined a mechanism where viruses could be used to distribute elements of a 
problem to other systems thus covertly harnessing vast quantities of computing power, 
far in excess of that available to any single user or institution.
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Vast quantities of computing power is available collectively in the world. The problem 
is, how do we access it ? Seeking permission to use it is impossible, therefore it would 
only be available if it could be accessed covertly. The computer virus provides just 
such a mechanism : it enters a system unknown to the user and with no permission 
from the system, performing any task it has been programmed to do.
Therefore a virus could be used to hide within it an "innocuous program to spread a 
distributed computing task among many users and many computers". Thus "processes 
and information can be distributed unwittingly by users in the normal process of 
sharing other information". As with any distributed problem, the inter-communication 
of the processes generated must be considered. For a virus probably the only 
reasonable communication mechanism would be a unidirectional one from parent to 
sibling : a virus when spawning a child would pass the original problem plus any 
progress it has made on the problem, to it. As White points out this lends itself to Tree 
Structured algorithms where offsprings are generated by parents and from that point 
remain independent of each other.
If a final result is calculated the virus could mutate itself into an "Information 
Carrying" virus and propagate back, eventually reaching the author of the task. Direct 
mailing of the result is another possibility but this risks identification of the author.
Clearly there are many possible tasks this form of virus could initiate. The task 
suggested by White was a Brute-Force attack on a Cryptosystem, for example the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) encoding scheme. A virus was suggested which would 
chose random keys and test for success and also spawn other viruses which did the 
same. For DES which has a key space o f size 2*56 he calculated the time required to 
crack it to be 0.26 years given that there were approximately 10*7 possible machines to 
infect. Although this was a vast underestimate, as it assumed all machines would 
become infected and would provide exclusive use to the virus all the time, it does
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suggest the possibility o f solutions to problems which are considered largely 
unsolvable. As White points out, as the aggregate computing power in the world 
increases so might the threat of such covert operations considering that such estimates, 
as mentioned above, will become more and more realistic.
1.6.2 DATA THEFT
In much the same way as for covert processing, a virus could be made to detect and 
remove sensitive data within a remote system H5]. The virus could be set the task of 
searching the files within the area it is executing for information. If it finds the 
information then it could mutate, as before, into an information carrying virus and 
attempt to propagate back to the author, or if  it failed it could attempt further 
propagation in its original form. Thus a virus could propagate through high security 
systems in search of sensitive data.
As an example, suppose a single user machine, which is kept under lock and key 
within an office in a high security building, contains a bank code stored within a data #
file. This machine may also be running the highest of security programs to prevent 4
entry. A virus is introduced into the system in the low security area of the building ( or 
potentially another country if you can wait that long ). This virus searches for data files 
which contain the string 'bank' or 'codes' or 'secret' in the title or even more specific 
search criteria. If it finds one, it places the contents o f the file within itself and 
propagates itself back into the system. If not, it continues to infect files in an attempt to 
propagate further. If the virus succeeds then eventually the information will appear on a 
low security machine which can be detected by the author and retrieved.
Obviously there are no guarantees that this would succeed : it presupposes that the 
machine accepts outside executable files. It is however possible and the implications are 
very serious.
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1.6.3 DATA CORRUPTION
Viruses exist today which corrupt data, deleting files or whole disks. What we may 
find is that viruses become more particular about what and how they corrupt. For 
example a virus may search for a specific file type such as accounting data files and 
change every '2' to a '3' within the file. The consequences of this may be far more 
damaging than complete data destruction. The virus may go unnoticed for longer and, 
in its undetected state, the damage it causes may be severe.
1.6.4 VIRUS JUNK MAIL
A virus was planted onto the widely used CompuServe network by a company, which 
placed an advertisement on the screen on a particular date and then removed itself 
It spread by infecting the initialisation files of the Apple Macintosh. Will this happen 
again? Are we about to enter an era of virus-generated junk mail?
1.6.5 SELECTIVE VENDOR ATTACKS
Selective predators of the SCAM-STAR category may be introduced as a marketing 
tool. Software developers may write viruses which target software sold by a specific 
rival vendor. The opportunity exists for malicious developers to attack their competitors 
without leaving a trace.
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1.6.6 THE POSITIVE VIRUS
It may be possible that a vims which is benevolent in nature may appear, Cohen 
suggested the possibility before vim ses actually existed. His example was a 
'Compression Vims' which, once attached to a file, compressed the original program 
code using a lossless compression algorithm. When the program was next executed the 
vims would decompress the program before mnning it. Thus, without the knowledge 
or expertise of the user, filespace would be saved. With this particular example 
problems exist :
[1] If the amount of space saved by compression is less than the size of the 
vims then no space is saved. In fact extra space is consumed.
[2] Compression algorithms work best with images and text, not with binary 
code which is what this vims would be dealing with.
[3] Users may not regard the space saved worthwhile compared with the 
overheads of decompression with each execution : this would then cease to be a 
'positive' vims.
These problems exist only for this particular example. Although it is highly unlikely, 
maybe some application of vimses could be found which does have a positive effect
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1.7 : CURRENT ANTI-VIRUS TECHNIQUES
As the number of incidences of Computer Virus Infection’ increases, so does the 
appearance of software to detect, prevent and remove viruses.
Like the first viruses, the first 'Anti-Virus' software was primitive. The first programs 
did not prevent the virus gaining entry to the system, but removed the virus and/or 
detected its presence. These programs were largely virus specific in that they were 
written for a single virus.
Now a large amount of software exists which is both professional and extensive H?]. 
Some very professional software of this type exists in the public domain but much of it 
exists as reasonably expensive software with yearly subscriptions for updates as new 
viruses are found.
Anti-Virus protection can be split into five distinct classes HSf Anti-virus software may 
include one, some or all of these classes of protection. The five classes are :
1.7.0 SCANNING
Scanning software is designed to examine files and/or boot sectors and/or memory for 
virus signatures. A virus signature is a section o f code which exists in the virus (and is 
non-modifying) but is unlikely to appear in other programs. An example o f a virus 
signature for the MS-DOS DEVIL'S DANCE virus H9] would be : 
AD03F3A426C706000003015E1E068CC048 
This is a section of the viruses code which is long enough, and when disassembled, 
unique or at least uncommon enough for it not to appear in any uninfected program.
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There are two types o f such programs :
[i] Terminate and Stay Resident or TSR's
TSR programs are executed on boot and remain in memory scanning each file 
as they are run. This has the advantage that all programs are checked. On the 
IBM under MS-DOS this may be done by monitoring the INT 21H Function 
4BH and 3DH, which are the execute and open functions, and scanning the file 
at that point
Alternatively such programs can check each floppy disk as it is inserted, thus 
preventing infection entering the system. On the Macintosh this is easy as the 
system is event driven and disk insertion causes a ’disk_insert* event. On an 
IBM PC there is no equivalent indication of a disk insert but one way is for the 
TSR to monitor INT 13H Function 02H, which is the read sector function. If a 
request to read the boot sector is made then the IBM is making what it reckons 
to be the first access to the floppy. Checking either the boot sector or the whole 
disk for viruses at this point is possible. The reason why this is an indication 
that a disk may have been inserted, is that the IBM reads this sector on the first 
access to the floppy, to find out what format the disk is in. Checking the boot 
sector is quite reasonable but checking the whole disk is probably not. The 
reason for this is that the IBM assumes that the floppy disk may have been 
swapped in the drive if  more than two seconds has passed and therefore the 
TSR program may scan the disk many times over with significant overhead 
each time.
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In the case of the IBM, using the INT 13H Function 02H to check for boot 
sector accesses only and scanning for boot viruses, and using INT 21H 
Functions 4BH and 3DH as mentioned above to check for opening and 
execution of files and scanning accordingly, together provide the most 
reasonable solution for resident scanning t^ l^. However, in the case of the 
Macintosh, scanning the floppy when inserted provides a virus check without 
overheads on execution o f programs on the hard disk. The hard disk only has 
to be scanned once and, if all floppies are scanned on entry, no virus (which is 
scanned for) can be introduced into the system. This has clear advantages over 
the IBM but is only available to the Macintosh because, unlike the IBM PC, all 
disk inserts are recognised by the operating system.
[ii] Manual Execution
Manual execution is the most common method, requiring the user to execute the 
scanning program. When invoked, the scanner checks memory and/or boot 
sectors and/or all/some of the files stored on all/some o f the disks within the 
system. This has the disadvantage that for a system with a large volume of 
files, either one must wait for a significant period of time for all the files to be 
checked or, what is more likely, one will check only a small subset o f files and 
therefore risk missing a possible infection. It has the advantage however of 
making the user aware o f viruses and the system in general by forcing his/her 
interaction.
Under DOS this type may be executed from within the AUTOEXEC.BAT file 
to check a specific set o f files on boot : if  this includes the file 
COMMAND.COM then this will usually provide a reasonable indication as to 
whether there is an infection. Similarly for MACOS this type could be executed 
as a startup application to check the SYSTEM and FINDER files.
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EXAMPLES
[1] SAM Virus Clinic™ : Symantec Anti-Virus for Macintosh l i^]
'SAM Virus Clinic scans files on your volumes fo r  the presence of 
known viruses and reports its findings ... it also reports "irregularities" 
in your files if you so desire.
I f  your files contains a known virus SAM Virus Clinic can often repair 
the file right then and there.'
This is a standard Macintosh application which requires the user to invoke it and 
choose a file, folder or volume to be scanned. It is not a shareware product and regular 
upgrades are only available to users who pay a yearly subscription. Upgrades are 
required as new viruses appear each day and Symantec add these to the list scanned 
for.
Another piece of software in the SAM package, SAM™ Intercept, is a memory resident 
application which can be configured to scan either the system folder or whole system 
volume on startup or shutdown. It can also be configured to scan floppy disks either 
automatically on disk insert or when a key sequence is pressed on insert.
Shareware Equivalent : Disinfectant (c) John Norstad, Northwestern University
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[2] VIRSCAN : Virus Scanning Software (c) IBM, for the IBM PC, MS-DOS [^ 3]
This software package comes in three parts. The first is an executable file called 
VIRSCAN.EXE which is invoked by the user or by the AUTOEXEC.BAT file on 
startup. The second and third are data files containing virus signatures for Boot Sector 
Viruses and File Infecting Viruses (parasitic) respectively. Upon execution Virscan 
checks both itself and the signature files for modification in case a virus has corrupted 
any o f these files. If there has been no modification the program scans firstly memory, 
then the boot sector, and finally a user defined set of files.
Shareware Equivalent : F-PROT Virus detection/protection/disinfection and utilities 
(c) F. Skulason
[3] Hyper ACCESS / HyperCOPY : Combined Communications/Copy & Virus 
Scanning (c) Firefox ï^l
Hyper ACCESS is a combined communications and virus screening software package. 
As the serial transfer of files is the slowest part o f a file transfer, virus scanning can be 
achieved with little to no overhead. HyperCOPY is a combined file copy and virus 
screening package. It behaves much like DOS COPY but incorporates the same virus 
scanning mechanism as Hyper ACCES S. Used together, all software entering the 
system will be scanned.
LIMITATIONS
[1] This is a classic case of ’closing the door once the horse has bolted'. Only after a 
system is infected will a scanning program detect the problem. Also by the time you 
have received the signature to add to the scanning software you may have the virus, 
have spread it, and have had your system corrupted.
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[2] As the number of viruses increase so will scanning 'run-times'. There is a limit to 
how many patterns a scanning program can search for without the overheads becoming 
too great.
[3] As the rate of increase of the number of viruses increases, so the chance of a virus 
scanning package being up to date will decrease. The sheer number and increasing 
complexity of new viruses will swamp the scanning software authors. The work 
involved in disassembling, decrypting and understanding new viruses is already very 
time consuming and is also increasing as the viruses increase in complexity
[4] Viruses which enter the system in compressed form will not be detected by standard 
signature checking until they are decompressed Therefore scanning floppy disks 
which contain compressed files which are decompressed by an install utility onto the 
hard disk, is futile.
[5] Unless booted from a clean floppy, a scanning program may fail to detect a virus if 
it incorporates 'stealth' functions within its code. As mentioned previously, a stealth 
virus will intercept attempts to check infected areas of a file and replace them with the 
original uninfected code.
[6] Scanning packages are often configured to check the boot sector on boot by 
inserting a command into the AUTOEXEC.BAT file. If a 'stealth' boot sector virus 
exists in the boot sector the scanner will not detect the virus as it has already been 
loaded into memory and its stealth abilities activated.
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[7] Viruses exist which use the timer to choose a random insertion point during 
infection. Thus scanners which look for signatures at a fixed offset within the file are 
not capable of detecting such viruses.
[8] Effort and possibly a considerable amount of money is required for the constant 
updating of this type of software. For example, SWEEP, a virus scanning program for 
the IBM PC from Sophos Limited costs £295 + VAT per annum for monthly updates
Public domain on the other hand although free or shareware, requires someone to 
download the updates from a bulletin board each month incurring telephone costs and 
considerable effort.
[9] Viruses such as the '666 Number o f the Beast' MS-DOS virus M, which are 
memory resident, intercept the file CLOSE function. Thus a scanning program can be 
the best possible agent for the spread : a scanning program may, whilst scanning, 
OPEN and CLOSE every uninfected file on a disk and for each CLOSE the file will be 
infected, resulting in complete infection of the disk.
[10] As mentioned previously, a new generation virus such as the 1260 cannot be 
detected by a signature scan. All but thirty nine bytes are encrypted and the thirty nine 
bytes have self modifying bytes dispersed through them. Thus the longest section of 
virus code is three bytes, not enough for a signature as it would be far from unique.
[11] Viruses such as the WHALE t^ l^ virus remain virtually totally encrypted even in 
memory and are only decrypted before processing. They also recrypt with a new key 
just after processing. This makes detection unlikely even when scanning memory.
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1.7.1 VACCINES
This type of Anti-Virus software is always memory resident. Its purpose is to watch 
for 'suspicious' activity within the system. Often this type of program offer different 
levels of protection. A low level of checking offers the advantage that it will require the 
user to have little knowledge of the system : it will inform the user of activities which 
are clearly suspicious and leave the user to check for viruses as a result of the warning. 
Higher levels whilst affording greater security, may require the user to have a fair 
understanding of how the operating system works.
EXAMPLES
[1] SAM™ Intercept : Symantec Anti-Virus for Macintosh l i^]
This part of the SAM package consists of two programs. The first is a Startup Program 
which automatically launches at startup and remains in memory. Its purpose is to 
intercept suspicious activities and report them to the user. The second is a Control 
Panel Program (CDEV) which allows the user to configure the startup program for the 
machine it is running on. One of the options provided is a choice of protection level : 
Basic ; Standard ; Advanced ; or Custom. As mentioned above, as the level of 
protection increases so does the requirement that the user knows how his machine and 
operating system works. Custom actually allows the user to choose exactly which 
operations should be checked for and reported, but this requires the user to have a very 
good knowledge of MACOS.
Two other useful features are present in this software : an ability to 'Learn* operations 
that the user considers valid so that when the user repeats this action SAM does not 
report it ; and a lock function using a password so that when the CDEV is used to 
configure the program this configuration is not alterable by another user.
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[2] GateKeeper : virus monitor for the Macintosh 
GateKeeper restricts two basic classes of operations:
[1] “File” operations : Operations on information about files that contain programs.
[2] “Res” operations : Operations on the components of programs stored within files.
Within each class of operation there are three variants:
[1] “Self.” : The file being operated on is the file containing the currently
running program, *i.e. the program is operating on itself.
[2] “System” : The file being operated on is the System file.
[3] “Other.” : The file being operated on is some other file, i.e. the program isn’t
operating on itself and it isn’t operating on the System file, either.
With these two basic classes of virus operations, each of which has three variants, we 
see that there are a total of six separate operations for which GateKeeper has to watch. 
If any operation occurs which would cause modification o f a file or resource albeit to 
itself, or the system or any other executable file, then Gatekeeper will veto the 
operation and inform the user. An example message is show below :
GateKeeper has uetoed an a ttem pt by Finder to 
uiolate “Res(Sgstem)” priuileges against System. 
[ fiddResourcedNlT, 29) 1
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The reason that GateKeeper defines the three variants to its restricted operations is that 
some applications require such operations during the normal course of its execution. 
Such applications can be given privileges, much like file privileges on multi-user 
systems. For example Unstuffit, a file decompression utility requires "other" access to 
file operations in order to be able to open and manipulate the contents of files to be 
decompressed. Gatekeeper may be configured to log all suspicious occurrences and 
therefore be checked over by a system manager. A choice is also given as to whether 
the user wishes a suspicious operation to be vetoed or just notified, giving the user a 
chance to allow the operation. The former is most useful for users with little knowledge 
of the system, the latter for users with more knowledge.
[3] FluShot Plus : Memory Resident Virus Monitor for MS-DOS
This memory resident (TSR) program monitors both the expected and unorthodox 
entry points to data held on physical storage. The most obvious, and correct, method of 
accessing disk data is via the file system. FluShot monitors all File Management 
Function Calls within INT 21H for suspicious activity. Alternatively one may access 
the disk in question directly. This would not be used by a normal application as the file 
operations deal with all necessary direct disk access. FluShot monitors all direct disk 
functions within INT 26H, INT 13H and INT 40H for any action which would violate 
normal MS-DOS procedures.
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LIMITATIONS
[1] Loopholes in the system
MS-DOS, in particular, has many undocumented features and loopholes and shortcuts.
Therefore Vaccine products which monitor 'standard' software interrupts such as INT 
13H and INT 21H which relate to disk access and file access can be by-passed with 
relative ease.
The first viruses which attempt this are appearing. An example of this is the '666 
Number of the Beast' virus which, by use of an undocumented DOS feature, obtains 
the original value of the interrupt vector for INT 13H. It can then-access data on disk 
directly without a software interrupt : therefore no monitor program can detect it.
Another example are files which are opened as read only by a program. Vaccine 
programs will often allow this as no harm can be done to the file. The DOS System File 
Table (SFT) can be manipulated directly once the file is opened and the access privilege 
field altered to allow write access. This permission is then returned to read only after 
infection and the Vaccine program is none the wiser.
[2] Often perfectly acceptable operations are trapped. Programs during their normal 
course of operation may attempt operations which are similar if  not identical to 
operations which a virus would attempt. However their reasons for attempting such 
operations are legitimate. As mentioned in the review o f GateKeeper, there are 
somewhat cumbersome solutions to this problem but it involves keeping vast lists o f 
'exceptions to the rule' and careful checking that a virus doesn't attempt to enter using
one such exception. =
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1.7.2 ENCRYPTION
This type of Anti-Virus Software writes programs and/or data onto the hard disk in a 
non-standard way and reverses the process when the files are read back. Thus if a virus 
does attempt to infect a system the effect is usually a scrambling of data rendering the 
program totally inoperable. The result of this is that detection is certain l^ l^.
There are many different approaches which may be implemented on a system. One 
could encrypt every file but for viruses this is overkill. One could encrypt just the 
'executables' within the system and therefore reduce the overheads. One could go one 
step further and only encrypt files which are critical or frequently used within the 
system.
A method o f reducing the expense of encrypting a whole file is to generate a signature 
block for the file to be protected including, say, a cryptographic checksum of the whole 
executable, a password from the authoriser and a time stamp fh^i] This signature 
block is then encrypted. Upon execution the signature block would be decrypted and 
the password and time stamp checked, and the checksum recomputed. This is far less 
computationally expensive than encryption of the whole file.
Under such a system, if a virus is unable to attack a file before it is encrypted and 
cannot break the encryption algorithm then the virus cannot infect the file. If the virus 
does infect the file before encryption, and all other files are encrypted, then the virus, 
although executed when the file is executed, will not be able to propagate.
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—LIMITATIONS
[1] It is possible to get into a situation where the system is inoperable and cannot be 
repaired, either by incorrect configuring or by a small change in the encrypted data 
causing the decrypted version to be totally corrupted.
[2] Part of the System must remain non-encrypted in order to be able to decrypt files 
and part will still be vulnerable.
[3] If the file being encrypted is already infected, the program will encrypt it regardless.
[4] The cost in maintenance of such a system can be large. This type o f system is 
therefore usually reserved for highly critical systems.
[5] There are penalties on the system due to such techniques : encryption at run time 
may cause significant delay.
1.7.3 OPERATION RESTRICTION
This type of Anti-Virus Software operates in a similar manner to the Vaccine type of 
software. Unlike its Vaccine counterpart however, when it detects an illegal activity it 
will automatically prevent it. The level of restriction depends on the implementation 
and also in the generality of the restriction. Restrictions may be made which apply to aU 
programs or to a single file. Often these restrictions refer largely to operating system  
files and areas of the disk which store parameters required by that operating system.
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Many of these features are already implemented in the security shells of mainframe 
computer systems; write protection of files, access restriction and inability to modify 
system parameters.
LIMITATIONS
[1] The more versatile this type of software becomes the more time required to set it up.
[2] Low-level and non-standard operations may circumvent these checks much in the 
same way as for vaccines.
[3] A way must exist for an operator to allow certain of the prevented operations for 
upgrades and legitimate alterations to the system. This provides another gateway for a 
virus.
1.7.4 CHANGE DETECTION
This type of Anti-Virus Software monitors certain unchanging information within the 
system. This may include all or some of : system files ; certain program files ; and 
system configuration. System configuration would include information such as 
partition location and bounds, volume directories and all information used to recover 
files fi'om the volume, CMOS RAM data. Interrupt vector locations and any other data 
used by the system which is likely to come under attack [53.54]^
The most common way to detect change in key parameters within a computer system is 
to keep a copy of the values and make a comparison. This is much the same method as 
MS-DOS uses, keeping multiple copies of the FATs which detects inconsistencies and
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corruption. These saved parameters may be stored in a hopefully secure area of the 
hard disk or stored on write protected floppy disk for periodic checking. The advantage 
of this is that it will firstly detect change, and secondly you have a backup of what 
these values should be.
Simply monitoring the physical size of applications will often alert the user to probable 
infection either manually using DIR or by using a special utility 1^ 2]. More advanced 
methods use some form of checksum or cyclic redundancy check (CRC) [55^  This will 
detect changes in files, sectors or areas of memory even if the file length has not been 
altered. Cryptographic checksums are not easily reproducible and should be used if 
possible
EXAMPLES
[1] VACCINE : Anti-Virus system from Sophos Limited 1^ 71
This software package calculates cryptographic checksums for specified data and uses 
these to detect changes. VACCINE generates, under user control, these cryptographic 
'fingerprints' and stores them. DIAGNOSE, another program in the package, checks 
these fingerprints for change and this can be configured to be automatic. The items it 
can protect are specific files, sets of files, disk sectors ( both logical and physical), and 
memory ranges. It w ill detect : changes to files, appearances of new files, 
disappearance of protected files, and changes to disk sectors and/or memory ranges. 
The approximate cost o f this package is £200.
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[2] T-CELL : Protection System from Secure Transmission AB [^ 3
This set of programs have been developed to be incorporated into mainframe systems. 
Firstly, they protect themselves using a software seal. They then maintain a set of 
standard 'safe' copies of certain operating system software and utilities, which they 
compare with operational versions for change.
[3] CA-Examine : MVS Operating System Virus Protection Tool [^ 1
This operating system specific set of programs use an extensive knowledge base of the 
internal structure of MVS to protect the system. They check system libraries, memory- 
resident modules, and system modifications. They use expert system techniques to 
analyse operating system parameters in order to identify abnormalities and unauthorised 
changes.
LIMITATIONS
[1] This type of Antivirus software is reactive rather than proactive. Again it is 
'Closing the door once the horse has bolted'. A virus attack will only be detected once 
it has happened.
[2] Checksums can be cracked l^ l^. The most common method is a Brute force attack 
where one generates many different sets of data and corresponding checksums until a 
match with the original data is found. In the case of a virus, the virus appends itself to 
the code and then alters a redundant area within the virus until the checksum is that o f 
the original. For a checksum of n bits it takes ln(2)*2" mutations before one has a 50%
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”probability of success. For example for a 16 bit checksum approximately 40 000 
mutations would be necessary. Clearly the implementation would choose a number of 
bits such that a brute force attack would not be practical. Thirty two bits would be 
satisfactory. However another method exists to break checksums, the Trap Door. If a 
checksum algorithm is invertable then a Trap Door exists. A Trap Door is a short 
cut to determine a checksum, and requires far less computational effort than a brute 
force attack. Unfortunately there is no test for invertability and therefore no test to 
show that a trap door does not exist for a checksum algorithm. Therefore such 
algorithms are not as secure as one might be lead to believe.
[3] If such methods include keeping multiple copies of information, there is no reason 
to suppose that a virus won't attack both copies in a similar manner and may therefore 
destroy the effective backup that existed and also cause both sets to be identical and to 
be passed by the change detection software.
[4] Checksumming an application pre-supposes that the original was virus free.
[5] The overheads, both in computing time and operator time, are high in this type of 
system. New software must be added to the change detection system and regular 
checks must be made for system integrity, or this system is worthless.
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1.7.5 OTHER METHODS OF REDUCING THE VIRUS THREAT
There are many ways apart from pure software means, by which we may reduce the 4
threat of virus infection. The most obvious is the education of the user. If a user is well 
informed of the risk of viruses, how they are carried and spread, and the possible result 
of infection, then they may be more responsible in their actions. Training may be 
sought from many places. Information often accompanies anti-virus software 
packages, and books exist on the subject
Companies such as SOPHOS offer complete training packages including a video and 
handbook set 1581. This particular course is split into two parts : one a basic explanation 
of viruses and their effects and what users should not do ; and the other which deals 
with prevention, detection and containment which is designed for managers and 
computer specialists.
A few conferences dedicated to the treatment of viruses have occurred 137,59]^  and will 
occur in the future, which inform the more involved computer operators and system 
managers of the state of the art techniques to prevent virus entry. One such conference 
entitled 'The First International Conference on Combating Computer Viruses' hopes to 
bring the key researchers into computer viruses to explain, from practical experience, 
the current threat, possible future threat, and methods of reducing these threats.
It has been found that employees will ignore warnings about running externally 
acquired software, even if they know their job is at risk if  they are caught. It has 
therefore been suggested that large organisations which can afford it should provide a 
'Dirty PC  fil which is isolated from all others and is used solely for employees to run 
demonstration software, games and shareware. This solution therefore allows the
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employees the opportunity at no risk and they are less likely to run them on forbidden 
machines. Also shareware or demonstration disks may be run which may be work 
related but would otherwise have been forbidden to the user.
Many consider that legislation should prevent the publication and distribution of 
material which is of use to a potential virus writer. Examples include the book 
'Computer Viruses : A High-Tech Disease' by Ralf Burger which contains the 
source code of several viruses, and a German software package called 'Virus 
Constructor Set' which includes a menu driven piece of software which will generate 
custom viruses with no expertise required by the user.
1.8 : VIRUSES AND MAINFRAMES
Although the vast majority o f computer viruses reported to date exist on personal 
computers, the threat to mainframes still exists. Cohen [36] illustrated the threat of 
computer viruses on mainframes back in 1984 where he introduced one into a VAX  
system running UNIX. The less consideration we give to the possibility of mainframe 
infection, the more the likelihood that such viruses will manifest themselves.
Cohen [231 also demonstrated a virus written in UNIX - C which consisted of 200 lines 
of code and made no use of any implementation lapses within the system. It took him 8 
hours to write it and it took only half a second for each infection and an average of 30 
minutes to take over the whole system.
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VIRUS PREVENTION
The Anti-Viral techniques covered in the previous section all apply here. One extra 
technique which significantly reduces the chance of virus spread throughout a 
mainframe system is Access Control Software.
Access Control Software often exists in such systems for other reasons. Since this type 
of software restricts access to critical programs, and thus prevents modifications, 
infection is not possible unless the virus exists at a high level of access. Thus users 
who have only Low Level access to a system may introduce a virus but the propagation 
will be severely limited.
Clearly users such as System Administrators who enter the system at a High Level of 
access could introduce a virus which could spread unbounded within the system. Also 
they could execute software which was introduced at a low level and allow it access to 
the higher level. These users must therefore be chosen carefully.
New software which enters such a system should be given only restricted access to 
High Level programs and should be monitored carefully for a 'trial' period before 
permanent inclusion to the system. However, even if  an administrator is careful, 
protection exists only at a software level, and viruses can and will find routes of 
infection.
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1.9 : ROGUE PROGRAMS
There are other types o f 'rogue' program which inflict themselves on the computing 
community [21,61] ^nd these will also be considered within the scope of this work. 
These include:
1.9.0 TROJAN HORSES
A Trojan Horse is a program which purports to do one thing but does something 
entirely different [G. Data destruction is the usual 'purpose' of these programs. 
Examples of these include :
DANCERS.BAS An MS-DOS Trojan
Displays dancers animated on the display whilst destroying the 
FAT tables , thus rendering the computer inoperable with total 
loss of data (recovery programs possible).
DISCSCAN.EXE An MS-DOS Trojan
Claims to scan the disk for bad sectors - Actually it writes them!
Part of the trouble with these is that it takes little expertise to write one : it takes little 
effort to write a program to format the hard disk, then all that is required is to think of 
an interesting name for it. Its ability to spread is more limited however as the source of 
the trojan is usually more obvious than a virus, so the author must take elaborate steps 
to inject it anonymously. Also a new piece of software is usually tried out, and 
therefore discovered, before it is further distributed. This is especially true of public 
domain libraries which test submitted software, albeit not all that thoroughly in some 
cases, before making it available to the public. More complex trojans may have a 
trigger mechanism much the same as a virus and this may make the application seem to 
function correctly for a period of time during which further distribution may take place. 
See section 1.5,0 for a case study of a very clever trojan.
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1.9.1 WORMS
Worms are self replicating, self-propagating programs which are complete in 
themselves. Unlike viruses they don't require a program to attach themselves to in 
order to reproduce. These usually replicate over a network.
The most infamous example of a worm is the 'Internet WORM' [62,63,64]^  This worm 
was written by a graduate student in computer science from Cornell and on November 
the 2nd 1988 he injected it into the Internet network. In a matter of hours it had invaded 
over 6,000 machines the length and breadth of the United States. Neither data 
corruption nor destruction was its aim but its effect was to cause many machines to 
have to be disconnected from the network or shut down, and thus many hours of 
computing time were lost.
The worm exploited a set of fairly well known loopholes in the systems it attacked. 
Firstly it used a debug option on the mail system which allowed it to execute 
commands on the remote machine. The commands it sent were a bootstrap to copy the 
worms main binary files onto the remote system and then link them with the local 
libraries and load them. Once loaded the worm gathered system information as to 
which hosts were connected. Further propagation was then attempted. Three possible 
routes were used :
[1] Remote Shell : certain hosts can have trusted user status where connection to 
a host requires no password. If the worm found this it executed a remote shell.
[2] Remote Finger : it is possible to overflow the buffer of this utility and 
overwrite the stack, thus modifying the flow of control back into the stack 
where the worm had placed another bootstrap.
[3] Mail : as described earlier.
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Then the worm attempted to break into local accounts on the machine in one of three 
ways :
[1] check password file for usernames with no password and break in
[2] crack the passwords with a series of possibilities such as the user's first name, 
last name, account name typed twice, account name typed backwards, etc ...
[3] encrypt each word in the dictionary and attempt a match with the encrypted 
passwords in the password file.
If a break was successful then again the worm searched for remote connections 
possible from the account and attempted to propagate.
This worm was benign in many respects but the potential for harm was enormous. It 
served to point out the vulnerability of computer systems, especially on a network.
1.9.2 MAGIC COOKIES
Magic Cookies are sections o f code imbedded into applications by the programmer 
which are not self replicating. Their purpose is not usually harmful : often these are just 
messages which appear if  a certain key sequence is entered. The potential however for 
these to do harm is there : It was reported by the German Press Agency (dpa) on 
January the 11th 1991 1^ 5] that French computer scientists were reputed to have 
implanted code within war associated electronic systems to : "provoke, after some 
time, faults and 'profitable repair work' ". Code also existed within these systems
62
which could be triggered remotely so that, for example, French built EXOCET missiles 
could be switched off from French ships. Given that this release was during the much 
publicised 'Gulf Crisis' this information may be considered as fairly suspect and the 
claims exaggerated and unlikely. They are however plausible and should be considered 
as a distinct threat as there is self confessed research into such electronic warfare (EW) 
currently under way l^ l^.
1.9.3 TEXT FILE BOMBS
It is often quoted that viruses cannot be transferred via data files This is true but it 
should be mentioned that, although this is the case, there is scope for mischief in this 
area. Often a word-processor data file may contain certain escape sequences which, 
when interpreted by the word-processor, will cause bytes from the file to be read as 
commands and executed or may redefine the keyboard. The result may be alteration of 
the data within the file, corruption of the system, or redefinition of a key to, for 
example, reformat the disk. The ability to replicate is highly unlikely, although this 
would in theory depend on the application in question : most applications will 
'interpret' these sequences as a distinct subset o f possible commands. It would be 
unlikely that any application would be written such that it would load 'real' executable 
code from a data file.
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1.9.4 LOGIC BOMB
A Logic Bomb is a section of code, embedded within a program, often inserted by 
individuals who are attempting an attack on specific individuals or institutions. A 
program containing a logic bomb will operate perfectly normally until some specific 
pre-specified condition is met. At that point instead of normal operation, the program 
will execute the embedded 'bomb' code.
A classic example of this occurred in 1985 when a programmer working for an 
insurance company placed code within his company's pay-roll processing program. 
This logic bomb checked for the existence of his pay-roll number and if this number 
was absent for two consecutive pay-roll calculations then the bomb triggered. On the 
21st September, two months after his dismissal, approximately 150 000 client records 
were destroyed.
Time bombs are a specific case of logic bomb which trigger on a time based event. It 
may activate on Christmas day with a Yuletide message or format the hard disk on 
April the first. Alternatively it may simply wait a month from its activation before 
performing a task, making it more difficult to trace the culprit.
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11.10 : SUMMARY
A Virus, unlike many forms of attack has a tremendous range. A typical IBM PC based 
virus spreads to hundreds of unconnected machines in a matter of weeks. In a well- 
connected network, spread can be more of the order of thousands of machines in a 
matter of hours. In a timeshare environment experiments have shown that a typical time 
to attain all privileges of all users would be a mere thirty minutes.
Viruses will persist indefinitely : a virus may appear to disappear from the computing 
community only to reappear as it is downloaded from a backup, maybe years later.
As the route a virus takes between the initial infection and any giyen instant may be 
complex and lengthy, tracing its source is not normally possible.
The potential threat of a wide-spread computer virus has been much theorised. Most 
concur that the potential damage to government, financial, business, and academic 
institutions is extreme [68,69.70]
As Anti-Virus software appears in the marketplace, so do more and more complex and 
sophisticated viruses. As a loophole is plugged, so another one appears. It is open war 
between the two and as each new virus which bypasses security appears, we are 
vulnerable to attack, until such times as the Anti-Virus software is updated.
The 'sting in the tail* of a virus, the code the trigger mechanism executes, could, and 
will be, wide and varied. Current virus writers have concentrated on the propagation 
and stealth capabilities o f their viruses but as these reach a relative peak of 
sophistication, we may find their attention moving to the code which is called upon
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triggering. This could vary from total destruction to the more alarming subtle alteration 
which could be equally destructive but much harder to detect. As mentioned above, the 
threat of theft, blackmail, and covert processing also exist.
The effect of computer viruses is already becoming apparent. As fear grows we are 
seeing a rapid movement towards isolationist systems. System managers and 
individuals alike are afraid o f free exchange o f computer data which will inevitably 
slow progress in the computing field. As 'fortress mentality' sets in we may also see 
the decline and eventual removal of Bulletin Boards as demand for such software 
plummets.
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CHAPTER 2
A METHOD FOR 
GUARANTEEING CONTAINMENT 
AND PROBABLE DETECTION 
OF COMPUTER VIRUSES
2.0 INTRODUCTION
Presented within this work is a unique hardware solution to the problem of computer 
virus infection. The design philosophy behind this solution is largely encompassed 
within the following statements : Firstly, a series of partitions is set up together with a 
series of well defined rules for transfer between these partitions. Thereafter, any 
attempts to violate these rules are detected and prohibited. Moreover the schema is 
wholly independent of the contents of the partitioned areas.
System Integrity has always been of primary importance in a computing system. Many 
systems incorporate measures to ensure users may only have access to data and the 
ability to invoke operations if certain well defined criteria are met, thus ensuring that the 
system's integrity remains secure. However, with the advent o f computer viruses and 
other hostile programs, such systems have failed to provide sufficient system  
protection.
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An example of this would be the file access privileges in the UNIX operating system. 
This system prevents a user from corrupting system files. However if a virus that has 
been introduced into a system at a minimum security level is executed by an 
unsuspecting user with high security access, the virus may corrupt, using all the 
privileges of the high security level access.
Due to the inadequacy of existing security mechanisms, many security systems 
dedicated to virus detection appeared. Such systems also prove to be inadequate as they 
are not only expensive to maintain, but fail to provide a lock-tight solution. Examples 
of such systems were discussed in Chapter 1.
These short-comings arise because it is not possible to isolate the anti-virus program 
from the virus. As long as both programs execute on the same microprocessor, it is 
possible for the virus to circumvent, corrupt or destroy its counterpart. It is a war with 
neither side having a real advantage.
Presented in this chapter is both method and apparatus for prevention against 
corruption, or destruction of data within a computer system, by computer viruses or 
other hostile programs. The method explained below will guarantee system integrity 
and virus containment for a given system given that certain basic criteria are met. This 
method will require little user intervention or discipline : it is intended that this method 
be largely transparent to the user. This method will require no hardware modification of 
the computer or the hard disk, nor software modification of the computer’s operating 
system. No apriori knowledge of a given virus will be required : this method will be 
sufficient not only for existing viruses but also all future viruses.
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The method used will inhibit the propagation of viruses by controlling the operations 
which can be performed on particular data or classes of data. This will be implemented 
by monitoring all read, write and format operations which are to be performed on data 
on the storage medium of the computer system. Any operation which is considered 
suspect will be prevented, and if necessary the machine rendered inoperable until a 
system manager has inspected it. The method is implemented in such a way that both 
the testing and control o f operations are made outwith the virus's reach. In the 
preferred implementation of this method, testing and control takes place on a dedicated 
processor placed between the computer system and its storage medium. As the physical 
access the computer system has on the extra processor is limited, corruption of the 
method cannot take place from the computer system and, as the virus executes on the 
computer system, it therefore cannot corrupt the method. Since the method relies on the 
supervision of operations between system and storage, it will hereafter be referred to as 
the 'Supervisor'.
The Supervisor will render certain data 'Read Only' so that no corruption is possible. 
System files, System parameters, and boot code are protected in this manner. Programs 
introduced into the system which are not self-modifying may also be protected in this 
manner. The remaining data within the system will be divided such that if  a virus is 
introduced, it is contained and the damage it can cause is severely limited. Detection of 
the virus is also extremely likely. Containment is made possible as most modern 
operating systems facilitate the partitioning of storage devices. The Supervisor will 
guarantee to keep partitions distinct so that viruses may not spread across partition 
boundaries. Therefore a partition which is virus free and has no infected programs 
introduced into it from an external source, cannot become infected however rife 
infection is within another partition on the same medium.
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2.1 THE METHOD
2.1.0 GENERAL OVERVIEW
Firstly the storage medium is divided into a plurality of non-overlapping partitions. 
Most operating systems, including MS-DOS, provide such a facility as standard. The 
first partition is the Boot partition, and the remaining General partitions. The sectors 
within each partition are then divided into two segments : those which contain operating 
system information and those which will eventually contain user-generated 
information.
The machine may be powered up in one of two possible modes : one requiring a 
password before entry, known as Unsupervised Mode ; and the default. Supervised 
Mode. During normal operation of the machine, a user would enter Supervised Mode, 
Unsupervised Mode being used only when the system requires modification.
In Supervised Mode the Boot partition is designated as 'Read Only' and should 
encompass all operating system files and boot code. The information stored within this 
partition will always be accessible, for reading only, when the machine is booted. Any 
attempt to write to this partition, including alteration to the partition's size, w ill be 
denied.
In Supervised Mode Low level formatting of the storage device will be denied.
In Supervised Mode the user shall decide on one partition which he requires after the 
machine has booted. This can be implemented either by the user choosing a partition 
from a menu when the BIOS for the storage device is executed, or by automatically 
designating the first partition the user accesses after booting.
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The partition which is made available to the user is referred to as the Active partition. 
The user is granted Read and Write privileges to the user sectors of this partition and 
Restricted Read and Write privileges to the Operating System sectors. Certain 
Operating System sectors may never be altered, such as the sectors which contain 
partition bound information.
A user, for a single session with a computer system protected by such a Supervisor, 
will therefore have access to two partitions : the Boot partition from which the user may 
read, and a single General partition of his choice, called the Active partition, to which 
the user may read or write. A session with a computer system is defined here as the 
time from boot to shutdown /  power down of the machine. It is necessary that the 
Active partition not be changed during a session as a virus may be active in memory 
and then inter-partition propagation could occur. Only if memory is cleared and the 
operating system re-installed from the virus-free software in the Boot partition, is the 
system safe for the allocation of an Active partition.
Any attempt to read from the user sectors of a non-active General partition will be 
denied. The reason for this is that a 'Read' implies a possible 'Execute' and this would 
allow a virus from a non-active partition to be activated. Any attempt to write to sectors 
within a non-active General partition is denied as this would allow the copying of 
infected programs across partition boundaries.
Tiiis schema provides a virus independent solution. It does not operate at a file level, 
nor does it require knowledge as to the content of the files stored within the system. 
Instead the locations from, and to which, data may be transferred and accessed are 
monitored and controlled. A virus placed within a system is guaranteed to be fully 
contained within the General partition into which it was initially introduced. It can be
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further guaranteed that no boot sector viruses may infect a device secured by this 
method. The operating system files and all other files stored within the Boot partition 
are also guaranteed virus free, provided they were virus free when introduced into the 
system. Virus detection is also likely, as a virus would normally attempt to infect files 
within the boot partition, and other partitions in general. When such an attempt is made 
it is denied, the machine rebooted, and a message displayed. The machine may also be 
rendered inoperable until a system manager reactivates it.
2.1.1 THE UNSUPERVISED USER
Supervised Mode relies on having a fully configured system which will require no 
future upgrading or alteration. A mechanism must exist within the schema to allow the 
system to be configured, including defining partition boundaries and formatting 
partitions. Software, including the operating system, must be installed within the Boot 
partition and periodically updated. To facilitate this a mechanism is implemented by 
which a single user may enter what is to be called Unsupervised Mode.
I
In Unsupervised Mode the Supervisor permits all operations, rendering it transparent to ^
the system. In this mode no virus protection exists. The user must be trusted and 
relatively experienced in the dangers of viruses. Software introduced into the Boot 
partition must be copied from shrink wrapped source disks. No software should be 
executed unless absolutely necessary (eg FDISK). If program execution is required, 
only executable files within the Boot partition or clean master disk should be used.
Executable files within General partitions are not guaranteed virus free and should 
never be executed in Unsupervised Mode.
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As such a mode provides a potential route of infection, it is password protected. This 
password should only be divested to system managers whose job it is to maintain the 
system in question. The password is passed before the operating system is loaded and 
therefore no virus may be active to intercept it. The password is stored on an area of the 
storage medium where it is inaccessible even in Unsupervised Mode.
2.1.2 CHOOSING THE ACTIVE PARTITION
Two different possibilities exist for possible mechanisms in determining which General 
partition to make active. Both methods are valid, so the choice as to which method is 
used is a matter of preference only.
[1] Explicit Choice
This method relies on the user making a determined choice before the system boots. 
This would preferably be implemented as a menu to facilitate a quick choice from all 
possibilities. Configuration of this menu in the form of a text field for each partition 
may be desired, giving the user an indication of the partition's contents.
The advantage of this method is that the user is conscious of the choice. However, only 
the text field indicates the contents of the partition and if the choice is incorrect a reboot 
is required.
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[2] Implicit Choice
This method is simple to implement : the first Read or Write operation to a General 
partition which would cause a violation if the partition was not active, and yet would be 
permitted if the partition was active, causes activation if no active partition already 
exists. Thus if a user selects a partition and executes an application then the partition is 
made active implicitly before the application is launched. This may be announced by a 
message to the screen.
The advantages of this are that firstly, it is simple to implement and secondly, as 
reading from system sectors of a non-active partition is allowed, the user may browse 
the root directory of all partitions before making his choice and committing himself to 
one specific partition. However, this method may not be as intuitive to users as the 
explicit method, and may lead to a certain amount of confusion. It would be a matter of 
market research as to which is the better choice.
2.1.3 REACTING TO OPERATION VIOLATIONS
The reaction the Supervisor may have to any given violation may vary. The possible 
actions include : warning ; reboot and warning ; and reboot, warning and disablement. 
The obvious way to decide on an action is to consider the operation type: whether it is a 
Read, Write or (low level) Format operation. It is possible, and may be desirable, to 
break these operations down further into groups, such as considering a Write violation 
to the Boot partition as being separate from that of a Write violation to a non active 
General partition. Again, within the existing hardware, the choice could be market 
directed.
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iCHAPTER 3 
IMPLEMENTING THE VIRUS SCHEMA
The chosen implementation was designed to operate on an IBM - AT, or true 
compatible, running the MS-DOS operating system. The reason for the choice is that 
this type of machine is by far the most prolific personal computer in the business 
world. This implementation will therefore provide security to the singularly largest 
group of potential users. This type of machine is also the one most under attack. To 
date there are over four hundred MS-DOS viruses recorded, with the number 
increasing at the rate of one per day.
The Apple Macintosh running MACOS would have been another possibility. These 
machines are however less numerous, as are corresponding MAC viruses, in the 
business world.
Mainframe machines running multi-user operating systems such as UNIX or VMS 
would have been a further possibility. Viruses are far less prolific on these machines to 
date, however they should not be ignored. It is also important to choose an 
implementation which will clearly exemplify the method without excess complication. 
A mainframe solution would be possible but the solution would be more complex to 
implement and the end product no better at proving the validity of the method. Such 
operating systems are also implemented on many different platforms and therefore a 
different implementation must be found for each, although the philosophy would be the 
same as described in this thesis.
The method outlined is general to any operating system which supports hard disk 
partitioning.
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3.0 HARDWARE
The prototype was implemented as a hard disk adapter card for an IBM AT running 
MS-DOS version 3,3 or later. The card contains both the Supervisor and a Small 
Computer Systems Interface for a hard disk (SCSI). The hardware was designed so 
that access to the SCSI interface is only possible with the Supervisor's prior 
permission. Figure 3.0 contains a block diagram which illustrates the function of this 
card.
PORTMAPPED'
IBMAdapterCard
SCSI Hard Disk
  SCSI Bus
SCSIController
Processor
liiiii.  ..
PARTIALLY PORT MAPPED Access Controlled by Processor
IBM I/O CHANNEL
Figure 3.0 : Block Diagram of the Prototype Implementation
3.0.0 IMPLEMENTATION
VERSION 1
This version was designed using purely discrete logic and 'standard' components. It 
was further designed such that the level of access restriction between the computer and 
the disk was fully configurable by a series of jumper settings. For full circuit diagrams 
see the appendices.
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Elements of the Design include :
[1] The Z80 Subsystem
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Figure 3,1 : The Z80 Subsystem
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A standard Zilog Z80B was used as the essential dedicated microprocessor which is 
remote from, and cannot be controlled by, any virus. Clearly the choice of processor 
for any implementation depends on the required performance. For a prototype, the Z80 
is ideal : it is simple both to design with, and to program. Since performance at this 
research level was not of great importance, the Z80 was ideal. It should be noted that i'•f
20MHz Z80 processors now exist, with 16 bit data buses and enhanced instruction i
sets, so an upgrade path does exist
An 8K Byte Read Only Memory (ROM) was used, since the BIOS could potentially 
require considerable code space. As the requirement for Random Access Memory 
(RAM) was not well known at the early development stage an 8K Byte Static RAM 
(SRAM) was made available.
The memory decoding is simple because the memory map consists of the RAM and 
ROM only. The ROM is placed in the lowest 8K Bytes in the memoiy map as required 
by the Z80, since it begins execution at location OOOOH on power up. The RAM is 
placed in the upper half of the address space, in the 8K Byte block beginning at 
8000H.
The sockets are wired so that either or both the RAM or ROM may be replaced by 16K 
Byte versions with no hardware modification. The ROM would exist with its base at 
(XX)OH, and the RAM with its base at 8(XX)H, as before.
[2] The SCSI Interface
The NCR 5380 SCSI Controller provides the hardware required in order to access and 
control a SCSI hard disk drive. Although an early generation controller, it is both tried
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and tested. It provides the possibility of 1.5 megabytes per second data transfer rate, 
although this is heavily dependent on the computer system to which it is attached. 
When measuring system performance however, operating system overheads, reduce 
this rate considerably.
SCSI Data Bus
SCSIControls
DO 1* \-- / 40
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!DB6 3 38
!DB5 4 NCR 37! DB4 5 5380 36
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Figure 3.2 : The NCR 5380 SCSI Interface Chip
The chip itself provides an eight bit, bi-directional data bus used during data transfer, 
and in configuring the chip's internal registers. It uses three lines to address the internal 
registers and control lines to facilitate both Programmed I/O and DMA transfers. The 
chip, when operating, produces all necessary signals via dedicated control and data 
pins, to communicate with a device using the SCSI protocol, as defined by the ANSI 
X3T9.2 Committee.
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The chip is controlled by reading and writing several internal registers. Depending on 
how this chip is configured it may take on either an initiator or a target role. It is also 
capable o f generating an interrupt to indicate either a task completion or an abnormal 
bus occurrence. Full arbitration is also supported, facilitating the implementation of a 
multiple initiator system, if required.
This chip provides the possibility of data transfer between SCSI bus devices on one of 
four modes :
[1] Programmed VO
This is  the most primitive form of transfer provided. The SCSI handshake signals 
( REQ and ACK ) are monitored and asserted by accessing the appropriate bits within 
the internal registers of the chip.
Basic handshaking is implemented via these signals. For example during a Write 
sequence, the initiator loads a byte into the Output Data Register, and waits for the REQ 
signal to become active by monitoring the REQ bit of the internal STATUS register. 
When this occurs, the initiator activates the ACK by setting the ASSERT/ACK bit in 
the INITIATOR COMMAND internal register. The initiator then waits for REQ to 
become false, at which time it resets ASSERT /ACK. This sequence is repeated for 
each byte transferred.
This type of transfer is usually reserved for the transferring of small volumes of data 
such as command blocks, message bytes, or status bytes as it is very slow.
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[2J Normal DMA
In this mode the chip outputs a DMA request via the external pin DRQ whenever it is 
ready for a byte transfer. Hardware is required both to identify such a request, and to 
reply via the external pin DACK. DRQ becomes inactive some time after DACK is 
asserted and the resetting of DACK must follow after that.
This mode is normally used for transferring large volumes of data.
[3] Block Mode DMA
This mode is similar to Normal DMA mode except that it allows an external DMA 
device to perform DMA transfer without relinquishing the data bus to the CPU. This 
provides no better a handshake mechanism, but, as the DMA controller has full control 
of the bus, the DMA data transfer rate does increase.
[4] Pseudo DMA
This mode is not technically a separate mode implemented within the chip, rather it is a 
technique that may be used to interface the chip to a microprocessor. The chip is 
programmed to transfer using the Normal DMA mode, but instead of using a DMA 
controller the microprocessor emulates the DMA handshake. Hardware is required to I
allow the microprocessor to monitor DRQ and generate DACK as required.
Implemented correctly, this mode will provide significant increase in performance over 
Programmed I/O, without the requirement of a DMA controller. In some computer 
systems this method may in fact prove to be faster than true DMA.
To summarise, this chip provides all that is required to communicate with any 
asynchronous SCSI bus device, provided a transfer rate above 1.5 Megabytes per 
second is not required.
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[3] IBM ROM BIOS
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+5v
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IBM
Address
Bus
y  1—1 IBM\ I M E M R
Figure 3.3 : Memory Mapped IBM BIOS ROM
A replacement section of the IBM's BIOS is required to override the existing INT 13H 
software Interrupt which provides all low level hard disk services. This requires the 
inclusion of an 8K byte ROM in the design, memory mapped into the IBM beginning at 
either address C8000 or CAOOO. In the present design the choice of address is effected 
by a jumper on the board.
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[4] Passing Control of SCSI Between the Supervisor and the IBM
Data Input 1 = IBM 0 = Z80
Z80 Port Mapped
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IBMDataBus
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Figure 3.4 : Control Switchover Logic
With the use of two D-Type flip-flops, one must guarantee that during the changeover 
of control, the Supervisor and the IBM are never both in control at once, even for an 
instant, as this would cause a system crash. The logic required for this is illustrated in 
figure 3.4, and the associated timing diagram is given in figure 3.5.
Data
Input Pulse
!PR(1)
Q(l)-Z80
!PR(2)
Q(2)-IBM
Control Control
Control
Figure 3.5 : Timing Diagram for Control Switchover Logic
This ensures that there will be no data bus or address bus clashes, nor any unexpected 
values generated on any o f the SCSI control lines.
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[5] Control of the Data Bus
The use of bus transceivers 74F245 allows for either the Supervisor or the IBM to 
access the SCSI controller. The control switchover logic decides which transceiver is 
enabled, and decoding of the read signal of the active processor decides the direction of 
data flow.
[6] Control of the Address Bus
IBMinControl
!EN-
SCSI Bus 
AO A1 A2
rn\ Li /r n !EN
Z80inControf
AO A1 A2 
IBM Bus
AO 
Z80 Bus
A1 A2
Figure 3.6 : Address Bus Multiplexing
A single 74LS244 octal buffer chip provides all the necessary logic to allow either the 
Supervisor or the IBM access to the address lines o f the SCSI controller, depending on 
which is in control, see figure 3.6.
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[7] IBM to SCSI Internal Register Access Logic
As naentioned previously, this card was designed such that any combination of internal 
registers could be made accessible to the IBM. This logic provides the required 
hardware mechanism. 74LS138, 3 to 8 decoder, chips generate a separate signal for 
each of the eight possible addresses from the values present in the lowest three bits of 
the IBM address bus. Read and Write attempts to the internal registers are differentiated 
by using two separate decoder chips. The remaining IBM address bits are used to map 
the internal registers into the IBM port space in either the range 300H - 307H or 320H - 
327H depending on the setting of another hardware jumper.
SCSI !CS
Z80 Generate Chip Select 0 = true IBM nowIBM !IOR
ReadPermissionLinks
WritePermis:LinksA9ASA7A6
D>£!AEN- !EN !EN EN A2 Al AO!EN !EN EN A2 Al AD
A5
A4 A2 Al AOA3IBM Address BusA2 A1 AO IBM Address Bus
A3Z80 in Control 1 = true
Figure 3.7 : IBM to SCSI Internal Access Logic
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If the IBM has control ( see part [4], 'Passing Control of SCSI Between the Supervisor 
and the IBM'), the upper address bits indicate the correct port range and a port Read or 
Write operation is attempted, then one o f the outputs of one of the decoder chips 
becomes active. If this output has a connecting jumper then the signal propagates 
through the remaining logic and activates the required control lines on the SCSI 
controller. If, however, the jumper is connected to five volts, and not the output of the 
decoder, then the signal proceeds no further and the desired operation is not performed 
on the SCSI controller. Thus any internal register may be made accessible or denied to 
the IBM by configurable hardware means.
[8] IBM to SCSI Pseudo DMA Implementation
+5v
PR
SCSI DRQ-
SCSI !DACKCLBMRQ 1 = true
~ 0 /c y > — IBM !I/0 CH RDYIBM !IOR IBM now
Figure 3.8 : IBM to SCSI Pseudo DMA Logic
This circuitry provides all the necessary hardware for data transfer between the IBM 
and the SCSI controller using Pseudo DMA.
94
It operates as follows :
[i] The SCSI controller is configured for DMA and transfer started ;
[ii] The controller either requests a byte or indicates a byte is available activating
the DRQ line (active high) ;
[iii] The IBM either requests a byte or indicates a byte is available by activating the
IBMRQ line (active high) ;
[iv] A byte is transferred.
If [ii] comes before [iii] then when IBMRQ becomes active it causes a rising edge on 
the CLK input of the flip-flop and the Q bar' output goes low. This in turn activates 
the DACK pin of the controller. When the controller registers the activation of DACK it 
causes DRQ to become inactive, then, when IBMRQ becomes inactive at the end of the 
read or write cycle of the IBM, it clears the flip-flop and DACK becomes inactive, thus 
completing the handshake.
If [iii] comes before [ii] then when IBMRQ becomes active, no rising edge is generated 
on the CLK input o f the flip-flop and therefore DACK remains inactive. Instead 
I/O CH RDY is activated, suspending the IBM’s operation. When DRQ finally 
becomes active, the rising edge is generated on the CLK input of the flip-flop, DACK 
is made active, and I/O CH RDY is inactivated. Operation then proceeds as normal.
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[9] IBM to Supervisor Communication
A single eight bit latch (74LS373) is used as a communications mechanism from the 
IBM to the Supervisor. The latch is placed in the IBM's port space at either 309H or 
329H. When the IBM writes to it the value is stored and a flip-flop is set. The latch 
output is placed in the Supervisor's port space, and when the Supervisor reads it the 
flip-flop is reset. This flip-flop acts as a flag to indicate the state of the latch to both 
systems. The Supervisor may read this flag to see if a byte has been sent by the IBM, 
and the IBM may read this flag to see if the Supervisor has read the last byte it sent. 
The flag output is also, therefore, mapped into both the IBM and the Supervisor port 
space.
[10] Supervisor to IBM Communication
Status information may be passed to the IBM from the Supervisor using a latch similar 
to that mentioned in the previous paragraph ([9]). Only six of the bits of the latch are 
used so that two are spare for other status generated on the board. One of these spare 
bits is used to represent the value o f the flag mentioned in [9] and the other remains 
unconnected but was used in development to monitor various signals within the 
system. A flag is not required for this communication because the IBM could always, if 
necessary, write to the latch in [9] to inform the Supervisor that it had read this latch.
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BUILDING AND TESTING
The card was built in distinct sections, and at each stage the operation of the hardware 
was tested. This modular approach simplifies error detection as faults will lie either in 
the newest, untested section, or in the interface between it and other tested sections. 
During the construction of each section, each wire was checked with a continuity meter 
after wrapping in order to reduce the chance o f errors due to loose or incorrect 
connections.
STAGE 1 : Standard SCSI Interface Card
The circuitry involving the interfacing between the IBM and the SCSI controller was 
constructed first. The Changeover control logic was hardwired so that the IBM was in 
permanent control. Firstly this section was built and the connections verified. Next a 
ROM was placed in the IBM BIOS socket which was programmed to write purely a 
message to the screen on boot. When the message appeared, it indicated that the ROM 
was correctly mapped into the memory map of the IBM and that all address, data and 
control lines to and from it were correct
Next, all chips in that section were inserted, together with an INT 13H BIOS ROM 
configured to the hardware implementation. When the machine booted successfully, 
with the card inserted and attached to a disk, and allowed the disk to be accessed, it 
meant that this section was working correctly.
Lastly, a .BAT batch file was written which repeatedly made copies of a set of files and 
deleted the originals. This was then executed and allowed to run for many hours. After 
thousands of copies, no error was detected by the operating system and the files were 
entirely uncorrupted. Hence not only was the section working, but also no intermittent 
errors existed which could be caused by a timing problem or loose connection.
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STAGE 2 ; The Z80 Subsystem
This section was built in quite small distinct sections, so each could be tested 
separately.
Firstly all address, control and data lines between the Z80, RAM and ROM, including 
memory decoding and system clock generation were wired.
The simple code shown in Figure 3.9 was used to test whether this section was 
working correctly. The code repeatedly writes the value A5H into an area of the RAM, 
and reads these values back. If this works, then the Z80 is executing the program from 
ROM correctly and by default is itself functioning correctly. If A5H is read back then 
the RAM is also being written to and read from correctly.
;Z80 test program [1] RAM/ROM
rambase equ OEOOOh
org OOOOh ensures ROM starts at OOOOhstart Id a,0A5h load A5h into accumulatorId hi, rambase load base of RAM into reg pair HLloop Id (hi),a write out to address in HLId a,(hi) read back valueinc hi increment addressjr nz,loop repeat until top of RAM reachedjr start repeat forever
end start
Figure 3.9 : Z80 RAM/ROM Test Program
A Logic Analyser is used to monitor firstly the control lines to check for enabling o f  
both RAM and ROM, and then the data bus during both Read and Write cyles of the 
Z80, checking for A5H. As a last check, the value A5H is replaced first with OOH, then 
FFH to check all bits on the data bus can be driven both high and low. This checks that 
all bits are 'mobile', ie no stray connections exist to fix a data line's value.
98
Then the two latches used for ÏBM-Z80 communication, together with all the associated 
decoding logic and the status flag were wired up. It was important to check that both 
latches were being written to and read from correctly and that the status flag worked 
correctly for the IBM to Z80 latch. To facilitate this, the code in Figure 3.10 was 
generated for the Z80 ROM.
;Z80 test program [2] Z80-IBM
IBMDataR equ OShIBMStatR equ 09hPathChW equ 08hStatus# equ 09h
Z80Path equ 00000000bIBMPath equ 00000001bStatMask equ 00000001b
org OOOOh
start in a,(IBMDataR) ; Clear status flagId a,OOOOh ; set status reg toout (Status#),aagain in a,(IBMStatR) ; Get Statusin a,(IBMDataR) ; Read Dataout (Status#),a ; Send Back to IBM
jP again
end start
Figure 3.10 : 2^0-IBM Port Communication Test Program
This code reads a value written by the IBM to the 'input' latch and writes it back to the 
'output' latch where the IBM can then read it. If the value is first written by the IBM, 
read and then written by the Z80, and finally read by the IBM and remains intact, then 
both latches function correctly. Unfortunately only six bits o f the Z80 output latch are 
mapped to the Z80 bus so only the top six bits can be tested in this manner. Also, we 
have no absolute indication that the status flag is functioning correctly. A logic analyser 
was again used to check the lowest two bits o f the data bus and to test the logic of the
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flip flop used to implement the status flag. Figure 3.11 shows the logic analyser output 
for the status flag for a single IBM write, Z80 read cycle. One should notice two 
important features : the IBM does not receive a 'ready' indication from the flag until the 
end of the Z80 read cycle ; and data is not marked 'available' to the Z80 until the end of 
the IBM cycle. The logic used to implement this dual flag thus ensures that, with 
correct monitoring, no corruption is possible due to mutual access of a latch by both the 
IBM and Z80.
IBM EL of Port 
Z80 Status Bit 
Z80 RD of Port 
IBM Status Bit
IBM Write!
data not avail
Ready for Write
data available data not avail
Z80 Read I
Previous Data Not Read Yet Ready
Figure 3.11 : Status Rag Logic Analyser Output
Lastly, the Z80 was wired up to the SCSI controller and the Control Switchover Logic 
hardwired so that the Z80 was in control. Code was then executed to cause a low level 
format of the hard disk. When this worked it indicated that a communications link 
between the Z80 and SCSI, using both control and data lines, had been established.
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STAGE 3 : Connecting the Two Sections Together
Once stage one and stage two are complete the next logical step was to connect the two 
together. In hardware terms this required the connections between the Z80 and the 
Control Switchover Logic to be made. A simple test was then made : the code in figure 
3.12 was used for the Z80 ROM causing control to be passed to the IBM. If the IBM 
could then boot and recognise and allow access to the disk then this would indicate at 
least partial success.
;Z80 test program [3] Pass Control to IBM
PathChW equ 08hSCIResW equ Oah
ZSOPath equ 00000000b -IBMPath equ 00000001b
org OOOOh
start out (SCIResW),a ; Reset SCSI ChipId a,IBMPath ; Choose path to IBMout (PathChW),a ; Set Path
end start
Figure 3.12 : Firmware Control Switchover by the Z80
Once the last test was concluded, a more advanced version was used. The code in 
figure 3.13 was used causing the Z80 to execute certain code sections if  a command 
byte was sent by the IBM. The code provided full control switchover ability, allowing 
control to be granted or denied to the IBM simply, through the DEBUG utility provided 
with MS-DOS.
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—;Z80 test program [4] Command Byte Driven Control Switchover
IBMDataR equ 08hIBMStatR equ 09hPathChW equ 08hStatus# equ 09hZSOPath equ 00000000bIBMPath equ 00000001b
org OOOOhstart in a,(IBMDataR) ; Clear status flagId a,OOOOh ; set status to OOhout (Status#),aretry in a,(IBMStatR) ; Get Statusbit 0, a ; Test for byte available
jr z,retry ; Repeat if no byte yet
in a, (IBMDatR) ; Read the byte
cp Olh ; Set Control for Z80
jP z,zSOpth
cp 02h ; Set Control for IBM
jp z,ibmpth
; Space for other Commands to be inserted!
jp retry ; should never get here
ibmpth Id a,IBMPath ; Set pathways for IBMjt setpath
z80pth Id a,ZSOPath ; Set pathways for Z80
setpath out (PathChW),a ; Set the control
jp retry ; Await next instruction
end start
Figure 3.13 : Control Switchover Under IBM Control
If control was set to IBM then access should be possible and if control is set to Z80 
then access should not be possible. When this proved to be the case hardware testing 
had been successfully completed.
Such a comprehensive building and testing sequence while time-consuming was 
worthwhile as errors were easy to detect at this stage, and it provided a certain feeling 
of confidence in the hardware. Such confidence reduces the time required to detect the 
cause of future problems encountered, since the possibility of hardware error can be 
ignored until all other possibilities have been exhausted.
102
VERSION 2
This version was designed to enhance the performance of the implementation and to 
remove much of the excess configuration hardware provided in version 1. The 
hardware requirements in this aspect were well defined by this point. This version was 
also designed to fit on a half size card and to have a significantly reduced component 
count to help in PCB prototype development at a later date.
This version of the hardware is functionally identical to its predecessor. An IBM BIOS 
ROM, Z80 subsystem, SCSI controller, and all required inter-connections are still 
present but much of it appears in a different form, is more economical and results from 
the research previously described.
A Z84C50 Superintegration Z80, from Zilog, was used as a replacement for the 
standard Z80B used in version 1. The reason for this was twofold. Firstly, the Z84C50 
provides a 2K byte internal, zero wait state RAM and, when consulting a reasonably 
complete prototype implementation, using version 1, 2K Bytes was found to be quite 
adequate. Having this RAM on chip meant significant speed increase coupled with 
reduced chip count. Secondly, the Z84C50 operates at up to lOMHz providing an 
overall increase in performance.
All ’glue' logic used in version 1 was reduced to five 16V8 GAL devices and two 
74ALS74 chips. This allowed the board to be implemented either as a half card or, a 
full length card, where the excess space could be used, for example, to provide full 
floppy control. The resulting reduction in chip count also meant that PCB fabrication 
costs would be less as well as the cost o f board population, should the board ever be 
produced commercially.
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The five GAL devices provide the required logic for the following :
GAL 1 provides decoding logic to map the ROM BIOS into the IBM memory map. It 
also provides tri-state buffering of the output of the status latch, to the IBM data bus.
D E V I C E  1 6 V 8 ;
T I T L E  S UPE RVI SOR PROJECT G A L l
NAME D. S. S. R o b b ;
S I G N A T U R E C 2 G 1 ;
STATUS_BIT 1* 20 vcc
Z80_READ_DATA 2 19 unused
IBM_PORTR 3 GAL 18 unused
A13 4 1 17 unusedA14 5 16v8 16 1BM_MEMR
A15 6 15 IBM_DO
A16 1 14 unused
A18 8 13 A17
A19 9 12 unused
GND 10 11 MEMR
!IBM_MEMR = A19 & A18 6 !A17 & IA16 & A15 S !A14 S !A13 i !MEMR;
IBM_DO.OE = !IBM_PORTR;
IBM DO = ! STATUS BIT;
Figure 3.14 : GAL 1 Description for Supervisor Circuit Version 2
The output IBM_MEMR is brought low if  a memory Read request is made, by the 
IBM, to any location from C8000H to C9FFFH in the IBM's memory map. IBM_DO 
output is only enabled if IBM_PORTR is active, which occurs when the Z80 attempts 
to read the status flag. When enabled, it takes the value o f the status flag which is 
driven onto the Z80 data bus on DO.
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GAL 2 provides access by the IBM to a predefined subset of the SCSI controller's 
internal registers. The choice of registers was taken from the working prototype using 
version one. It further provides the pseudo-DMA decoding logic for data transfer to 
and from the SCSI controller. Finally, it provides decoding to map the status flag and 
the two latches used to communicate with the Z80, into the IBM port space.
D E V I C E  1 6 v 8 ;
TI TL E S U PE RV I S O R PROJECT GAL2
NAME D. S . S . ROBB;
S I G N A T U R E C 2 G 2  ;
A4 1* 20 VCC
A3 2 19 IBM_PORTNW
A2 3 GAL 18 IBM_PORTW
A1 4 2 17 IBM_PORTR
AO 5 16v8 16 SCSI_IBMDMA
IBM_IOR 6 15 SCSI_IBMCS
IBM_IOW 7 14 A5
IBM_AEN a 13 A6
A9 9 12 A7
GND 10 11 AS
SCSI IBMCS = (!IBM_IOR 4 !IBM__AEN & A 9 4 A 8 4 !A7 4 ! A6 4 AS 4 !A4 4 !A3
4 !A2 4 !A1 4 AO) /* READ PI »/
1(!IBM_IOR 4 !IBM_ AEN 4 A9 4 A8 4 ! A7 4 ! A6 4 AS 4 '.A4 4 !A3
4 A2 4 !A1 4 AO) /* READ P5 */
1(!IBM_IOW 4 !IBM_ AEN 4 A 9 4 A 8 4 IA7 4 Î A6 4 AS 4 !A4 4 !A3
4 !A2 4 !A1 4 AO) /* WRITE PI */
1(!IBM_IOW 4 !IBM_ AEN 4 A 9 4 A 8 4 !A7 4 ! A6 4 AS 4 !A4 4 I A3
4 A2 4 !A1 4 AO) /* WRITE P5 */
1{!IBM_ION 4 ! IBM__AEN 4 A9 4 AS 4 !A7 4 !A6 4 AS 4 !A4 4 ! A3
4 A2 4 A1 4 AO) / *  WRITE P7 */
(! IBM AEN 4 A9 4 A8 4 !A7 4 !A6 4 AS 4 ! A4 4 A3 4 !A2 4
!A1 & !A0) & (!IBM_IOR | !IBM_IOW));
!IBM_PORTR = (!IBM_IOR & ! IBM__AEN & A 9 & A 8 &  !A7 & tA6 fi A5 6 !A4 & A3 &
!A2 & !A1 & AO);
!IBM_PORTW = (!IBM_IOW S !IBM_AEN & A 9 & A 8 &  !A7 fi !A6 & A5 S !A4 fi A3 &
!A2 & !A1 S AO);
IBM_PORTNW = (!IBM_IOW i !IBM_AEN & A 9 &  A8 & !A7 S !A6 i A5 4 IA4 4 A3 4
!A2 4 !A1 4 AO);
Figure 3.15 : GAL 2 Description for Supervisor Circuit Version 2
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The output SCSI_IBMCS is activated if the IBM either writes to ports 32IH, 325H or 
327H, or reads from ports 321H or 325H. These are the minimum ports required for 
SCSI data transfer and do not include any which could be used to invoke a SCSI 
command. The output SCSI_IBMDMA is activated if  the IBM either reads from, or 
writes to, port 328H. This port is used to transfer actual data bytes and 
SCSIJBMDMA is used to generate a DACK in the pseudo-DMA cycle. IBM_PORTR 
and IBM_PORTW are activated when a request is made to port 329H to read or write, 
respectively. These lines are used to activate the latches used in communication with the 
Z80. IBM_PORTNW is the same as IBM_PORTW but of the opposite polarity, as this 
is required elsewhere and no discrete inverters are available.
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GAL 3 multiplexes between the Z80 and IBM address buses, to the SCSI controller 
address bus.
DEVICE 16v8;
TITLE SUPERVISOR PROJECT GAL3
NAME D . S. S. ROBB;
SIGNATURE C2G3 ;
Z80_A0 1* 20 VCC
Z80_A1 2 19 unused
Z80_A2 3 GAL 18 unused
IBM_AO 4 3 17 SCSIA2
IBM_A1 5 15v8 16 SCSI_A1
IBM_A2 6 15 SCSI_AO
IBM_PATH 7 14 unused
unused 8 13 unused
unused 9 12 unused
GND 10 11 unused
SCSI_AO
SCSI_A1 
SCSI A2
( (!IBM_PATH & Z80_A0) |{ IBM_PATH 6 .IBM_AO) );
( {!IBM_PATH & Z80_A1) I( IBM_?ATH & IBM_A1) );
( (!IBM PATH S Z80 A2) I( IBM PATH S IBM A2) );
Figure 3.16 : GAL 3 Description for Supervisor Circuit Version 2
The logic used, and the operation thereof, of this GAL is self-explanatory. If the IBM 
is in control then the IBM address lines drive the SCSI controller address bus, 
otherwise the Z80 address lines do.
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GAL 4 multiplexes between the Z80 and and IBM control lines, to the SCSI controller. 
Furthermore it provides logic which enables either, but never both, transceivers, which 
connect either the Z80 or IBM data bus, to the SCSI controller data bus. Finally, it 
provides logic which, together with a single D-Type flip-flop, provides the required 
electronics to implement the wait state generator used in version one.
D E V I C E  1 6 v 8 ;
T I T L E  S UPE RVI SOR PROJECT GAL4
NAME D. S . S . ROBB;
S I G N A T U R E C 2 G 4  ;
SCSI_IBMDMA !• 20 VCC
SCSI_IBMCS 2 19 Z80_TEN
SCSI_280CS 3 GAL 18 IBM__TEN
SCSI_DRQ 4 4 17 SCSI_IOW
IBM_PATH 3 16v8 16 SCSI_IOR
IBM_IOR 6 15 SCSI_CS
IBM_IOW 7 14 DMA_CLK
Z80_RD a 13 IO_CH_RDY
Z80_WR 9 12 DMA_NQ
GND 10 11 unused
!IO_CH_RDY = (DMA_NQ & SCSI_IBMDMA);
DMA_CLK = {SCSI_DRQ & SCSI_IBMDMA)/
!SCSI_CS = ((SCSI_Z80CS S !IBM_PATH)1(SCSI_IBMCS & IBM_PATH)); 
!SCSI_IOR = ((!Z80_RD & !IBM_PATH> | (!IBM_IOR S IBM_PATH) );
iSCSI_IOW = < ( ! Z80 WR S ! IBM_PATH) I ( ! IBM_IOW & IBM__PATH) ) ;
!IBM_TEN = ({SCSI_I3MCS & IBM_PATH) t (!DMA_NQ & IBM_PATH) )/
!ZBO_TEN = (SCSI_Z80CS & !IBM_PATH);
Figure 3.17 : GAL 4 Description for Supervisor Circuit Version 2
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The output ÎO_CH_RDY is used to generate IBM wait states by connecting it via an 
open collector buffer to the I/0_CH_RDY line of the IBM. This line becomes active if 
the controller DRQ is not active, indicated by DMA_NQ, and the IBM is attempting to 
generate a DACK, indicated by SCSI_IBMDMA. Once the controller is ready it will 
activate DRQ and the wait state generation will cease. The controller's DACK line is 
activated if DMA_NQ goes low which occurs when a rising edge is generated on 
DMA„CLK. Such a rising edge will occur only when the controller's DRQ is active 
and the IBM is attempting to transfer, indicated by SCSI_IBMDMA.
The outputs SCSI_CS, SCSI_IOR, and SCSI_IOW all operate in a similar manner. If 
the IBM has control then the values of the IBM inputs, which are intended to drive 
these control lines, are driven out, otherwise the Z80 input values are driven out.
The remaining two outputs are used to activate the data bus transceivers which allow 
either the IBM or Z80 data bus to connect with the SCSI controller data bus. The 
IBM's transceiver is activated if it is both in control and is attempting either a 
Read/Write of a valid SCSI controller internal register, or a DMA data transfer. The 
Z80's transceiver is activated only if  the IBM is not in control and the Z80 is attempting 
a Read/Write of a SCSI controller internal register. Clearly, from this logic, both 
transceivers cannot be active at the same time.
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GAL 5 provides all the decoding logic required by the Z80 : it maps the Z80 ROM into 
the Z80 memory map ; it maps the two latches, the status flag, the SCSI reset line, and 
the control switchover flip-flop, into the Z80 port space.
D E V I C E  1 6 v 8 ;
T I T L E  S DPE RV I SO R PROJECT GAL5
NAME D. S . S , ROBB ;
S I G N A T U R E C 2 G 5 ;
Z80_A0 1* 20 VCC
Z80_A1 2 19 Z80_ROM_EN
Z 8 0 A 2 3 GAL 18 SCSI_RESET
Z80_A3 4 5 17 Z80_D0
Z80_IORQ 5 16v8 16 ZBO_READ_DATA
Z80_RD 6 15 PATHCH
Z80_WR 7 14 Z80_WRITE_DATA
Z80_MREQ 8 13 Z80_CS
Z 8 0 A 1 5 9 12 unused
GND 10 11 STATUS BIT
Z80_WRITE_DATA = !Z80_WR & !Z80_IORQ & Z80_A3 & !Z80_A2 S !Z80_A1 & Z80_A0
!PATHCH !Z80_WR & ! Z80__IORQ & Z80_A3 & !Z80_A2 & !Z80_A1 s !Z80_A0
!SCSI_RESET !Z80_WR & !Z80_IORQ & Z80_A3 & !Z80_A2 & Z80_A1 & !Z80_A0
! Z80__READ_DATA = !Z80_RD & !Z80_IORQ & Z80_A3 & !Z80_A2 & !Z80_A1 & !Z80_A0
Z80_D0.OE !Z80_RD & !Z80_IORQ £ Z80_A3 S !Z80_A2 S !Z80_A1 & Z80_A0
Z80_D0 
!Z80_ROM_EN 
Z80 OS
STATUS_BIT;
!Z80_MREQ & !Z80_A15; 
!Z80 A3 & !Z80 lORQ;
Figure 3.18 : GAL 5 Description for Supervisor Circuit Version 2
The following ports are allocated using the logic within this GAL : port 08H (Write) 
which causes data to be written to the latch which is read by the IBM ; port 09H (Write)
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which causes the IBM to be in control if the lowest bit o f the Z80 data bus is high, or 
the Z80 to be in control if it is low, by writing to the control switchover flip-flop ; port 
OAH (Write) which causes a reset pulse on the SCSI controller ; port 08H (Read) 
which causes the contents of the latch the IBM writes to to be placed on the Z80 data 
bus ; and port 09H (Read) which causes the value of the status flag to appear on the 
lowest bit of the Z80 data bus. Also, ports OOH to 07H are mapped to the internal 
registers of the SCSI controller.
The output Z80_ROM_EN is activated on any memory Read request to the lowest 32K 
bytes of memory.
BUILDING AND TESTING
As in version 1, this circuit was built in distinct stages. At the end" of each stage both, 
physical connection and functionality were tested.
Firstly, the IBM ROM BIOS was wired up, together with GAL 1 and the IBM address 
bus buffers. Following the same method as used in version 1, the ROM was 
programmed to write a message on the screen on boot, and when this occurred it 
indicated correct operation of this section.
Next, the SCSI controller was wired up and connected into the IBM. This required the 
wiring of the IBM data bus transceiver, the pseudo DMA flip-flop, GAL2, GAL3 and 
GAL4. It also required, what would become the output of the control changeover flip- 
flop, to be tied high through a resistor so that the IBM would be in permanent control. 
An INT 13H BIOS ROM configured to the hardware implementation was then 
inserted. When the machine booted successfully, with the card inserted and attached to 
a disk, and allowed the disk to be accessed, it meant that this section was working 
correctly.
I l l
Lastly the Z84C50, its ROM, GAL5, the status flag, the control changeover flip-flop, 
and both IBM communication latches were wired. As in version 1, the IBM /Z 80  inter­
communication was tested to ensure both latches and the status flag operated correctly. 
Once this was done, slightly modified versions of both fully operational prototype 
ROMs from version 1 were inserted, and a fuU test executed.
As fully operational firmware was available by completion o f the hardware, testing was 
a simple matter. A ROM containing the working firmware developed for version 1 was 
used and the board put through exhaustive software testing. When it functioned 
identically to version 1, allbeit with increased performance, it proved itself to be an 
upgraded replacement
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3.1 FIRMWARE
3.1.0 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
[1] MS-DOS BIOS Implementation
ROM Format
A ROM BIOS loader routine is executed on power up. This routine searches the ROM 
space above the 640K byte limit for any additional ROMs. The location of such ROMs 
is illustrated in figure 3.19
ROM BIOS
r 4 — FFFF:OOOFH (1MB) 
1— FFFF: OOOOH
Other ROM and RAM
^ — FOOO-.OOOOH
^  Top Of RAM
^  AOOO-.OOOOH
Free RAM
M— 0000:0000H
Figure 3.19 : Memory Layout at Startup
The BIOS loader routine scans memory from A(X)0:OOOOH to F(X)0:0(X)0H for the 
occurrence o f a particular sequence of signature bytes. If an additional ROM BIOS is 
found then its initialisation routine is called. Scanning involves checking the first two
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bytes of each 512 byte block for the signature AA55H. If this signature is found then 
the third byte indicates the ROM size, in number of 512 byte blocks. The ROM is then 
checksummed and if the least significant byte is found to be zero then the BIOS is 
initialised.To initialise the BIOS, the IBM then executes the fourth byte.
BIOS Execution
As mentioned above, a ROM found somewhere between AOOOrOOOOH to FOOOiOOOOH 
in memory, with the signature AA55H at the start, has its fourth byte executed on 
power up. A ROM configured in this manner will therefore usually place a jump to an 
initialisation routine at this location. The initialisation routine is often present to 
reconfigure the machine to execute other routines within the ROM, when certain 
software interrupts are encountered.
Software Interrupts
A series of so called 'software' interrupts exist as part of the MS-DOS operating 
system. To invoke a software interrupt some required information is placed by an
active program within the general purpose registers of the processor and then the
■Iinterrupt executed by the active program with the INT command. This, -in effect, is 3
merely a far call to a routine whose address is found within an interrupt table. For 
example, ENT 13H provides all disk services, hence in order to read from a disk the 
Read command, which is function 02H, would be placed within the high byte of 
register AX. One would then place values representing the start address, the number of 
sectors to be read, and the drive to read from within other defined registers and execute 
an INT 13H instruction.
The initialisation routine o f a ROM BIOS will usually alter certain pointers within the 
software interrupt table so that they point to replacement routines within that BIOS.
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[2] Small Computer System Interface (SCSI)
The Concept
The SCSI interface is a parallel, multimaster I/O bus that provides a standard interface 
between computers and peripheral devices. Its goal was to provide a non-proprietary 
interface. Manufacturers build disk drives with varying numbers of cylinders, heads 
and sectors,with the result that separate drivers were required for each drive type. SCSI 
overcomes this limitation because the host system can perceive any disk drive, 
regardless of manufacturer, as a string o f consecutive logical blocks. Therefore one 
variable, the maximum addressable block, fully defines a SCSI drive and this is 
available by issuing a Read Capacity command. By placing a certain amount of 
intelligence, required by SCSI, on a drive, and using it to convert between logical 
addresses and physical ones, a single driver can be used to communicate with any 
drive.
Features of SCSI
All commands issued to a SCSI drive contain logical addresses. As mentioned above, 
the drive appears to the SCSI host as a series of contiguous sectors. SCSI therefore 
deals with all facets of the logical to physical conversion. This includes the mapping 
out of all defects on the drive which exist when the drive leaves the factory and are 
generated after the event. A SCSI drive always appears defect free to the host.
SCSI supports not only multiple hosts but also several commands to different 
peripherals which may be in operation at the same time : an initiator may issue a 
command and disconnect from the bus until the peripheral is ready to respond, thus 
allowing another initiator to use the bus or the same initiator to issue another request to 
another device. SCSI can therefore perform complex concurrent I/O operations.
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The SCSI Bus
During normal operation the SCSI bus makes orderly transitions between bus states 
known as phases. In the following implementation the SCSI bus will be required to 
support only one host and therefore no arbitration for control of the bus is required.
Power-Up or Reset
BUS FREE Phase SELECTION Phase
Information Transfer Phase 
COMMAND, DATA, STATUS, or MESSAGE
Figure 3.20 : SCSI Phases in a Single Host System
Eight possible SCSI phases exist : BUS FREE, ARBITRATION, SELECTION, 
RESELECTION, COMMAND, DATA, STATUS and MESSAGE. The latter four are 
known as the Information Transfer Phases. Arbitration and Reselection will not be 
discussed as they will not be required in any implementation mentioned within this 
work. The schematic in figure 3.20 indicates the relationships between phases and 
show the possible phase transitions. A series of phases which start and end in the BUS 
FREE phase is defined as a transaction. The actual phases involved in a transaction will 
depend on the command being executed and the success o f that execution, and is 
controlled by the target device.
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On power-up, or following a reset, the system comes up in the BUS FREE phase. An 
initiator may cause the bus to enter the SELECTION phase by placing the target ID of 
the required peripheral on the data bus and asserting the SEL line. Success is indicated 
by the target asserting the BSY line, and to complete the sequence the initiator then de- 
asserts SEL. If BSY is not asserted within a defined time then the bus will return to the 
BUS FREE phase, else it will enter one of the Information Transfer Phases.
After selection the target takes control of all bus timing and phase transitions and retains 
control until the transaction is complete. The three SCSI lines, MSG, C/D, and I/O 
combined, denote the phase. This is further illustrated in Figure 3.21.
MSG
Signal
C/D VO
Phase Name Description
0 0 0 Data Out Initiator sends data to Target
0 0 1 Data In Target Sends Data to Initiator
0 1 0 Command Initiator sends command to Target
0 1 1 Status Target sends status to Initiator
1 0 X (ResavetO
1 1 0 Message Out Initiator sends message to Target
1 1 1 Message In Target sends message to Initiator
Figure 3.21 : SCSI Control Signals Indicating Information Transfer Phase
In the COMMAND phase, the target requests a command byte from the initiator. In the 
DATA phase, data is transferred. In the DATA OUT phase the initiator sends data to 
the target and in the DATA IN phase the target sends data to the initiator. In the 
STATUS phase the target transfers a byte to the initiator to indicate the success or 
failure of a command and finally, the MESSAGE phase is available to transfer a 
message from target to initiator, or vice versa.
Bytes are transferred between initiator and target using the REQ and ACK control 
signals to implement a full handshake protocol. For example, to transfer a byte from an 
initiator to a target the following occurs : the target indicates it is ready for a byte by 
asserting REQ ; the initiator indicates a byte is available on the bus by asserting ACK ;
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the target reads the data and then de-asserts REQ ; and the initiator then de-asserts ACK 
when it realises the change on REQ. For a transfer from target to initiator the actions of 
these lines is similar : target asserts REQ to indicate byte ready ; Initiator reads and 
asserts ACK ; target norices and de-asserts REQ ; and initiator completes cycle by de- 
asserting ACK. Alternatively data may be transferred synchronously in the data phase 
but as the SCSI controller used in the hardware design does not support this, this 
option is not possible for this implementation.
Issuing SCSI Commands
SCSI specifies only classes and formats for commands. Each SCSI command is sent to 
a device as a Command Descriptor Block (CDB). The first byte of a CDB defines the 
type of command, the number of bytes required to define the command, and the 
command code itself. The following bytes contain extra information required in the 
execution of the command. For example in the Read command the logical unit number, 
the source address, and the number of sectors required are all present in bytes 1 to 5 of 
the CDB. Figure 3.22 contains the layout of such a read CDB.
Byte 
0 Operation Code
Logical Unit Number Logical Block Address (MSB)
Logical Block Address
Logical Block Address (LSB)
Transfer Length
Control
Figure 3.22 : Layout of a Six Byte Command Descriptor Block - Read Command
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In a late revision of the SCSI standard a series of commands for each class of device 
likely to be using the SCSI bus is defined. This was a result of many of the vendors 
meeting to develop a Common Access Method for SCSI devices. The table in figure 
3.23 indicates the Group 0 standard command set for Direct-Access Devices.
OP Code Type Command Name Rod:650
OOH 0 Test Unit Ready yesOlH 0 Rezero Unit yes02H V03H M Request Sense yes04H M Format Unit yes05H V06H V07H 0 Reassign Blocks yes08H M Read yes09H VQAH M Write yesOBH 0 Seek yesOCH V *ODH VOEH VOFH VlOH VIIH V12H E Enquiry yes13H V14H V15H 0 Mode Select yes16H 0 Reserve yes17H 0 Release yes18H 0 Copy NO19H VlAH 0 Mode Sense yesIBH 0 Start/Stop Unit yesICH 0 Receive Diagnostic Results NOIDH 0 Send Diagnostic yeslEH 0 Prevent/Allow Medium Removal NOIFH R
Types M = Mandatory CommandE = Required for Self Configuring DriversO = Optional CommandR = Reserved Command for future standardisationV = Available for Vendor Specific Commands
Rodime 650 20MByte SCSI Disk drive used in prototype
Figure 3.23 : Table o f Standard Commands for Direct-Access Devices
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Each command listed in figure 3.23 has an associated, defined CDB which is to be 
adhered to during transfer. Clearly vendors may use some of the spare commands of 
type V for their own defined commands, but the commands defined above are 
sufficient for normal operation of a direct-access drive. Commands added by the 
vendor are often to be used only at factory level to test and configure the device before 
sale.
3.1.1 IMPLEMENTATION
[1] Direct Control IBM BIOS
The first requirement, after hardware testing, was to provide a working INT 13H BIOS 
replacement which would allow access to a SCSI hard disk drive through the hardware 
with no Supervisor intervention. This, together with the code in figure 3.12 blown into 
the Z80 ROM, would provide a firmware implementation of a 'standard' hard disk 
interface card.
The BIOS consisted of an initialisation routine, executed at boot time, and replacement 
code for the INT 13H and INT 19H software interrupts.
The 80x86 assembler code in figure 3.24 contains a simplified initialisation routine. 
Pointers and labels are assumed to be defined previously. The routine first checks that 
no other hard disks have been installed in the system. This not only simplifies the 
implementation for the prototype, but is also the preferred setup, since having an 
unprotected disk on-line introduces another possible source of infection for the active 
partition. If no other disk is present then the software vectors for INT 13H and 
INT19H are altered to point to routines within the new BIOS ROM. These vectors 
correspond to the Disk Services vector and Bootstrap vector, respectively.
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initialise :
cmp hf_num,0je install_drivestiret
; check no other hard drives ; continue if so ; else fail
install_drive:
mov word ptr org_vector,offset disk_io ; new INT13Hmov word ptr org_vector+2,csmov word ptr boot_vec,offset boot_strap ; new INT19Hmov word ptr boot vec+2,cs
mov hf num., 1 ; increment number of disks ; in battery RAM
mov word ptr hf_tbl_vec,- offset RO650A ; set drive
mov ax,0 ; reset drivemov dx,80h mov cx,10 
int 13h
mov ax,1000h int 13H
jnc drive_up
dec hf num
drive up: ret
; test drive ready
/ jump if drive ready 
; else remove disk 
; finished
Figure 3.24 : Simplified Hard Disk BIOS Interrupt Routine
The variable held in the battery RAM of the machine, which represents the number of 
drives in the system, is then incremented so that the operating system will become 
aware of its existence. The hard disk is then fixed as a Rodime RO650A drive as this 
was the drive used during development. The drive is then reset, and a 'test unit ready' 
command invoked. If this command returns a positive response then initialisation is 
complete, otherwise the number o f drives is set back to zero.
The INT 19H replacement code features, in simplified form, in figure 3.25. The 
sequence it follows is fairly simple. Firstly it attempts to bootstrap from the floppy : if 
the reset fails then no disk is present, otherwise it reads the boot sector from the disk 
into RAM and executes it. Even if a non-system disk has been inserted, executable
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code will exist in this sector which prints a message to the screen informing the user 
that it is not a system disk, if the disk is formatted.
BOOT STRAP:sub dx, dx /reset floppysub ax, axint 13H
jc SKIP_FRD ; if fail try hard disk
mov ax,201H ; read boot sector into RAMsub dx, dxmov es, dxmov bx,offset BOOT_LOCNmov cx, 1int 13H
jnc BOOT_LOCN ; if success try booting
TRY HD BOOT
cmp hf_num,0je ENTER__BASIC
sub ax, axmov dx,80Hint 13H
jc ENTER_BASIC
mov ax,201Hsub dx, dxmov es, dxmov bx,offset BOOTmov cx, 1int 13H
jc ENTER_BASIC
mov ax,word ptr BOcmp ax,0AA55H
jnz ENTER_BASIC
jmp B00T_L0CN
;else try hard disk 
; if no hard disk then fail
/reset hard disk
; if error then fail 
; read boot sector into RAM
; if error then fail
0 ; check boot sector/signature
; if error then fail
;else try boot
ENTER BASIC: 
int 18H
Figure 3.25 : Simplified Hard Disk BIOS Bootstrap Loader
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If no floppy is present then bootstrapping of the hard disk is attempted. First there is a 
check to see if a hard disk exists, then a reset followed by a Read of the boot sector. 
Finally the boot sector signature is checked to see if it is valid. If any of these tests 
prove negative then the bootstrap fails and the code attempts to call the ROM based 
BASIC interpreter if it exists. If all tests pass then execution o f the downloaded boot 
sector occurs.
Both the initialisation and the bootstrap loader routines use the replacement INT 13H 
code. This software interrupt must be capable of providing all low level disk services 
required by the system. In total there are eighteen services it must provide, although for 
a prototype system a small subset of these suffices.
Five of the INT 13H functions must be present for a system to function correctly. 
These are : RESET DISK SYSTEM ; TEST DRIVE READY ; and READ, WRITE, 
and VERIFY SECTORS. Each o f these are explained separately below :
RESET DISK SYSTEM
This function is used by the system to reset the entire disk system. For a SCSI 
implementation this requires the SCSI bus to be reset and each drive in the system, in 
this case only one, to be tested for readiness.
disk_reset proc near
; reset SCSI busmov dx,icmdp ; dx=internal command register SCSImov al,rst ; al=reset commandout dx,al ; send command to SCSI
/DELAY loop here in full version mov al,null ; finish resetout dx, al
/DELAY loop here in full version call tst_rdy / test drive ready
disk_reset endp
Figure 3.26 : Reset Disk System Function for Replacement INT 13H BIOS
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The code in figure 3.26 shows a slightly simplified implementation of this function. 
Delay loops have been removed for clarity. The tst_rdy call will return the status of the 
function which in turn will be propagated out of the RESET function.
TEST DRIVE READY
This function is used by the system to check that a drive is available for use. This is 
implemented using the TEST UNIT READY command in SCSI.
tst_rdy proc nearmov al,null ; SCSI byte-5 - no parameters requiredpush axmov al,null ; SCSI byte-4push axmov al,null ; SCSI byte-3push axmov al,null ; SCSI byte-2 -push axmov al,null ; SCSI byte-1push axmov al,OOH ; SCSI byte-0 - Test Unit Ready Commandpush axmov cmd,aljmp commandtst_rdy endp
Figure 3.27 : Test Drive Ready Function for Replacement INT 13H BIOS
The code in figure 3.27 loads a SCSI format command block onto the system stack, in 
reverse order, representing the function required. In this case bytes one to five are filled 
with nulls since no parameters are required for this command. Control is then passed to 
code which executes the SCSI command. This will be explained later.
124
READ, WRITE, and VERIFY SECTORS
These commands are grouped in this section because, although their functions are 
entirely dissimilar, the information required to issue the command is the same. Thus the 
SCSI command block for each is very similar.
disk_ write proc nearmov al,null / SCSI byte-5push axmov al,cmd+4 ; SCSI byte-4 - Number of Sectorspush axmov al,cmd+3 ; SCSI byte-3 - Low order addresspush axmov al,cmd+2 / SCSI byte-2 - Middle order addresspush axmov al,cmd+1 ; SCSI byte-1 - High order addresspush axmov al,OAH ; SCSI byte-0 - Write Sectors commandpush axmov cmd,alimp commanddisk__write endp
Figure 3.28 : Write Sectors Function for Replacement INT 13H BIOS
Figure 3.28 contains the code required to load a 'Write Sectors' SCSI command block 
onto the system stack and to execute that SCSI command. Aside from the command 
byte, the command block includes the three byte logical address to write to and the 
number of bytes to be written. The Read command is almost identical, with the 
command byte being the only difference. The verify command requires a ten byte 
command block but the information it contains is identical to that of Read and Write : 
the address and number of sectors.
A SCSI command is executed via the assembler routine shown in figure 3.29. No 
attempt is made to arbitrate for use o f the SCSI bus as only one host will exist in this 
implementation. SCSI can however be configured for multiple hosts sharing the bus.
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This code firstly attempts to select the target. If this is successful then the target takes 
control of the SCSI bus and causes it to enter various phases, dependent on the type of 
operation, until the command is completed, with or without error.
/Disk Command Interface command proc near call select
3 0jmp
command_l ;jmpcommand
comman d _ l  
P h a s e r
e n d _ _ s e qendp
/ select target on SCSI bus / jump on error 
/ perform requested phases
/ return to caller with carry set
Figure 3.29 : Main Routine for Execution of SCSI Commands
The code in figure 3.30 indicates the required sequence to select a drive using the SCSI 
controller mentioned in the hardware section. Firstly the SCSI controller is configured 
as an initiator, as opposed to a target, and the interrupts disabled since they are not 
required. Then Initiator Command Register is reset, as are all the error flags within the 
controller by reading the Parity/Interrupt register.
select :movmovout
movout
movin
movmov
out
movmovout
movmovout
dx f modep al,OOOOOOOOB dx, al
dx,icmdp dx, al
dx,prstp al, dx
al, host_targ dx,datap dx, al
al,datoutt dx,tcmdp dx, al
dx, icmdp al,sel dx, al
mov cx,OFFFFH
/ set as initiator / no interrupts
/ reset initiator command register
/ reset parity/interrupts
/ send host & target data byte
/ set to data out target
/ assert SEL
/ set a big count in case of trouble
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mov dx,statlpselect 1 :in al, dxand al,OlOOOOOOBjnz select_goodloop select_l
mov dx,icmdpxor ax, axout dx, alstcret
select_good;mov dx,icmdp xor ax,ax dx, al ret
; wait for BSY true 
; ERROR so reset select false 
; indicate error - set carry flag
; reset select false; note - carry flag reset by this out
Figure 3.30 : SCSI Drive Selection Sequence
Once this has been done, the host and target addresses are placed within a byte and 
driven onto the data bus. Both addresses correspond to a single bit set within a byte, as 
only eight SCSI devices may share a bus. The two addresses are combined therefore 
by a simple logical OR. The next step is to assert the SCSI select line (SEL) to begin 
the handshake procedure. If the SCSI BSY line becomes active after some time then the 
chosen target has responded and selection has occurred, or else an error has occurred. 
To complete the handshake SEL is then reset
M
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Once the target drive has been successfully selected, its SCSI controller enters a series 
of distinct phases which, when completed, have executed the required SCSI command. 
The BIOS firmware must follow the phases that the target controller enters and supply 
any requested data or read any supplied data. The code within figure 3.31 is used to 
call one o f six subroutines, one for each possible SCSI controller information transfer 
phase. The choice of subroutine to be called depends on the current phase of the SCSI 
controller, and this is identified by reading one of the internal status registers.
127
P h a s e r proc near
phaser_0: mov in
test
jz
testjz
andcmp
jzcmp
jzcmp
jzcmp
jzcmp
jzcmp
jzjmp
dx,statlp al, dxal,OlOOOOOOB exit
al,OOlOOOOOB phaser_0
al,phasemal,datoutpda toutal,datinpdataindal, cmdpcmdbyteal,statuspstatus
al,msgoutpmesgoutal,msginpmesginphaser_0
read status 
test BSYexit, if lost BSY
test for REQ - pending data trans try again if not got one
mask for phase bits only data out phase
data in phase
command phase
status phase
message out phase
message in phase
should never get here!
Figure 3.31 : Main Routine Run During SCSI Controller Phase Execution
This routine first checks to see if  the phase sequence is complete. If it is not, and data 
transfer is requested, then this routine identifies the current phase and jumps to the 
corresponding subroutine which deals with the requested transfer, and returns upon 
completion. Different SCSI commands step through different sequences of SCSI 
phases and this routine allows any combination of phases to occur, dependent only on 
the target SCSI controller's requests. Information that may be required by a subroutine 
in order for it to complete its task is made available to it before the subroutine is 
executed. For example, the command bytes required to be sent during the SCSI 
command phase have been pushed onto the top of the stack.
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cmdbyte :mov dx,i cmdp / command phasein al , dx / enable output driversor al,OOOOOOOIBout dx, al
mov dx,tcmdp / set up command phasemov al, cradtout dx, al
pop ax ; get command byte from stackmov dx,datapout dx, al / send command bytecall ackdrv ; acknowledge byte ready
mov dx,icmdp ; disable output driversmov al,nullout dx, aljmp phaser_0 / get next phase
Figure 3.32 : SCSI Command Phase Subroutine
The command phase usually follows directly after the selection phase and the code for 
this is represented in figure 3.32. This phase allows the target drive to identify the 
command required by the initiator. To start with, this routine prepares for transfer by 
enabling the output drivers o f the SCSI controller and setting the target command 
register to match the current phase. The requested command byte is then popped from 
the stack and placed on the data bus. The subroutine 'ackdrv' then implements full 
handshake using REQ and ACK, to transfer the byte. The command phase routine will 
be called repeatedly until all command bytes have been transferred.
The two data exchange phases, the DATA IN phase and DATA OUT phase, provide 
the required mechanism for mass data transfer. Data is sequentially transfeired, byte by 
byte until the desired block has been relocated. The implementations shown in figure 
3.33 and figure 3.34 use the repeat instruction abilities o f the Intel processor to fast- 
transfer one sector at a time since all data moves in multiples of sectors within this 
phase. After each sector has been moved the tests are repeated to check for transfer 
continuation.
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datain:movmov
movmovout
movmov
out
movmovout
mov
out
datain_0: mov in
ax,x_seg es, ax
al,00000000b dx,icmdp dx, al
al,datint dx,tcmdp dx, al
al,00000010b dx,modep dx, al
dx,dmairp dx, al
dx, stat2p al, dx
; set input buffer
/ data in phase using pseudo DMA ; de-assert data bus
; set up data in phase
; DMA mode
; start DMA receive
; check status bits
and al,01001000b / test phase match and DMA REQcmp al,01001000bjne datain__l / if not ready jump to .further
mov dx, dmap / else read data bytesmov cx,512rep insbjmp
I 1 *
datain_0
test al,OOOOIOOOB /test phase match
jz datain_0 /if match retry else exit
mov dx,modep ; cancel DMA modemov al,nullout dx, aljmp Phaser /get next phase
Figure 3.33 : DATA IN Phase for SCSI Transfer
The ability to use the repeat instruction comes from the hardware wait state generator, 
implemented in the previous section. If the SCSI controller has not requested a byte but 
the repeat instruction has attempted to send one, or the SCSI controller does not have a 
byte available but the repeat instruction attempts to read one, then wait states are 
generated until the SCSI controller can oblige.
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d a t o u t mov ax,xseg ; select buffer to outputmov ds, ax
mov al,datoutt / set to data out phase + pseudo DMAmov dx,tcmdpout dx, al
mov al,00000001b ; assert data busmov dx,icmdpout dx, al
mov al,00000010b ; DMA modemov dx, modepout dx, al
mov dx,dmaisp ; start DMA sendout dx, al
mov dx,icmdp / enable output driversin al, dxor al,00000001bout dx, al
datout_l:mov dx,stat2p ; check status bitsin al, dxand al,01001000b ; test phase and DMA REQcmp al,01001000bjne datout_2 ; if not ready - further tests
mov dx, dmap ; else output data bytesmov cx,512rep outsb
jmp datout_l ; look for next block
datout_2:
test al, 00001000b ; test phase matchjnz datout_l ; if a match - try again else exit
mov al,null ; cancel DMA modemov dx,modep
out dx, al
mov dx,icmdp ; disable output driversout dx, al
jmp Phaser ; get new phase
Figure 3.34 : DATA OUT Phase for SCSI Transfer
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The code is similar for both transfer phases : the SCSI controller is configured for the 
transfer, DMA is invoked, and data is transferred. The data transfer repeats until all 
sectors have been relocated.
status :mov dx,datap ; status phasein al, dx / read status bytemov disk_status,al / store statuscall ackdrv ; acknowledge targetjmp phaser_0 / get next phase
Figure 3.35 : STATUS Phase for SCSI Transfer
The operations required for implementation of the STATUS phase are simple, see 
figure 3.35. A byte is read from the internal data register of the SCSI controller, using 
the standard handshake procedure, and stored in a variable.
mesgin:mov dx,datap in al,dx call ackdrv jmp phase r_0
/ message in phase / read message in byte ; acknowledge target ; get next phase
Figure 3.36 : MESSAGE IN for SCSI Transfer
The implementation of the MESSAGE IN phase is functionally identical to the 
STATUS phase except that for the purposes of this implementation, the message byte 
is o f no use and is discarded. The only message which provides any useful information 
for this implementation is the COMMAND COMPLETE message, but alternatively this 
may be identified by the release of the BSY line by the target
Once the required phases were implemented, a fully operational SCSI disk interface 
had been realised. The BIOS was recognised and executed on power-up, and re-routed 
the bootstrap and disk services interrupts making the drive visible to the system. After 
power-up the drive could then be high-level formatted and used.
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[2] Supervisor Control IBM BIOS & Z80 Control Program
The next stage in development was to route all required disk requests through the Z80. 
All operations involving the SCSI controller, except the physical transfer of data 
blocks, were to be performed by the Z80 and indeed made impossible for the IBM to 
perform.
A command that requires no DATA phase can be executed solely by the Supervisor. 
This requires the IBM BIOS to transfer the command information to the Z80, and for 
the Z80 to return status information to the IBM on completion. The IBM BIOS code for
a TEST UNIT READY command is illustrated in figure 3.37
tst_rdy proc near
waitforit ;*Wait for Supervisor readyMOV DX,Sdatout ;*Output data byteMOV AL,Ctstrdy ;*Test Unit Ready CommandOUT DX,ALwaitforit ;*Once read Sstatin cleared
Tretry :MOV DX,Sstatin ;*Read status of supervisorIN AL,DX
AND AL,11111100B ;*Mask off lower 2 bitsCMP AL,OOOOOOOOB ;*Test if command finishedJE Tretry
CMP AL,00000100B ;*Test if finished and okayJE Tonward
MOV AH,error ;*Error returnedSTC ;*set carry flag to indicate errorret
Tonward:XOR AX,AX /*Clear carry flag to indicateret ;*no error
tst_rdy endp
Figure 3.37 : Test Unit Ready Function for Supervisor Controlled IBM BIOS
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Note that the whole SCSI Command Descriptor Block is not transferred, only the bytes 
with useful information. For the Test Unit Ready command, the command specifier is 
enough. The routine then monitors the status byte from the Z80 for either an 'error' or 
'status good' indication. If an error is detected then the IBM carry flag is set.
The Z80 ROM continuously polls the register, to which the IBM writes bytes, awaiting 
instructions. When a byte is written, it is read as a command specifier and used to call a 
subroutine which will execute the requested SCSI command. This may involve reading 
more bytes from the IBM. When execution is complete the program returns to polling 
for another command specifier. Therefore when the IBM sends its test unit ready 
command specifier to the Z80 the subroutine in figure 3.38 is executed.
Itstrdy Id ix,ramit + tstrdy ;*Load Command'Setcall phaser ;*ExecuteId a,c ;*load in statusor noerr ;*set finished bitout (StatusW),a /^output status returned
jP asklBM ;*go get another
Figure 3.38 : Test Unit Ready Command Execution by the Z80
This routine uses a predefined command descriptor block for the test unit ready 
command. Elements of this CDB could be altered at this point if required, but the test 
unit ready command requires no extra instruction bytes. The subroutine phaser is then 
called. This routine behaves identically to the subroutine phaser for the direct access 
IBM BIOS in the last section, only this time it is written in Z80 assembler. Thus the 
command is executed and status returned in Z80 register 'C. This status is then output 
to the Status port where the IBM will read it and know the command is finished and 
whether it was a success.
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Commands that require a DATA phase are more complex. Control of the SCSI 
controller must be passed to the IBM for the actual data transfer, in order not to slow 
the system down. Figure 3.39 passes a READ SECTORS command to the Supervisor 
with all associated address and sector number information.
disk_read proc near waitforit mov dx,Sdatout mov al,Cread out dx,al
waitforit mov dx,Sdatout mov a1,cmd+1out dx,al
waitforit mov dx,Sdatout mov al,cmd+2 out dx,al
waitforit mov dx,Sdatout mov al, cmd+3out dx, al
waitforit mov dx,Sdatout mov al,cmd+4 out dx,al
/*Wait for Supervisor ready ;*Output data byte ;*Read From Disk Command
;*Wait for Supervisor ready ;*Output data byte
;*Wait for Supervisor ready ;*Output data byte
;,*Wait for Supervisor ready ;*Output data byte
;*Wait for Supervisor ready /*Output data byte
Figure 3.39 : READ SECTORS Command for Supervised IBM BIOS : PART 1
The supervisor reads the first byte sent and as a result executes the procedure in figure 
3.40. This procedure reads the required bytes sent by the IBM and calls the phaser 
routine in the same way as for the TEST UNIT READY command previously 
explained.
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I r e a d Id ix,ramit + dread *load in CDBcall await *wait for IBM byteId (ix+1),a *add to CDBcall await *wait for IBM byteId (ix+2),a *add to CDBcall await *wait for IBM byteId (ix+3),a *add to CDBcall await *wait for IBM byteId (ix+4) , a *add to CDBcall phaser *execute
Figure 3.40 : READ SECTORS Command Z80 Code : PART 1
The main difference occurs during the DATA IN phase, see figure 3.41. The target 
requests this phase and the Supervisor must allow the IBM access to the bus to transfer 
the data. The Supervisor configures the SCSI controller for the operation, but it does 
not initiate the transfer itself. Instead it gives the IBM control of the SCSI controller 
and sends a status byte to the IBM to indicate that the controller is ready for the 
transfer.
datain
;*de-assert data bus 
;*set to data in phase 
;*set to diTia mode 
;*give IBM control 
;*inform ibm ready
Figure 3.41 : READ SECTORS Command Z80 Code : PART 2
The IBM has been waiting since sending the command bytes in figure 3.39 for this 
status to be sent by the supervisor. The code in figure 3.42 contains the loop used to 
wait for the Z80 to indicate transfer readiness. When ready the IBM initiates the 
transfer and reads the sector, or sectors, in exactly the same manner as explained for 
the direct access BIOS.
Id a,00000000bout (icmdp),a
Id a,datintout (tcmdp),a
Id a,00000010bout (modep),a
Id a,IBMPathout (PathChW),a
Id a,read_dataout (StatusW),a
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Z t e s t :mov dx,Sstatin in al,dx
and al,11111100B cmp al,read_ready jne Ztest
mov ax,x_seg mov es,ax
mov dx,dmairp out dx,al
Zatain_0: mov in 
and cmp jne
mov
clirepstijmp
dx,stat2p al, dx
al,01001000b al,01001000b Zatain_l
cx,512
insb
Zatain 0
Zatain__l :
test al,OOOOIOOOB jnz Zatain_0
mov dx,Sdatout out dx,al
;*Read Status of Supervisor
/*Test status info /*Ready for info to be read ? ;*if not then try again
;*Set up buffer segment
;*Start DMA Receive
/ check status bits
/ test phase match and DMA REQ
/ if no then jump
; else read sector ; clear interrupt flag ; string input from port ; set interrupt flag
; test phase match
; inform supervisor finished ; data value not important
Figure 3.42 : READ SECTORS Command for Supervised IBM BIOS : PART 2
Once transfer is complete the IBM indicates completion by writing a dummy byte to the 
write out port to the Z80. The Z80 has been waiting for this indication, see figure 3.43. 
When it detects that the byte has been written, by reading the status flag, it takes control 
of SCSI back and completes any further phases requested by the target. It should be 
noted that at no point, when the IBM has control of the data bus, is it possible to 
reconfigure the SCSI controller to read or write to an alternative location. Having 
control of the data bus purely means that the IBM has the ability to transfer data to the 
SCSI controller, the destination of these data bytes is kept restricted, in hardware, to a 
minimum set which does not include the configuration registers of the controller.
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R w a i t in a, (IBMStaR) ;*See if IBM finishedbit 0, a ;*test status bit
jP z,Rwait ;*retry if no data yet
Id a,ZSOPath ;*take control of pathwayout (PathChW),a
Id a,null ;*exit DMA modeout (modep),a
jp phaser
Figure 3.43 ; READ SECTORS Command Z80 Code : PART 3
Upon command completion a status byte is sent to the IBM as normal and the dummy 
byte, the IBM sent to indicate data transfer completion, is read : this indicates to the 
IBM that the supervisor has finished. The code for this is shown in figure 3.44.
Id a, c ;*load in statusor noerr ;*set finished bitout (StatusW),a /*output statusin a,(IBMDatR) ; *Dummy read-done !
jp asklBM /*go get another
Figure 3.44 : READ SECTORS Command Z80 Code : PART 4
Finally, the IBM gets an indication that the Z80 has completed the command, so it 
reads the status and exits according to the indicated result, see figure 3.45.
waitforit ;*Wait for Supervisor finish
in alfdx ;*Read statusand al,llllllOOB ;*Mask of lower 2 bitscmp al,OOOOOIOOB ;*Test if finished and okay
je Zonward
mov ah, time_out /*Error returnedstcret
Zonward:xor ax, ax ;*Clear carry flagret
disk_read endp
Figure 3.45 : READ SECTORS Command for Supervised IBM BIOS : PART 3
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1This form of command requires careful passing of control between the two processors. 
Careful use of status interchange is used to ensure that they remain synchronised and 
that both are aware o f the condition of the transaction at each stage.
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So, with the exception of the DATA phase, all execution of SCSI commands was #
transferred to Z80 control. This involved the routine 'phaser' and all associated 
subroutines. The data phases, both DATA IN and DATA OUT, required the careful 
mutual execution outlined above. Once this was implemented the Z80 could begin to 
take on its full role as Supervisor, as the ability to allow or deny any given SCSI 
command became possible. The IBM could no longer execute a SCSI command 
without the aid o f the Z80 due to the hardware access restrictions to the SCSI 
controller’s internal configuration registers.
The implementation, at this stage, was functionally identical to that of the previous 
stage. Although commands were no longer directly issued to the SCSI controller, they 
were however executed with the result that no change would be apparent to the user.
[3] Restricted Access : A full implementation of the Supervisor
[1] Implementing the Unsupervised Mode
Firstly provision must be made for entry into a mode where Read, Write and format 
requests are executed without restriction. This is further referred to as unsupervised 
mode. This facility must be provided so that partitions may be created or modified, and 
so that the operating system may be updated and new virus-free software placed within 
the boot partition. Access to this mode must be limited to experienced system managers 
and in order to facilitate this a password schema was implemented. Without the 
required password a user is restricted to supervised mode only.
Firstly, the supervisor reserves the last track on the hard disk for storage of this 
password, and any information it may further wish to store. The size of the disk is 
reduced accordingly, so the space cannot be allocated to the user. Access restrictions on 
the area above the last partition ensure that the password cannot be read directly from 
the disk in supervised mode. The password is passed byte by byte to the supervisor 
before DOS is even loaded, ensuring no software can be running in the background 
monitoring the password transfer. Thus the password is entirely secure from both user 
and virus. No encryption is required either, due to the hardware access restriction.
The flow diagram presented in figure 3.46 illustrates the supervisor's boot sequence. 
Firstly, the existence o f  a floppy is checked for. If no floppy is present, then 
supervised mode is the only possible option, so the permission list is built ready for 
interrogation, as explained in the next section. A supervisor maintained variable, 
'locked', is then checked. The variable is initialised from a cold start as false, which 
occurs when the machine first powers up. During a later point in the boot sequence, 
'locked' is made true, thus, if a warm start is subsequently initiated, 'locked' is found 
to be true. A warm start is where the processor is reset, usually from a CTRL-ALT- 
DEL key sequence, when the machine is already powered up, and memory contents are 
usually unaffected by this type o f boot sequence. If 'locked' is found true during the 
warm start, the machine hangs with the message, 'You must power down'. This 
ensures the contents of memory are cleared, destroying any memory resident viruses. 
If locked is false then supervised mode is entered, and the user is informed o f this. 
Locked' is then made true and the operating system is loaded from the hard disk.
Over The Page : Figure 3.46 ; Supervisor Boot Sequence Flow Diagram
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ENTRY
Pause & Retry 
3 times
Is There a Floppy ?
LOCKED ? 
ie Warm Boot
MESSAGE 
'Must Power Down'I HALT I
▼MESSAGE 
'Do You Wish Hard Disk Mounted ?' 
Noy^\.Yes
MESSAGE 
'Floppy Only System'
4Lock Out Drive
4BOOT
Build Permission Table 
Read Boot Track 
Success ?
LOCKED?
Pause & 
Retry 
3 times
MESSAGE 
'Must Power Down'
[ h a l t  I
Existing Password? 
Noy%\^ Yes
MESSAGE 
'Entering Supervised Mode’
Lock In Supervised Mode 
LOCKED := TRUE 
SUPERV := TRUE
MESSAGE 
'Enter New Password' 
+
READ PASSWORD
MESSAGE MESSAGE
'Not Match' 'Enter Again for Verification'
+
READ PASSWORD
4
MATCH ?
IBOOT
MESSAGE 
'Enter System Password' 
+
READ PASSWORD
4
MATCH?
MESSAGE 
Want to Change Password ?'
Lock In Unsupervised Mode 
LOCKED ;= TRUE 
SUPERV := FALSE
BOOT
If a floppy disk is present then two possible modes can be entered. Firstly, however, 
'locked' is checked as for supervised mode entry. This ensures no memory resident 
virus can be active as before. If 'locked' is false, one can boot from the floppy with the 
hard disk forced off-line by the supervisor. This is in effect an unsupervised mode but 
with the hard disk safe. This mode can be accessed by any user for the testing of 
floppy based software with the knowledge that no harm can come to sensitive data on 
the hard disk.
The second possibility is to have the hard disk made on-line. This is true unsupervised 
mode and therefore requires the password mentioned earlier. A check is made to see if 
a password exists. When first installing this system clearly this is not the case. A 
signature is placed within the password sector once a valid password exists, and so this 
signature need only be checked : this is how DOS identifies if  a boot sector exists. If no 
password exists then the user is immediately prompted for one, which is entered twice 
and compared in case o f typing error. The password is then saved and unsupervised 
mode entered for the first time.
If a password already exists then the user is prompted to enter it, and it is then 
compared against the stored original. A password correctly entered is followed by the 
offer of password alteration, a facility which must be provided for any password 
schema. Unsupervised mode is then entered and the system 'locked' and the variable 
'superv' set to false to indicate the mode.
As already outlined, the machine remains in the mode it is in after boot, until a cold 
start is initiated. For a supervised user to alter active partition, the machine must be cold 
booted into supervised mode once more, and the new partition selected.
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[2] Building a Partition Map of the Hard Disk
MS-DOS version 3.3 and above supports two types of MS-EX)S partition : primary and 
extended. A primary partition can be made bootable by marking it active and formatting 
it using the FORMAT command with the /S switch set. An extended partition cannot be 
made bootable but may contain within it a multiple of physically contiguous logical 
drives. This is illustrated in figure 3.47. The extended partition allows large hard disk 
drives to be split into a series of smaller, more manageable logical drives.
DISK SPACE
I
•Disk' C •Disk’ D •Disk' E
 1--------------
Prim ary Partition
I I
Disk' F Remainder
Extended Partition
Figure 3.47 : Example Layout of a Hard Disk Under MS-DOS 3.3+
For the prototype implementation it was assumed that the disk would contain only 
MS-DOS partitions. This would mean that there would be at most two partitions 
existing in a system, one primary MS-DOS and one extended MS-DOS partition. 
Should partitions be introduced by another operating system, these could be mapped 
out, but this would have introduced unnecessary complication.
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PARTITION OFFSET SIZE DESCRIPTION
ONE OIBEH 1 byte boot indicator (OOH-non-boot, 80H-boot)
OIBFH 1 beginning head (0->)
OICOH 1 beginning sector (l->)
01 Cl H 1 beginning cylinder (0->)
01C2H 1 system indicator (GOH=unknown,01 H/04H=DOS)
01C3H 1 ending head (0->)
01C4H 1 ending sector (l->)
01C5H 1 ending cylinder (0->)
01C 6H  4 Starting Sector rel to beginning of disk
OICAH 4 number o f sectors in partition
TWO OICEH 1 boot indicator (OOH-non-boot, 80H-boot)
OICFH 1 beginning head (0->)
OIDOH 1 beginning sector (l->)
OIDIH 1 beginning cylinder (0->)
01D2H 1 system indicator (OOH=unknown,01H/04H-DOS)
01D3H 1 ending head (0->)
01D4H 1 ending sector (l->)
01D5H 1 ending cylinder (0->)
01D 6H  4 Starting Sector rel to beginning o f disk
OIDAH 4 number of sectors in partition
Figure 3.48 : Partition Table for a Physical Disk With Two MS-DOS Partitions
Under the MS-DOS partitioning standard, the first physical sector on the fixed disk is 
the Disk Boot Sector (DBS) which contains not only a bootstrap program, but also the 
partition table for the drive. Figure 3,48 contains the partition table for a two partition 
drive, as mentioned above. The information located within the bytes marked in bold in 
figure 3.48 are sufficient to locate the Partition Boot Sector of the partition in question. 
This boot sector contains a loader routine and a BIOS Parameter Block (BPB) with 
information about the device. The contents of the BPB are illustrated in figure 3.49.
OFFSET SIZE DESCRIPTION SYMBOL
OBH 2 bytes bytes per sector
ODH 1 sectors per allocation unit
OEH 2 reserved sectors (0->)
lOH 1 number of FATs
11H 2 number of root directory entries
13H 2 total sectors in logical volume15H 1 media descriptor byte (F8=fixed disk)
16H 2 number o f sectors per FAT
Figure 3.49 A BIOS Parameter Block
R
n
N
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The layout of an MS-DOS file system within a partition is shown in figure 3.50. Using 
the information contained within the BPB it is possible to identify any of the 
boundaries that exist within this structure. For example, we can identify the address of 
the start of the user files area of the partition. This is important as we need to be able to 
identify system sectors from user sectors within a partition in order to implement the 
schema outlined in Chapter 2.
Start Of System Section - Xs — ^
Start Of User Section for 
Non-Active Partition - Xu
Start Of User Section for 
Active Partition - Xu(mod) — ^
Start Of Next 
System Section - (X+l)s — ^
Disk Boot Sector 
Contains Pointer to Start of Partition
Partition Boot Sector
OEM Identification 
BIOS Parameter Block (BPB) 
Loader Routine, Reserved Area
Identifies Xu and Xu(mod) Boundaries
File Allocation Table (FAT)
Possible Copies of FAT
Root Disk Directory
Files Area
Figure 3.50 : Layout of an MS-DOS File System
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The two pointers, SUx and SUx(mod), in figure 3.50 are the ones of which we require 
knowledge. SUx identifies where the system sectors finish and the user sectors begin, 
for the partition. A non active partition will use this boundary, as reading from system 
sectors is allowed and indeed required by the system, whereas reading from user 
sectors is forbidden. The reason for this is that a Read request implies a possible 
Execute, and executing an application from a non-active partition cannot be allowed. 
Writing will not be allowed for either type of sector. When a partition is activated. Read 
and Write privileges are given to the user sectors, the directory sectors, and the FAT 
tables within the system sectors. As the permissions are identical, this is implemented 
most easily by shifting the system/user boundary back to SUx(mod). The system 
sectors which remain before SUx(mod) retain their 'Read only' status since writing 
would allow the partition bounds to be altered and therefore would allow the possibility 
of writing outwith the bounds of the partition.
Figure 3.51 contains a flow diagram indicating how the required address boundaries 
are obtained from the disk. The algorithm starts at the first physical sector of the fixed 
disk where, as mentioned above, the partition table exists. Address OOOOOOOOH is also, 
understandably, the start address for the system section of the first partition, SSi.
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4 r
X := 1
SSx = SSl := 00 00 00 00
i
Reads (Buffi , SSx)
Reads (Buffi, SSx + ReadA (Buffi, 1C6H) )
R = ReadW (Buffi, OOEH) 
n = ReadB (Buffi. OlOH)
N = ReadW (Buffi, 01IH)
S = ReadW (Buffi, 016H)
SUx = SSx + R * S) + (N / 16)
IF
ReadB (Buffi . IDOH) = 00
THEN
FINISHED
ELSE 
X := X + 1
SSx := ( (IF X=1 THEN SSI ELSE SSI) + 
ReadA (Buffi . 1D6H) )
Disk Boot Sector
Partition Boot Sector
No, of Reserved Sectors 
No. of FATs 
No. of Root Dir Entries 
No. of Sectors per FAT
SUx
Test If Another 'Disk' Exists 
'No Drive'
Find Start of Next 'Drive'
SSx =
Base Address (Primary or Extended Start) 
+ Offset (found in DBS)
Figure 3.51 : Flow Diagram for Partition Boundary Address Acquisition
Firstly the disk boot sector is referenced to obtain the location of the partition boot 
sector, and the start address, SU i, o f the user segment is calculated from the 
information thus obtained, together with the modified address, SUi(mod).The disk boot 
sector is then re-examined to see if a further partition exists. If it does the address, SS2, 
is obtained and the whole operation re-executed. All logical addresses obtained are 
relative to either the primary partition base address, SSi, or the extended partition 
address, SSi. Each partition created within the extended partition is treated as a logical 
drive. Each logical drive has its own disk boot sector, located within the first sector .
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This in turn contains pointers to the start of the partition itself, and therefore the 
partition boot sector, and a pointer to any subsequent logical drives. This is illustrated 
in figure 3.52. The whole operation is repeated until all logical drives have been 
analysed.
System System 
11-----'----- IT
System UsctJ   L1n II□1■2 L_4 a
 1—
’Disk’ C
 1-----
Disk’ D
I
Disk’ E
 1 I
Disk’ F Remainder
Prim ary Partition Extended Partition .
DBS - Disk Boot Sector PBS - Partition Boot Sector
Figure 3.52 : Partition Layout With Regard to Boot Sectors
The Z80 assembler listing which implemented the flow diagram of figure 3.51 is 
shown in figures 3.53 through to 3.55. When this routine has run to completion, all the 
required address boundaries have been identified and pushed onto the stack in order.
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genlist Id a,Targ ;*Read Partition Tablecall xrbitra ; * (Disk Boot Sector)Id ix,ramit+addressId iy,bufficall phasez
; * Find address of Start of partition
Id ix,ramit+addressId iy,buff2call phasez
Figure 3.53 : Assembler Listing for Partition Boundary Address Acquisition - Part 1
In the first section, contained within figure 3.53, the Disk Boot Sector is read from the 
first physical sector o f the hard disk into buffer, 'Buffi'. The address SSx is also 
pushed onto the stack. An offset is obtained for the location o f the Partition Boot Sector 
(PBS) and used to read the PBS into a second buffer, ’Buff2'.
;* (where the BOIS Param Block is ! !)
Id iXframit+address ;*set index register
IdId b, (ix+4)c,(ix+5) ;*load in lower 16 of addresspush be ;*Save lower 16 of addr - SSxId hi, (buffl+Al_L) ;*load in lower 16 of offsetadd hi, be /*Add themId (ix+4),h /*And store themId (ix+5),1 ■
Id b,(ix+2) ;*load in upper 16 of addressId c, (ix+3)push be ;*Save upper 16 of addr - SSxId hi, (buffl+Al__H) ;*load in upper 16 of offsetadc hi, be ;*Add them + possible carryId (ix+2),h ;*And return themId (ix+3),1
Id a,Targ /* Read BIOS Param Block
call xrbitra ;* (Partition Boot Sector)
149
loopl
; * Generate address - :
Id iy,buff2Id b,(iy+n)Id d, (iy+S__l)Id e,(iy+S_2)
Id hi,OOhId a, OOhadd hi, deadc a, OOhdjnz loopl
Id d,(iy+N_l)Id e,(iy+N_2)
srl drr esrl drr esrl drr esrl drr e
add hi, deadc a, OOh
Id d, (iy+R_l)Id e,(iy+R 2)push de
add hi, deadc a, OOh
Id ix,ramit+address
Id b,(ix+4)Id c,(ix+5)push beadd hi, bepush hi
Id l,aId h,00hId b,(ix+2)Id c,(ix+3)push beadc hi, bepush hi
Id hi,ramit+listleninc (hi)
SUx and add to list
; *B = n ;*DE = S
;*AHL = S*n 
;*DE = N
*DE = N/16
*AHL = N/16 +' S*n
*DE = R 
*Store R
*AHL = N/16 + S*n + R
*set address pointer
*load in lower 16 of address
*Store *Add them
*Save lower 16 of addr - SUx
*load in upper 16 of address 
*Store*Add them + possible carry *Save upper 16 of addr - SUx
*Adjust size of list
Figure 3.54 : Assembler Listing for Partition Boundary Address Acquisition - Part 2
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Contained within the PBS is the BIOS Parameter Block. From this all the information 
required to calculate the position of SUx and SUx(mod) is obtained. The code for this 
appears in figure 3.54. Firstly 'n' and 'S’ are extracted and multiplied. They represent 
the number of copies of the FAT present and the number of sectors that each FAT 
requires, respectively, and their product indicates the total number of sectors used to 
store FAT information for the given drive. Next, 'N', the total number of root directory 
entries, is extracted and divided by sixteen, to convert the number to the sector 
requirement to store the entries. Each entry requires 32 bytes and there are 512 bytes 
per sector, therefore each entry requires 32/512 of a sector (ie a sixteenth). Lastly, 'R' 
is obtained, the number of reserved sectors. Such sectors are used for the partition boot 
sector itself to reside in. The the sum of the two values calculated above, together with 
'R' provide a value for SUx when added to the start address of the partition. 'R' itself, 
when added to the start address of the partition, provides the value for SUx(mod).
; * Go back and read pointer to next partition
Id a, (buffl+ldOh) ;*read sector numberor a ;*test if OOh;*if 00 return as no more P ’s
jp 2 ,endbit
;* Get. address of next partition
Id ix,ramit+addres2 ;*load in copy of address
Id b,(ix+4) ;*load in lower 16 of addressId c,(ix+5)Id hi,(buffl+A2_L) ;*load in lower 16 of offsetadd hi, be ;*Add them
Id ix,ramit+address ;*Store copy 1Id (ix+4),hId (ix+5),1
Id a,(ramit+listlen) ;*load length of list
Id ix,ramit+addres2 ;*Store copy 2 iff listlen=lcp Olh ;*addres2=start of curr drivejp nz,loopx
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loopx
Id (ix+4),hId (ix+5),1
Id b, (ix+2) ;*load in upper 16 of addressId c, (ix+3)Id hi,(buffl+A2_H) ;*load in upper 16 of offsetadc hi, be ;*Add them + possible carry
cp Olh ;*Store copy 2 iff listlen=l
jp nz,loopy
Id (ix+2),hId (ix+3),1
Id ix,ramit+address ;*Store copy 1Id (ix+2),hId (ix+3),1
loopy
;* Repeat with next partition block 
jp genlist
Figure 3.55 : Assembler Listing for Partition Boundary Address Acquisition - Part 3
Finally, the code illustrated in figure 3.55, checks for the presence of another logical 
drive and repeats the whole sequence accordingly. The buffer 'Buffi' is re-examined 
as it contains the Disk Boot Sector. It is tested for the presence of a second entry in the 
Partition Table. The easiest way to test for this is to check the value of the 'Beginning 
Sector' field : valid sector values range from one upwards, so if the value is zero then 
no entry exists. If this is the case then we have reached the end of the chain and all 
drives have been identified. A non-zero value indicates the presence o f another drive 
and the pointer to it is obtained. As mentioned before, all addresses obtained are 
relative to one of two base values : the start o f the primary partition or the start of the 
extended partition. The current base address is stored within the locations pointed to by 
'Addres2', and is updated only once when moving from one partition into the other. 
The code sequence starting at the top of figure 3.53 and moving through Figure 3.54 
and figure 3.55 is repeated until no second entry in a DBS Partition Table is detected.
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Once this sequence is completed all required values are available on the stack. These 
values are popped off and placed in a table of the format illustrated in figure 3.56.
Address Field Second Address Field Flags Access
Segm ent Read Write Alter s/u CountCs Start Address Unused R NW U S 0Cu Start Address Modified Start Address R NW U U 0Ds Start Address Unused R NW A s 0
Du Start Address Modified Start Address NR NW A u 0
Es Start Address Unused R NW A s 0
Eu Start Address Modified Start Address NR NW A u 0
Fs Start Address Unused R NW A s 0
Fu Start Address Modified Start Address NR NW A u 0
X Start Address Unused NR ■NW U 0
 ^ 4 Bytes 4 Bytes 1 Byte 1 Byte ^
10 Bytes Per Entry
FLAGS Read R = Read Permission, NR = No Read Permission
W rite W = Write Permission, NW = No Write Permission 
Alter A = Alterable, U = Unalterable 
S / U S = System Segment, U = User Segment
Figure 3.56 : Permission Table
Each entry occupies ten bytes. The first four contain the logical start address for the 
user or system section o f each partition. If the entry is for a user section then the
second block of four bytes contains the modified address which will replace the first 
four bytes if that partition is activated. If the entry is not for a user section then these 
bytes remain unused. The last two bytes are used for status information. For the 
prototype, four bits are used : Read permission, Write permission, system/user 
indicator, and alter permission. Entries for the boot partition and the final entry which 
covers all unused space at the top end o f the drive, are unalterable in that their Read and 
Write permissions may not be changed. All other entries may have their permissions 
altered during activation. The second status byte, purely for prototype testing, 
maintains a count of the number o f accesses of that segment of the disk.
153
[3] Act iva t ing  a  P a r t i t io n
When the machine has just booted, the permission list will contain the status 
information illustrated in figure 3.57.
D rive Segm ent Read Write Alterable
C System Yes No No
C User Yes No No
All Others System Yes No Yes
All Others User No No Yes
Above Partitions N/A No No No
Figure 3.57 : Permission list Status On Boot
Nowhere on the disk has write permission, and read is restricted to drive C and all 
system segments of the other drives only. The first violation of these permissions, 
which occurs within an alterable segment, will cause automatic activation of the 
partition to which that segment belongs. Violation occurs if  the system segment o f  a 
partition is written to, or a Read or Write is attempted within a user segment.
The flow diagram used to determine Read permission is presented in figure 3.58. 
Firstly, a variable called 'Superv', which is maintained within the supervisor's RAM 
space, and initially set 'TRUE' on boot, is interrogated. If the value indicates 
'FALSE', then the system is currently in unsupervised mode and all Read operations 
are permissible. This variable is set during the boot sequence when the mode is 
decided. If not, then the permission list entry is obtained for that segment of disk. If the 
Read permission value for that entry indicates that Read operations are allowed then the 
operation is permitted. If not, then two further tests are made : is the entry unalterable 
and has a partition already been activated? If either of these tests prove positive then the 
operation is not permitted as this violates the protection schema. A previous activation 
is indicated using a variable within the Supervisor's RAM which is initially false and 
made true after activation. If both tests prove false then the operation is allowable but 
the partition in question must be activated first
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SUPERVISED MODE ? 
Ncur N^ Yes
ALLOW
Unsupervised Mode
Find List Entry
READ PERMISSION? 
Y e s /  XNo
IALLOW
Read Permission
ALTERABLE? 
Now vYes
ACTIVE?
NR->R 
NW->W 
Sux > SUx(mod) 
ACTIVE? := TRUE
I a l l o w I
Read + Activation
Figure 3.58 : Flow Diagram for Read Permission
As Read permission is only restricted initially within user segments the request 
therefore can be assumed to be within the user segment of the partition. The permission 
list entry which has been identified therefore requires only that Read and Write 
permission be granted and the modified address copied from bytes four through seven 
into the first four bytes for activation to be implemented. Finally, the variable Active?' 
is updated to indicate that activation has occurred as this may only happen once per 
session on the machine.
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During what may be referred to as 'normal' operation of the machine, where a partition 
has been activated and all requests are within allowed segments, the number of tests 
required are kept to a minimum. Tests for unsupervised mode and for Read permission 
within supervised mode are made first and under normal conditions one of these will 
grant permission.
Write permission is slightly more complex and the flow diagram which is used to 
determine such permission is presented in figure 3.59.
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SUPERVISED MODE ? 
No> S. Yes
ALLOW
Unsupervised Mode
WRITE PERMISSION ?
Find List Entry
No
ALLOW
Write Permission
ALTERABLE ? 
No, SYes
ACTIVE?
I BAD I
NR->R NW->W SUx > SUx(mod) ACnVE?:=TRUE
ALLOW
Write + Activation
Move Back One Item In List 
(ToSU x)
4SUx -> SUx(mod)NR ->R NW->W ACTIVE? := TRUE
Find List Entry 
(with modified list)
SSx ?
ALLOW
Write + Activation
Figure 3.59 : Flow Diagram for Write Permission
157
The flow diagram closely follows that of Read permission to the point of activation. 
Once it has been determined that a Write operation is potentially allowable, but 
activation is required, a complication arises. Firstly, the request may be to write to 
within either a system or user segment as both have restricted Write and are alterable 
after boot. If the request is made to within a user segment, determined by testing one of 
the status bits of the permission list entry, then activation is identical as for Read, and 
permission is granted. If however the request is made to within a system segment, then 
in order to activate that partition, the entry corresponding to the user segment must be 
obtained as it is this entry which is updated, not the system segment entry. Once found, 
the entry is updated as previously described. The request must then be re-evaluated to 
find out on which side of the new boundary between system and user segments, it 
resides. If it still lies within the system segment then it must be a request to modify the 
boundary of the partition itself which cannot be allowed. If however it now lies within 
the expanded user segment then it is a request to modify either a directory entry or 
update a FAT table, either of which is permissible.
Once a partition is activated the permission list is of the format illustrated in figure 
3.60.
D rive Segm ent R ead W rite
C System Yes No
C User Yes No
Active Partition System Yes No
Active Partition User (mod) Yes Yes
AH Others System Yes No
All Others User No No
Above Partitions N/A No No
Figure 3.60 : Permission List Status After Partition Activation.
After activation, no further modifications may be made to the permission list. 
Attempted violation of access privileges will result in a warning and possible drive 
disablement.
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[4] Finding an Entry Within the Permission List
Identifying the entry in the permission list which describes the segment of disk, which 
contains a data area to which a data transfer request has been made, is a time critical 
task. A significant degradation in performance is possible if the identification algorithm 
is inefficient.
In an attempt to minimise the instructions required to move about the list and test 
addresses, a series of measures were incorporated. The list is stored in reverse order, 
thus the first time the requested address is found to be greater than or equal to the 
entry's address, the entry has been identified. This means that only one bound of each 
segment need be checked, until the entry is identified. Once identified the upper bound 
of the request is checked to make sure it is still within that segment. Each entry in the 
permission list is o f fixed length, incurring waste in system segment entries, but this 
ensures moving between entries can be implemented with a fixed length jump.
List Entry := 1 
A ;= Address to be Checked
A >= List Entry [Address] ? 
Y e s /  XNo
FOUND List Entry List Entry + 1
Figure 3.61 : Simple Permission List Search Algorithm
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Figure 3.61 illustrates how simple the search algorithm can be made. If the algorithm 
illustrated in figure 3.62 is incorporated within figure 3.61 then, when testing whether 
the requested address is greater than, or equal to, the list entry address, minimum tests 
are carried out to identify whether the relationship holds. In figure 3.62, 'n' represents 
the byte number within the address starting with the most significant with value zero. If 
the address highest order byte is found to be greater than the corresponding entry byte 
then the entry has been found. If the former proves to be less than the latter then the 
correct entry has not been found so the algorithm is re-executed with the next entry. If 
neither of these are true then the bytes are equal and the next order byte must be tested. 
If all bytes in the address have been tested and they all prove equal then the correct 
entry has been identified.
n := 0
An >Ln ?
FOUND
A > L
An < Ln
FAIL
A < L
A /
List Entry := List Entry
 K
n — 2
FOUND
A = L
n := n + I
V
Figure 3.62 : Byte by Byte Testing o f Addresses
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This algorithm ensures that the relationship between the two addresses under scrutiny 
is identified at the earliest possible stage, for each entry. For the prototype the highest 
order byte, the fourth, is ignored as the three lower order bytes can address over eight 
gigabytes of disk and it is not envisaged that drives of greater size than this will appear 
for the IBM PC family of machines for some considerable time, if ever.
A further improvement can be made, if a moving base is implemented. That is, for all 
bytes in the requested address that have zero value, once a corresponding zero in the 
entry table has been identified, that byte order is ignored for further entries. The 
implementation of this is relatively simple : first, the base is set to zero, the highest 
order byte. Then, when an event occurs where the requested address and entry address 
base order bytes are both zero, the base is incremented. When beginning a new test the 
algorithm always starts with the base order bytes, not the highest ofder bytes as before. 
An example of this is illustrated in figure 3.63,
A
L =
00 00 21 Execution :
01 lA FF base := 000 FA 01 A1 < Lli : L1->L2, n:=base
00 A5 20 Al = L2l = 00 : base:=l. A1->A2, L21->L22
00 50 00 A2 < L22 : L2->L3, n:-base
00 21 IF A2 < LS2 ** : L3->L4, n:=base
00 11 11
00 OA lA A2 = L82 = 00 ; base :=2, A2->A3, L82->L83
00 00 37 A3 < L83 ; L8->L9, n:=base
00 00 00 A3 > L93 ** : BINGO ! !!
Ay = Requested Address, byte yLXy = Permission List entry ’X', byte y
** = base has moved -> result itallic values never checkedFor this example 8 tests have been avoided, and associated jumps
Figure 3.63 : Example o f Moving Base Algorithm Improvement
The final algorithm with all these improvements implemented appears in figure 3.64. 
This includes a boundary check which is executed only when the correct entry has been 
found. This check makes sure that the number of sectors requested does not cross over 
into the next segment.
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Test (Al, A2, C) -> Check Byte C of Al & A2 & return >, =, or < 
BASE := 0 > Base Column 
L := First List Entry Start Address 
A := Address to Check 
C := 0 -> Current Column
A>L
L := Next List Entry 
C := BASEC=3?Yes No
Ac = 00?
,YesNa
BASE := BASE + 1
L := Previous List Entry
A := A + No. of Sectors Requested
4Test (AJL,1)
A>L, A=L X  A<L
Test (A^ La)
A>L
Test (AJL.3)
A>L
Bounds Error
Good
Found Entry +
BOUNDS CHECK 
Once Entry Identified
No Bounds Error
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Previous Page : Figure 3.64 : Fast Permission List Search Algorithm
The code implementation of this algorithm returns a pointer to the entry in the 
permission list. This allows for interrogation of the permission status bytes, and 
possible partition activation as a result.
[5] Parallelism within the system
Clearly, with the addition o f a dedicated supervising processor, the possibility of a 
certain amount of parallelism exists. This occurs in many places within the schema ; 
both processors working after an effective fork where the IBM initiates a supervisor 
event ; followed by an effective join, where the IBM waits for a status byte to be
returned by the supervisor.
IBM
Command Entry Point 
SEND SUPERVISOR (Select Drive Request)i
BUILD LOGICAL ADDRESS
AWAIT STATUS 
Finised ? AND Success ?
SU P E R V ISO R
y
4
Select Drive 
Sequence
4"Generate STATUS 
 1
SET Bad_Status
IMP End
Continue
Execution
4
Figure 3.65 : Example o f Parallelism
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Figure 3.65 illustrates one occurrence of parallelism in the system. As soon as a 
request for a hard disk function is made, the IBM issues a select drive request to the 
supervisor. The IBM then computes the logical address required, from the cylinder, 
head, and sector values passed to the INT 13H call. Whilst this is happening, the 
supervisor attempts to select the required drive ready for access. When the IBM has 
completed its task it then waits for a 'success' status from the supervisor before 
continuing, Thus the drive is selected in effectively zero time.
Savings made in this way offset the overheads incurred during interrogation of the 
permission list.
3.1.2 TESTING
Manual Testing Using Debug
A routine was provided within the firmware which, when invoked, transfers the 
contents of the permission list, byte by byte, to the IBM. An executable program was 
further written, PRLIST.EXE, which invoked the aforementioned routine in firmware 
and displayed the permission list in readable form. This provided an easy means by 
which the virus protection schema could be verified.
Firstly, a drive was formatted and partitioned. The permission list was then displayed 
using PRLIST. Simple calculation could then verify that the system boundaries were 
correct.
The utility DEBUG.COM, provided by Microsoft, as part of the DOS operating system 
software was then used. This utility allowed direct calls to the hard disk services 
interrupt, INT 13H. Using this facility one could read all required sectors in order to 
manually check the user boundaries present in the permission list.
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Once the permission list was checked the primary partition, 'C, could be tested by 
attempting to write a sector to it using DEBUG again. This was a violation, and a 
visual warning resulted. This was repeated with both read and write, from and to, the C
upper disk area, above the top partition. Once this was completed, the Unalterable' 
areas of the disk were shown to be operating correctly.
Partition activation was tested by both writing to the directory of the system segment, 
and reading and writing, from and to the user segment of a partition. This resulted in 
the expected alteration of the permission list, which was viewed using PRLIST, once 
more. Writing to the partition data area o f the system segment was also shown to 
produce a warning, and prevent activation o f the partition.
After successful activation, various segments were tested for Read and Write. All types 
o f partition : boot/primary, active and other, were shown to behave as required.
Attempts to transfer a block of data which begins within a valid segment, but crosses 
into another invalid segment, were also made, and failed as expected.
A systematic check of all possible access requests to all possible segments and 
partitions was made and the system behaved as required, by the definition o f the 
schema. Repetitive batch files were also executed which copied files from one place to 
another, and then back. After many hours the information being copied was found to 
be intact, indicating that no intermittent errors were present in the SCSI transfer 
firmware or hardware.
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Introducing a Virus
The ultimate test had to be made. A particularly virulent virus, the DARK AVENGER 
or 'EDDIE' virus, was introduced into the system. This virus is probably the most 
widespread and dangerous Bulgarian virus to date. To quote the author of the virus :
" In early March 1989 Version 1.31 of the Dark Avenger virus was called into 
existence and started to live its own life to all engineers' and suckers' terror.
So, never say die. Eddie lives on and on and on.... ”
This virus is memory resident and infects during execution or opening of a file. The 
virus was introduced into the system, by execution of an infected program, which was 
placed within an active partition. Instantly, the system halted with a warning message. 
No files were infected as the DARK AVENGER, in common with most viruses, 
attacks the COMMAND.COM file in drive 'C first, to ensure that it is executed on 
boot. This attempt was trapped instantly by the protection system as drive C  always 
has 'read only' status. One should however realise that, although no files were infected 
in this case, the virus did have the ability to infect, corrupt, or destroy all, or some, of 
the information stored within the active partition.
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CHAPTER 4 
POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS
4.0 PARTITION ACTIVATION BY EXPLICIT CHOICE
The choice of active partition can be made at boot time, ensuring the user has explicit 
knowledge of the choice. A menu, similar to the example in figure 4.0, would be 
presented to the user.
PARTITION REQUIRED
D MISCELLANEOUS
E WORD
F DBASE
G ACCOUNTS
H DAVE - PRIVATE
I JOHN - PRIVATE
J FRED - PRIVATE
K GAMES
Figure 4.0 : Choice of Active Partition from a Menu
A field would be provided, defined by the unsupervised user, which would appear in 
the menu alongside the drive letter. This field would be used to provide a brief 
description of the drive's contents. This would provide vital information for the user, 
as this method does not allow perusal of the root directories o f drives before making 
the decision.
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Figure 4.1 ; Screen Message After Choice Has Been Made
After the choice has been made the user would be presented with a message on the 
screen, similar to figure 4.1, reaffirming the decision. This message could be re­
invoked by executing a utility program, should the user forget.
This method ensures that the user is fully aware of the partitions which he, or she, may 
access, and the Read and Write permission associated with them. This method also 
facilitates certain other improvements introduced below.
4.1 MULTIPLE READ ONLY PARTITIONS
As mentioned previously, any executable file which is virus free, and not self­
modifying, may be placed within the boot partition, 'C. Any executable file thus 
placed cannot be infected due to the Read Only' status of the partition : it is guaranteed 
virus proof. There are a few situations that may occur where such a guarantee would be 
desirable, but the boot partition would not be suitable : the 'C drive may not have the 
required space, and reformatting the disk and altering the size allocated to C  may not 
be a realistic solution ; or the software may not be self-modifying, but may not be one 
hundred percent guaranteed virus-free ; or simply, one would not wish to clutter the 
boot partition further by adding yet another piece of software.
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PARTITION REQUIRED
WORD
ACCOUNTS
DAVE - PRIVATE
JOHN - PRIVATE
FRED - PRIVATE
Figure 4.2 : Menu After Partition 'D' Made Read Only
An improvement that could be made would be to offer the facility of marking a partition 
'Read Only’ to the unsupervised user. This partition subsequently would not appear as 
a possible partition for activation. It would, however, be presented'as being available, 
for reading only, in the message which follows after the choice is made, ensuring the 
user is aware of the possibility. For example, if, in the configuration presented in 
figure 4.0, the 'Miscellaneous' partition ('D') was made 'Read Only', the menu would 
appear as in figure 4.2, with the message following shown in figure 4.3.
ACTIVE PARTITION : H DAVE-PRIVATE
READ PERM ISSION : 0 BOOT 1
MISCELLANEOUS I
Figure 4.3 : Message After Partition D' Made Read Only
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This facility would provide a dynamic allocation of Write protected disk space, 
guaranteeing virus protection for programs which are not self-modifying, and 
protecting data that does not require updating from corruption.
4.2 SECURITY SHELL
Existing within the schema already, is a mechanism for password entry restriction, to 
unsupervised mode. This concept could be extended into supervised mode, to provide 
a security shell similar to those found in mainframe, multi-user systems.
The unsupervised user would have the ability o f adding a user touhe system. Once a 
username is created, the user, when first attempting to use the machine, would be 
required to enter a password. These username/password pairs would be stored in the 
same manner as for the unsupervised mode password where the information is totally 
secure. Password entry would be by the same method also : byte by byte before DOS 
is loaded.
If a correct password was entered, then entry would be given to supervised mode. This 
in itself would insure that no unauthorised users could gain any access to the system. 
This concept can be extended, however, to provide more versatile and comprehensive 
security.
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z  Û  ÛS
READ
ONLY U SE R SDRIVES
D MISCELLANEOUS 
E WORD 
F DBASE 
G ACCOUNTS 
H DAVE 
I JOHN 
J FRED 
K GAMES
Read Only
Figure 4.4 : Allocating Partitions to Supervised Users
A mechanism could be further provided, so that the un supervised user could allocate a 
subset of the possible partitions to any given user. To continue the example above, 
figure 4.4 represents a possible security shell implementation, where the unsupervised 
user defines the partitions available to each user through alteration of a table, generated 
on demand at boot time. This table would be generated with a column for each defined 
user, and a row for each defined partition. A column has also been added here to 
implement the Read Only' partition mentioned in the previous section. For each 
partition which is not rendered 'Read Only', permission of use can be allocated on an 
individual user basis.
In the example in figure 4.4, users Dave, John, and Fred have a partition allocated to 
them which is only accessible to them as individuals. Clearly, these partitions can only 
be infected by the user to which they are allocated, and so one can guarantee that no
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infection can be introduced by another user's carelessness. Thus a careful user can be 
assured that a partition allocated to he, or she, alone cannot have been infected by 
someone else during a previous session on the machine.
USERNAME : DAVE
PASSW ORD : *******
PARTITION REQUIRED 1
E WORD
F DBASE
G ACCOUNTS
H DAVE
K GAMES
Figure 4.5 : Example Login Sequence
Figure 4.5 illustrates an example login sequence for user Dave' for the example 
configuration in figure 4.4. Considering purely the security aspect of this concept, one 
can also see that more use can be made of an individual machine if certain individuals 
cannot access certain information held on that machine. Imagine the scenario where 
Dave is the manager, Fred the accountant, and John the salesman for the company 
which own this machine. Previously, it is unlikely that John would be allowed to use 
the machine as all the salary information is stored within the accounts partition, and he 
cannot be allowed to have access to this. With this system running, however, access 
can easily be denied, and John would no longer require a separate machine for his 
client database, and for writing letters.
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User names need not be allocated on an individual basis. In the example above, the 
username 'User' has been introduced which gives use of the 'Word' and 'Games' 
partitions. The password of this username could be given to all employees, who have 
not been allocated an individual username. This allows all employees use of the low 
security software on the machine, which they may require at some time.
A possible addition to this might be a username, such as 'Guest', which requires no 
password, but gives access to only the boot partition and 'Read Only' partitions. Such 
a user would not be able to activate a partition and therefore would not be able to write 
to the disk. Such a user could not possibly introduce a virus, but could do useful work, 
saving results onto a floppy disk on completion.
Clearly, such a security shell could provide more versatility, both to the machine in 
general, and to the virus protection mechanism itself.
4.3 FLOPPY SCHEMES
A major source of infection is the floppy disk. With the virus protection schema we can 
guarantee that certain areas o f the disk remain virus free and that general partitions 
become contained units, rendering partition to partition infection impossible. Infecting 
an active partition is, however, still possible via a floppy disk. A few possible methods 
of reducing, or removing the chance of infection by this method are presented below. 
They all depend on the addition o f the floppy disk controlling hardware onto the 
supervisor card.
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4.3.0 DENIAL OF ALL REQUESTS IN SUPERVISED MODE
This is the simplest solution. All requests to read or write, from or to, a floppy disk, 
whilst in Supervised mode, are denied. This insures that infection of the active partition 
cannot take place. It does, however, also prevent the backing up or restoring of 
software, or the introduction of valid files. This would therefore require the 
Unsupervised user to introduce all software, and backup all files on a regular basis. 
This method of restriction would heavily reduce the functionality of the machine, and 
would impinge on the freedom of the user in the completion of tasks. It is, however, 
the most ri gourous solution, and could be implemented, provided the Un supervised 
user was particularly diligent and regularly available.
4.3.1 RESTRICTED ACCESS IN SUPERVISED MODE
With the security shell implemented, as mentioned above, it is possible to provide a 
restricted access mechanism, in one of two ways.
One way would be to restrict access to certain users. This could be implemented by the 
addition of a row to the access table where access to the floppy drive can be granted on 
an individual user basis. The advantage of this would be that a subset of trusted users 
could have backup abilities, whilst ensuring less trustworthy users, or those who 
would not require such access, do not. This would reduce the chance of infection and 
maintain a small, well defined group who are responsible for the state of the machine. 
No partitions, save 'Read Only' ones, could be guaranteed virus free by this 
mechanism.
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A second way would be to restrict access to sessions on the machine where certain 
partitions are active. This could be implemented by the addition of a column to the 
access table. Dependent on the choice of active partition, a user may or may not be 
granted permission to access the floppy drive. This has the advantage that certain 
partitions, without floppy permission can be guaranteed virus free as for the floppy 
scheme presented in section 4.3.0. These partitions would have to be backed up by the 
unsupervised user. Certain other partitions would have permission and in this case cl
backing up and maintaining a virus free condition would be the responsibility of the 
users. For example, continuing with the access table in figure 4.4, partitions 'Word',
'Accounts' and 'Dbase' could have floppy access denied and be maintained by the 
unsupervised user, whilst partitions 'Dave', 'Fred' and 'John' would have floppy 
access and would be the responsibility of the user assigned to them. The 'Games' 
partition would probably be given access rights, as this partition would have very low 
security associated with it, allowing users to introduce games, and possibly viruses, at 
will. This would prevent employees being tempted to introduce the games elsewhere, 
risking infection within partitions where important data is kept.
4.3.2 FULL ENCRYPTED ACCESS IN SUPERVISED MODE
Ideally one would wish for complete virus protection, rather than containment, whilst 
allowing the backing up, and restoring, to and from, floppy disk. This could be 
implemented using a reasonably complex method involving encryption.
The implementation of this method requires that a portion of the Z80 ROM be filled 
with a random sequence, different for each ROM. The supervisor would segment this 
sequence into a machine number, and a unique partition number for each partition.
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In supervised mode, all Write requests to a floppy disk would cause the data to be 
encrypted, before transfer, using the machine number and partition number 
corresponding to the active partition, as the lock and key to the encryption algorithm. 
All Read requests would be similarly decrypted. See figure 4.6.
ROM machine number 
partition 1
f ' 1
WRITE REQUEST 
Unsup Mode ?
X \
partition X ---► ENCRYPT Write to Disk(Active P = X)
. iWrite to Diskmax partitionf ' ]
1 READ REQUEST
Read From Disk
4
Unsup Mode ? 
sY
DECRYPT 
(Active P = X)
Stop
IStop
Figure 4.6 : Encryption of Floppy Disk Data in Supervised Mode
Thus, a floppy disk formatted, and written to, by a supervised user, may only be read 
when the disk is returned to the same machine, with the same partition active. This 
means that no software may be introduced into a partition, unless it originated from that 
partition. It also means that this particular floppy disk cannot cause a virus to be 
spread, within the machine, or to an outside machine, as it is unreadable outwith its 
defined partition.
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A partition with encryption implemented can therefore be guaranteed virus-free, whilst 
allowing users of the partition floppy access for vital backing up and restoring. It 
should also be noted that important, sensitive data cannot be removed from the partition 
and read elsewhere, providing a secure way of preventing theft and careless spread of 
data.
Using the ROM as storage of the random sequence ensures that no user can gain access 
to the sequence, whilst guaranteeing that, even after a disk crash, data can be retrieved 
from backup floppies. Alteration of the partition structures after such a crash from what 
they had previously been, by the unsupervised user, could mean that the partition 
which encrypted the floppy disk would no longer exist. The unsupervised user would 
be provided with a utility which would decrypt any floppy encrypted on the machine by 
trying all possible unique partition numbers, which could be used"either for restoring 
after a crash, or for introducing information into a different partition. New software 
could only be introduced by the unsupervised user, which is the ideal case.
It is probably desirable that only certain partitions be protected in this manner, as it 
would require a reasonable amount of diligence of the user to mark floppies with the 
machine and partition indicated. Failure to do this would mean that a floppy introduced 
into an incorrect partition would appear unformatted and it could be mistaken for a 
blank disk. Partitions requiring only low security, such as a games partition, could be 
left unprotected. Implementation would require the addition of a row in the access table 
indicating whether encryption would be required.
This method provides the desired level of protection and is reasonably transparent to 
the user and operating system. All that is required is that a user is fully aware that a 
floppy disk, once formatted, can be used solely when using the machine and partition 
that were in use dm ing the format.
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CHAPTER 5 
ALTERNATIVE IMPLEMENTATIONS
5.0 PROCESSOR FREE SOLUTION
The virus protection schema, so far described, relies on the use of a second processor, 
the supervisor, to control access to the hard disk drive. The addition of this processor 
ensures that decisions can be made without possible intervention or corruption by an 
advanced virus. An alternative schema was considered which would not require such a 
processor, but would use only the CPU of the machine, whilst maintaining the 
incorruptibility of the system.
Most of the firmware would be ported to run directly on the 80x86 processor of the 
IBM. Using the small circuit in figure 5.0, a small area of RAM would be provided 
which could be written to after a cold boot, but could subsequently be rendered 'Read 
Only'. Effectively this RAM could be converted to ROM during a session on the 
machine, but not converted back. The flip-flop in the circuit powers up with a 'Q' 
output of logic zero, as the capacitor connected to the asynchronous 'Clear' input 
ensures that the input is held low long enough to clear the flip-flop's contents. A 'Q' 
output of zero allows write pulses to propagate from '!WE Input' to '!WE Output' and 
thus the RAM may be written to. However, a single pulse sent to the 'Clock' input 
causes the 'Q' output to go to logic one and prevents all write pulses from being 
propagated. This operation is non reversible and thus the effect is to convert the RAM  
to a ROM.
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> lOK
Port Mapped WRITE ---
CL
!WE Output
!WE Input
+5v j j—
Figure 5.0 : RAM to ROM Conversion in Hardware.
This RAM would be filled with the permission list on boot, and then rendered 'Read 
Only' before loading the operating system. This would ensure that no user or virus 
could tamper with the list.
A mechanism, which guarantees the decision making firmware being executed, would 
also be required. If we can ensure that it is actually the ROM which is being executed 
and not a program simulating the ROM which is being executed from elsewhere, then 
this would be the case. The simple circuit in figure 5.1 would ensure this.
+5vLast Memory Access
C800
Port Mapped WRITE
Violation ?1 = Allow 0 = Violation
5 0
Figure 5.1 : Hardware to Ensure Execution Within ROM
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At the start of a disk request, the firmware would write to the latch in figure 5.1, setting 
the output to one, if and only if, the instruction came from within the supervisor ROM. 
This would enable the SCSI controller for use. If, at any time in the future, an access is 
made to an address which resides outwith the controller's ROM and RAM, then this 
latch is reset, and therefore the SCSI controller disabled. Thus, if this latch is set at the 
start of a disk request, and has not been reset by the time data transfer is to begin, then 
the request has been cleared by the supervising firmware. The latch is automatically 
reset on completion of the disk request, by the far return instruction.
A virus cannot set the latch, as it cannot be executing from the area where the ROM 
resides. Nor can it interrupt a disk request and divert control as this would cause an 
immediate reset of the latch. Thus we have reached our objective : no virus can interfere 
with the supervisor's operation.
The advantage of this implementation would be that the 'Supervisor' would operate at a 
speed dependent on the system clock. Thus, faster machines would not incur a greater 
relative overhead from the virus protection system, as potentially they might from a 
distinct processor operating at a fixed clock rate.
5.1 DRIVE FIRMWARE SOLUTION
SCSI bus devices, by definition, are intelligent. Therefore, in general, SCSI disk 
drives include a fairly general-purpose processor. The 'Supervisor' firmware could be 
ported to run on this processor, as an outer shell, executed before the existent 
firmware. A replacement BIOS ROM would still be required, but many manufacturers 
provide empty sockets on the motherboard. Communication between the 'Supervisor' 
and the replacement BIOS ROM,would take place over the SCSI bus using vendor 
unique commands, created specifically for the task.
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This implementation removes the requirement for a second processor, but it requires 
the co-operation and aid of a SCSI disk drive vendor. The final product would then 
have to be packaged as a drive/ROM pair, rather than purely a card for replacement in a 
system with an existent drive.
5.2 IN-LINE SOLUTION
Certain computers cannot be modified by the addition of a card. The 'classic' series of 
Apple Macintosh come into this category. Such machines are supplied with all 
requirements installed, and are relatively sealed as far as the owner is concerned. This 
series of computers has an external SCSI port supplied, and all required hardware and 
firmware installed within. Thus, all implementations discussed so far would be entirely 
unsuitable. The possibility of implementing the virus system as a module to be inserted 
between the machine and drive does however exist.
An in-line implementation would have to maintain two distinct SCSI buses, one 
connecting itself with the drive, and the other with the computer system. The computer 
system would make a request to the 'supervisor module' for consideration. If the 
request was to be permitted, the supervisor module would indicate this to the computer 
system, and data would be transferred, the supervisor module transferring the data 
from one bus to the other.
This would be a moderately inefficient implementation, but would be easily installed in 
an existing system. It is also the only implementation possible for such a closed 
system.
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5.3 USE OF AN ALTERNATIVE BUS
The SCSI bus was used for the prototype due to its speed and versatility. SCSI is an 
intelligent interface, and far superior to the ST506 standard IBM disk interface. 
However in order to use SCSI, both hardware and firmware, in the form of a disk 
BIOS, must be added to the system. As a modified BIOS and an adapter card were 
both required for this project, this presented no problem.
Other alternatives are now possible : 'Synchronous SCSI' and SCSI II are making their 
debuts, as is the new 'AT interface. Implementing synchronous SCSI would require 
only upgrading the SCSI controller chip, and associated setup and control firmware. 
The result would be a possible increase in transfer speed to 10 Mbytes per second. 
SCSI n  could also be implemented which would require much the same changes as for 
Synchronous SCSI, and would also yield the performance benefits due to the advanced 
capabilities of the bus.
Adapting to the AT interface would require similar changes : in both the controller and 
the firmware. Whilst eliminating the requirement of mapping the IBM task file address 
to a SCSI logical address, the problem of maintaining protection would, however, be 
complicated by the nature of the addressing system.
The virus protection system is not in any way interface dependent. Any modem disk 
interface could be utilised in the design.
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CHAPTER 6 
INTRODUCING COMPRESSION
6.0 INTRODUCTION
As hard disk technology approaches the finite limit defined by the physical limitations 
of the component parts of the drive, new ways must be found to provide an increase in 
disk space. Disk heads can only be made so small, disk platters spun so fast, and only 
so much information stored on a finite space.
Only two solutions exist : increase the area and number of disk platters ; or reduce the 
amount o f information required to be stored. The physical size o f the device is 
becoming increasingly important with the advent of the laptop, and now notebook, 
computer. Thus the former solution can only be considered viable when regarding large 
systems, not personal machines. The latter solution can be implemented using 
compression techniques, but this introduces certain major problems.
Two major techniques have been developed which make lossless compression 
possible. Lossless compression requires that the information compressed must be able 
to be decompressed to an identical copy of the original. This is clearly a requirement for 
computer data storage in general. However, when an image is to be compressed, one 
may accept the very high compression ratios o f lossy algorithms, at the expense of 
exact data reproduction.
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The first lossless compression technique was presented in 1952, by David HuffmanHf 
Now known as Huffman Coding, it involved reducing the number of bits used to 
represent frequently appearing characters in a given input stream, whilst increasing the 
number of bits required for less frequent characters. The second technique, the LZW 
methodl^'31, compresses data by encoding strings o f characters, generating an 
expanded alphabet based on the strings appearing in the input stream. Both these 
techniques work by reducing the redundant information which exists in the data. An 
explanation of these techniques is provided in section 6.2.
Real time, in-line compression/decompression is only now becoming a reality, forty 
years after Huffman first conceived of the idea, for two reasons : firstly, up to now it 
has been cheaper to maintain research into other aspects of storage,, such as improving 
the physical aspects of drive technology mentioned previously ; and secondly, 
electronics has only recently advanced to the point where compression can be 
implemented as a hardware state machine, and therefore be fast enough.
With the arrival of such compression chips, investigation seemed appropriate. It 
appeared that, although compression was now possible, an appropriate allocation 
schema was proving to be somewhat o f a stumbling block. With a block o f data 
compressed to an indeterminable size, would allocation prove to be as much o f an 
enormous task as memory allocation in multiprocessing computer systems?
Including both compression and virus protection as a complete and transparent add-on 
to a machine would be desirable. The supervisor could take control of the compression 
so that it was transparent, even to the IBM BIOS. Certain other benefits, provided by 
the strictly maintained regime of the virus protection system, might also be found.
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6.1 THE SCHEMA
The largest problem with implementing a compression system for hard disks is the 
allocation of disk space. Clusters would no longer be of fixed length. Such problems 
have been researched before with the allocation of memory in multiprocessing systems, 
and in the file disk space allocation by an operating system. The techniques involve 
maintaining complex lists o f free space available, and allocating sections of the free 
space to requests using various methods to reduce fragmentation.
Allocation on this basis would have to be dynamic. A file allocated with space on the 
disk might be read, amended, and no longer fit after recompression in the original 
space. The file would therefore require to have alternative space reallocated.
A possible solution exists which may circumvent the requirement for such complex 
allocation mechanisms. It involves a static mapping from the operating system logical 
address, to the hard disk logical address, coupled with a system of overflow storage. 
For this solution to work, one must have a reasonable idea of the compression ratio, 
found by experiment, which can be expected for the system. This is used to find a 
sector size which would be adequate to store a high proportion, between seventy and 
ninety per cent, of compressed DOS clusters. The disk is thus segmented, and a 
mapping found from cluster address to disk address. The clusters which do not 
compress to the required size will have the overflow stored within a reserved area on 
the disk, to be recalled as required. This is presented formally in figure 6.0.
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Definition
Action
DOS sector size = 2*^
DOS minimum cluster size = Me (all duster sizes a multiple of this)
Reduce disk sector size = 2^ where k<K(this gives more grades of possible compression)
From Experiment choose compression ratio (C) so that 
80% say compress to at least this extent where :
C e  IM c * 2 X =  1 M e ( K - k )
Choose an area (R) large enough to store the overflow data of 
the clusters which are 'oversize' after compression.
Logical disk size ; L = (P-R)*C (where P = Physical size of disk)
Ci = number of sectors to be transferred by DOS
Co = number of compressed sectors actually transferred to disk
Co = C i*  2 , (where Ci in 2^ size sectors, Co in 2^  size sectors)
Ai = DOS logical address 
Ao = Disk drive logical address
A„ = ^  * Ai
we now have a P to L capacity drive and if  physical space 
fills up before logical does then the surplus logical space can be 
consumed by the addition of a single hidden file
Figure 6.0 Possible Allocation Schema
This is best explained using an example, and this is presented in figure 6.1.
OS Sector size 512 bytes -> K  = 9
Min Cluster Size 4 > Me = 4
Disk Sector size choose 256 bytes > k  = 8
C €  (8,4,8/3,2,8/5,8/6,8/7,1) choose 2 by expt -> C  = 2
Overspill area choose 10 Mbyte -> R  = 1 0
Physical disk size choose 60 Mbyte -> P = 6 0
Logical disk size L = (60-10)*2 -> L  = 1 0 0
Number of clusters relation Co = Ci * 2/2 ->Co = C iAddress Mapping A o = l / l* A i > Ao = Ai
Thus 60 Mbyte drive becomes a 60 to 100 Mbyte drive assuming 
compression o f 2:1 for majority of clusters.
Note the address and cluster number mappings are one to one as this 
is a special case where disk sector size is reduced by a factor of 
two and compression is by a factor of two, therefore they cancel out.
6.1 Example Using the Allocation Schema
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It would be preferred if the overspill area was not contiguous, but evenly distributed 
around the disk, ensuring less latency delays when access is required. Also it would be 
desirable for the sector size of these areas to be further reduced, to reduce wastage due 
to small overspills. A mechanism would have to be found for storage and retrieval of 
this information, but the task would be less critical regarding both optimum allocation 
and time. Only 20 per cent of requests approximately would involve access to this 
space. The sector tag of the last sector of the oversize cluster could have a pointer to the 
overspill placed within it. Also a protocol would have to be implemented to inform the 
drive when writing, and the machine when reading, that an overspill must be 
transferred, together with the compressed cluster.
This schema would require firmware changes to the disk drive together with relatively 
expensive hardware and firmware on an adapter card. However it does not require a 
rebuild of the drive, or modification to the operating system in any way, above the level 
o f software interrupt. Methods which require either of these modifications invite 
trouble. With a large enough compression ratio, the cost o f the extra electronics could 
easily be offset. The system ensures compatibility and fully informs the user of the 
range of possible capacities which depend on the data stored,
6.2 COMPRESSION TECHNIQUES REVIEWED
For compression of computer data, an algorithm must be lossless, uniquely decodable, 
and preferably optimum and instantaneous. A  compression algorithm is optimum if the 
average code size is equal to the entropy of the codelfi. A code is instantaneous if, 
when looking at the incoming stream of bits one at a time, it is possible to identify the 
value o f the input upon reaching the end o f the code word. The two most used 
compression methods which fall into this category are described below.
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6.2.0 HUFFMAN METHOD
Huffman codingfh2.3 ,4]  jg a simple and yet elegant method o f lossless data 
compression. It works by assuming that the distribution of symbols used is not 
uniform. For example, a data file containing a piece of prose written in English, would 
probably contain more space characters than any other, as every word would be 
terminated by one. Also statistics would indicate that the letter 'e' would be present far 
more often than the letter 'z'. Thus, such a data file would contain an uneven 
distribution of symbols, and this is true for almost all types of data stored in a computer 
system, from code files to accounting files.
Assuming that an uneven distribution of symbols exists, Huffman goes on to indicate 
formally how one may assign differing symbol lengths to symbols of differing 
probabilities o f occurrence. The more frequent the symbol, the shorter the symbol 
should be.
The formal method begins with the acquisition of a symbol probability table. This can 
be compiled from statistical observations of the type of data being compressed, or 
generated by prescanning the file. The former will be faster but, being more general, 
will produce less than optimum results. The latter approach requires more time but 
ensures optimum compression.
An encoding tree is generated from this table. Such a tree is binary, with a symbol at 
each leaf. Construction is simple : first, one takes the two symbols o f lowest 
probability and combines them as two leaf branches under a node ; the probabilities are 
then combined and this new node and probability returned to the list ; this is then 
repeated until a single tree exists with probability equal to one. An example of this is
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included in figure 6.2, for a file containing merely the characters, 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', and 
’e’. The resultant compression ratio is poor due to the extremely small number of 
symbols, chosen to simplify the example.
Symbol Probability Table
-A' = 0.10’B' = 0.15
C  = 0.11'D' = 0.06'£• = 0.58
Tree Generation
.00• E 0.58 *E 0.58 •£ 0.58 *E 0.58• B 0.15 ^  0.16 A  0.26• C 0.11_~^ a d  B C• A 0.10• D 0.06 • B 0.15• C 0.11
0.42
0.1^A D  A DB C
A DB C
Figure 6.2 : Huffman Encoding Tree Generation
By assigning binary values T' and 'O' to the branches o f the encoding tree, one can 
simply find any Huffman code for a symbol by reading from the leaf containing the 
symbol up to the root. As mentioned above, the symbols with highest probability have 
the shortest paths from root to leaf, thus they require the least bits to store. 
Decompression requires merely that one starts at the root and uses the Huffinan code to 
find the route to the leaf, where the symbol can be found. This is illustrated in figure 
6.3. In a serial stream, one does not require code delimiters as once a leaf is reached, a 
symbol has been found, and one returns to the root to decode the next. Dependent on 
the ordering of equal probabilities during the encoding tree's generation, and the binary 
allocation to the branches, the Huffman algorithm may generate multiple solutions 
which differ in length of code as well as choice of representatives of that code. All 
solutions are, however, optimum and will give the same compression.
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EncodingA DB C B = 000,
Decoding 
l \  Oil = D
Figure 6.3 : Using the Encoding Tree
With a moderate loss in compression it is possible to generate the Huffman coding tree 
on the fly while reading and actively compressing. At the start compression is fairly 
poor, but as the tree 'matures', near optimum compression is reached.
6.2.1 LZW METHOD
The LZW methodt^’3] like Huffman's method, simple in concept. It works by 
extending the alphabet, using additional characters to represent strings of characters 
which appear in the data. For example, if  we consider compressing eight bit ASCII 
codes, one would use a nine bit code, leaving an extra 256 codes spare. These extra 
codes would then be determined by strings which appear in the input. These codes, 
together with the string they represent, must be stored in a table for referral during 
further compression, and of course decompression.
The algorithm works as follows : start with a null string and then read in a character 
from the input string and append it to the string. Next one checks the character table for 
the existence of that string and repeats the reading of characters and appending to the 
string until a match is not found in the table. Once this is the case we have generated a 
new entry for the table and it is inserted. To the output one sends the code from the 
table representing the last substring to be found existing in the table. The final character 
which made up the new string is then used as the basis for the next string.
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while -eof(infile) do ! r e p e a t  u n t i l  f i l e  c o m p r e s s e d  begi n
. ' k e e p  g o i n g  u n t i l  n o t  i n  d i e t  o r  e n d  o f  f i l e
H i t e r a l  - s t o r e s  c u r r e n t  c h a r a c t e r  c o d e  r e a d  f r o m  i n p u t  f i l e  
. ' c o d e  - s t o r e s  c o d e  f r o m  d i e t  o f  s t r i n g  s o  f a r
! u p d a t e d  w i t h i n  ' i n . d i c t i o n a r y ' wh e n  f o u n drepeat
literal := decode(read(infile) ) while in. dictionary(oldcode,newcode) and ~eof(infile)
J o u t p u t 'code' = t h e  l a s t  i d e n t i f i e d  s t r i n g  i n  d i e t  output.code
! a d d  an  e n t r y  i n t o  d i c t i o n a r y  -  c o d e + l i t e r a l  p a i r  if ~eof(infile) do add.entry(code,literal)
H a s t  c h a r a c t e r  b e c o m e s  b a s i s  f o r  n e x t  s t r i n g  code := literal
end
output.code H a s t  c h a r a c t e r  m u s t  b e  o u t p u t
Figure 6.4 : S-Algol Code Routine for LZW Compression
Figure 6.4 illustrates this algorithm, presenting a highly documented section o f the 
main routine. The full source code implementing LZW, and providing visual dictionary 
output as in figure 6.5, appears in the appendices.
Figure 6.5 shows an example of LZW compression. The input stream This is a' is 
compressed. The output stream matches the input whilst the dictionary builds up, until 
the second tuple 'is' appears in the input stream. This is found in the dictionary and can 
therefore be represented by a single nine bit code.
Input Dictionary
entry-string
Output
T
h 256 T+h T
i 257 h+i h
s 258 i+s i
<sp> 259 s+<sp> s
i 260 <sp>+i <sp>
<sp> 261 258+<sp> 258 = i+s
a 262 <sp>+a <sp>
a
Figure 6.5 : Example o f  LZW Compression Algorithm
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This algorithm requires significant amounts of memory. The larger the dictionary, the 
greater the compression, but the larger the memory required. Also, however large the 
dictionary is made, it will fill up eventually. Three methods of dealing with this are 
possible. One way is to freeze the dictionary and create no new entries which will result 
in poor compression if the type of data changes from one end of the stream to the other. 
Alternatively the dictionary could be cleared all together, and building begun again, 
which would reduce compression whilst the dictionary is reasonable empty, but reduce 
the effect of data change which occurs with a frozen dictionary. One other approach is 
possible : one could keep track o f the frequency of use o f an entry, and when the 
dictionary fills, start replacing the least used entries with new ones. Although more 
complex, if anything there would be an improvement in compression, not a reduction.
6.3 IMPLEMENTATION
6.3.0 SOFTWARE
Both Huffman and LZW methods were simulated in software, the code appearing in 
the appendices. This was primarily to give an indication of the probable compression 
ratios under different conditions. Crude experiments indicated that both Huffman 
encoding trees and LZW dictionaries prove to be highly data specific, and general 
versions fail to produce significant compression.
Huffman encoding trees were generated for different types o f files : ASCII, database, 
program source and binary code. Each type of file was compressed using all generated 
trees. The binary file expanded when any tree but its own was used, as the other trees 
expected seven bit ASCII data, with a few possible irregularities. However, all files 
compressed when using the binary file's encoding tree to a reduced extent over their
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generated optimum tree. It was, albeit crudely, estimated that a computer disk with 
approximately a fifty-fifty split of ASCII and binary information could expect savings 
of 25 per cent if the single binary file encoding tree was used. Even assuming that a 
better general encoding tree could be found, compression ratios could not be increased 
dramatically, and compression to this degree would not be worthwhile.
Using a reasonable size 8K byte entry dictionary, various dictionaries were generated, 
and used to compress other files, and file types. The dictionary proved to be even more 
data specific than the Huffman tree which is to be expected, as only a small, finite 
number of possible strings can be given entries in the dictionary and these are likely to 
appear frequently within only the given file, not in general.
Also compression was attempted using nibbles, bytes and words as input code lengths. 
The shorter the code length the more the compression ratio depended on the distribution 
of datum, and therefore the more the chance of a general compression being found. The 
larger the code length the more the compression relies on the non-existence or near 
non-existence of certain codes, for average to small size files. General solutions would 
not be appropriate as different codes would be absent for different files. Thus, small 
code lengths suffer as they cannot be compressed significantly. Large code lengths can 
be better compressed but require specific encoding trees or dictionaries.
From a combination o f crude experimentation, and information gathered from related 
literature, it appeared that dynamic generation o f an encoding tree or dictionary, for a 
given file, was the only route to reasonable compression. As this could not be done in 
software without noticeable degradation in a computer systems performance, a 
hardware implementation was required.
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6.3.1 HARDWARE
Incorporating compression hardware, on the adapter card, would have certain 
advantages. If the compression occurred before transfer, then the time saved on 
transfer due to the compression would offset the time taken to compress. Also, a 
certain amount of parallelism would be possible, with the Z80 supervising the 
compression, whilst the IBM continued with other operations.
The IC105 data compression coprocessor from InfoChip Systemsl^’^ 7] was chosen as 
this chip guarantees error free, lossless compression using proven proprietary 
algorithms developed by information theorist, Claude Shannon.
This chip is capable of continuous compression at 1.5 Mbytes per second, and 
decompression at three to four Mbytes per second. Importantly, it guarantees that 
expansion is not possible because, if the algorithm would cause expansion, the data 
stream is passed straight through without 'compression'.
It was necessary to discover what compression ratios could be obtained, given the 
short input streams of one MS-DOS cluster which is required for implementation of the 
schema mentioned above. To facilitate this, a minimal hardware system was built 
which would allow definable compression and decompression, together with the ability 
to view and alter the dictionary memory it requires. Infochip claim a possible 2 to 8 
times compression.
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The Design
Figure 6.6 contains a block diagram of the prototype compression circuit. It contains a 
32K byte RAM for the dictionary, a 4K byte input buffer, and a 4k byte output buffer. 
All the RAM had to be accessable by both the ICI05 and the IBM and thus electronics 
effecting dual port access was included. The IC105 has a complex, non-standard 
interface for access to the internal configuration registers and status registers. This 
facilitates interleaved read and write requests, but also significantly complicates 
interfacing.
Compatible
Memory
Mapped
Mapped
DICTIONARY BUFFER
RAM RAM
32 KBytes 2 x 4  KBytes
DUAL PORT ACCESS HARDWARE
Internal
Register
Access
&
Control
Logic
IC105
Compression
Coprocessor
Dictionary & 
Buffer 
Interface
Setup & Status 
biterfece 
& Control
Figure 6.6 : Compression Circuit Block Diagram
Data is only valid from a read request after a fixed number o f clock cycles after the 
request is made, and only for one cycle. A request is made by generating a single 
pulse, one clock cycle in length on the CMD line, a clock cycle being only 50 
nanoseconds for this implementation.
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lOK
PR PRICI 05 Clock CL CL
Input ►"
'CMD' Output
ICI05 Clock
Figure 6,7 : CMD Line Circuit and Timing Diagram
Figure 6.7 indicates how the CMD pulse was achieved. The input is port mapped to the 
IBM : a write by the IBM to the port causes an active high pulse, many ICI05 clock 
cycles in length. This relinquishes the permanent 'clear' hold on the flip-flops. A logic 
'T is propagated through the first flip flop on the first subsequent rising edge of the 
ICI05 clock. This in turn causes a rising edge on the clock input of the second flip 
flop, which propagates a logic 'O' to the '/Q' output and therefore on the 'D' input of 
the first flip flop. This logic ’O' is then passed through on the next rising edge of the 
ICI05 clock. Thus a single pulse, one IC105 clock cycle in length is generated. This is 
not repeated until the flip flops are cleared, which will only occur after the end of the 
input pulse.
Writing to the internal registers of the IC105 requires no additional electronics, over 
and above the port mapping into the IBM port space. Both the address and data are 
valid when the ICI05 samples them during the IBM I/O write cycle.
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Data Read On Rising Edge->| 
/  /  /  /  /  /  /
Clock
CM D
address
kxL data
Figure 6.8 : Read Internal Register of ICI05 Timing Diagram
Figure 6.8 contains the timing diagram for a status register read, and the timing for a 
read I/O cycle for an IBM (top two lines). When considering the I/O read cycle of the 
IBM, one can see that attempting to read bytes from within the IC105 is more complex. 
Again, the address lines are valid when the ICI05 samples them, but the ICI05 places 
the data on the bus for only one clock cycle and so the data must be latched. Figure 6.9 
provides both circuit and timing diagrams for this.
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+5v
lOK
PR PR PRICI 05 Clock ^
CL CL CL CL
Input
!I/0 CH RDYLatch Data
ICI 05 Clock
AddressSampled
( generated elsewhere ) 
Data
Latch
data latched for last time
I/Ochrdy active released when data latched
Figure 6.9 : ÎC105 Register Read Circuit and Timing Diagrams
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Flip flops 1,2 and 3 divide down the system clock to provide a rising edge at the 
required point when the data from the IC105 is valid. Flip flop 4 ensures that once the 
output, 'Q', of flip flop 3 is high, it remains so until the input pulse is complete, 
ensuring that there is no possible repeat latching. The line I/O CH RDY is activated at 
the start of the input pulse until the data is latched, this extends the read cycle of the 
IBM to ensure the data has been latched by the time the IBM samples it. The AND gate 
is used to minimise the propagation delay between the rising edge of the ICI05 clock 
and the latching of the data. Data is latched on every rising edge from the start of the 
input pulse until the output, 'Q', of flip flop 3 returns high. Thus the last data to be 
latched occurs at the desired timing point with only the one AND gate propagation 
delay from the rising edge of the clock.
ICI 05 ‘Done’
5v
lOK
OutputPolled by IBM 'Done’=‘r
ICI 05 Clock
Input ^ >IC105 ’Start’
PR
CL
PR
CL
PR
CL
Figure 6.10 : IC105 'START and DONE' Circuit
Two other pins on the ICI05 required attention : 'START and DONE'. The circuit 
required is outlined in figure 6.10. Once a compression or decompression has been 
configured, using the internal registers, the task is initiated by issuing a pulse, a single 
IC105 clock pulse in length, to the 'START input. This is effected using exactly the
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same single pulse generator used for the CMD' line. A third flip flop is required which 
is reset on 'START' pulse generation, and set when the 'DONE' line goes active, 
which is sampled during the rising edge of the IC105 clock. The IBM can then poll this 
flip flop to determine when an operation is complete.
With the electronics above, one can communicate with the IC105, and configure all 
compression and decompression sequences. All that is further required is a memory 
interface which will allow both the IBM and the IC105 access to the buffer and 
dictionary RAMs. Between a 'DONE' pulse and a subsequent 'START pulse, the 
IC105 places all address and data lines tristate and, using this knowledge, one can 
simulate dual port access to the RAMs by use o f tristate buffering of the IBM address 
and data buses, together with certain logic functions to ensure only single access to any 
given RAM at any given time.
A single 8K byte RAM is used for the buffer RAM. The upper address bit is fed by 
either the 'BRD' pin of the ICI05 or the 'MEMR' of the IBM, dependent on which 
requires access, so that a read request accesses the lower 4K bytes of the RAM, and a 
write request accesses the upper 4K bytes.
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IC105_BRD 1# 20 vcc
A19_18 2 19 A16
A17 3 GAL 18 BRAM_WE
A12 4 16v8 17 BRAM_OE
A15 5 16 BRAM_CS
IBM_MEMR 6 15 DRAM_WE
IBM_MEMW 7 14 DRAM_OE
IC105_DWT 8 13 BRAM_A12
IC105_DRD 9 12 DRAM_CS
GND 10 11 ICI05 BWT
!BRAM_CS = A19_A18 6 !A17 & A16 & A15 & (!IBM_MEMR | !IBM_MEMW)
BRAM_A12 = {A19_A18 6 !A17 & A16 fi A15) & A12)
I (A19_A18 & !A17 & A16 S A15) S IC105_BRD)
BRAM_OE = !(A19_A18 S !A17 S A16 & A15 & !IBM_MEMR) & IC105_BRD
BRAM_WE = !(A19_A18 i !A17 & A16 & A15 & !IBM_MEMW) & IC105_BWT
!DRAM_CS - A19_A18 & ÎA17 & A16 & !A15 & (!IBM_MEMR | !IBM_MEMW)
DRAM_OE = Î(A19_A18 & !A17 S A16 & !A15 & ! IBM__MEMR) & IC105_DRD
DRAM_WE = ! {A19 A18 & !A17 & A16 S !A15 S ! IBM MEMW) & ICK)5 DMT
Figure 6.11 : Boolean Logic Required to Effect Dual Port Access to RAMs
The IBM may access either RAM when the ICI05 is not active, as both the ICI05 
address bus and data bus are tristate. Any attempt by the IBM to access a RAM causes 
the required address buffers to be enabled, together with a transceiver on the data bus, 
with its direction set corresponding to the nature of the access. Also required is 
decoding logic to activate the output enable, 'OE', and write enable, 'WE', of the RAM 
chip. If either the IC105 or the IBM require activation of any of these lines, then 
activation takes place. As the IBM only attempts access when the ICI05 is inactive, 
both will never make a simultaneous request. The logic required appears in figure 6.11.
201
The full circuit diagrams for the prototype compression board appear in the appendices. 
The result is a hardware compressor mapped into the IBM’s port and address space, as 
defined in figure 6.12.
Address Space
Dictionary RAM D000:0000 -> 7FFFBuffer RAM I/P D800:0000 -> OFFFBuffer RAM 0/P 0800:1000 -> IFFF
Port Space
IC105 'RESET' W Port 308HIC105 ’START’ W Port 30CHIC105 ’DONE' R Port 308H (BitO=l ifIC105 internal R/W Port 300H -> 307H
Figure 6.12 : Compression Hardware IBM Mapping 
Compression can be achieved simply, using the MS-DOS utility DEBUG.COM to 
issue the required port and memory instructions, illustrated in figure 6.13.
[1] Configure the ICI05 : Send the following information :Port 300H C8H ’compress’Port 301H 77H RAM wait state infoPort 302-304H nnnnnnH Number of bytes to compressPort 305-306H aaaaH Start Address
[2] Fill Buffer with Data to be compressed : D800:0000 - OFFF
[3] Clear Dictionary ; 0000:0000 - 7FFF = OOH
[4] Issue ’START’ command : write to port 30CH
[5] Poll ’DONE' flag for finish condition : read port 308H bitO
[6] Once 'DONE' true :Port 300H Status -> bit 7 indicates errorPort 301-303H Input CountPort 304-306H Output Count
Figure 6.13 : Required Sequence for Compression
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By following the simple steps in figure 6.13 one can compress any number of bytes 
and investigate the compression ratios possible. Once compression is complete, one 
can also view the contents of the output buffer, and the dictionary.
Preliminary investigation, using this hardware indicated 3:1 compression of ASCII data 
and 2:1 compression of binary code could regularly be achieved when compressing 
whole files. However, compression of a file cluster by cluster reduced the compression 
and was more erratic in nature. ASCII files could typically be compressed by 2:1, 
whereas binary code was reduced by only 7:5. Not only was this compression poor, 
but compression was very uneven, as some individual clusters compress extremely 
well, others very little.
6.4 CONCLUSION
With large cluster sizes, used by MS-DOS for large partitions, a general compression 
ratio of 2:1 could be possible. This would then fit into the schema mentioned in this 
work, providing a static allocation method for indeterminate compression.
A better solution, and one that would work for all partitions, might be to attempt to 
generate a fixed dictionary or partial dictionary, which would be preloaded before 
compression. The reason that the compression ratio is poor for a cluster is that, for 
LZW, compression improves as the dictionary matures. A mature dictionary might 
match a very large string to a single character, whereas a relatively new dictionary 
contains only strings of two to three characters. If a dictionary could be generated 
which was fairly general, then there would be an immediate improvement in 
compression. If however, the dictionary proved to be less than general, compression 
might even be replaced by expansion.
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A partial dictionary would leave entries available for allocation when non-general 
strings are encountered, giving the improvement desired, whilst accepting the 
differences between datum in the system.
To include compression within the virus schema, one would require that only user 
areas were compressed, and that overspill areas were kept distinct for each partition. If 
dictionary preloading was implemented, then one could have one dictionary for each 
partition, which could be specific for that partition. As only one partition can be active 
at any one time, dictionary switching would not be required. Housekeeping could be 
handled by the supervisor processor, keeping the implementation transparent to the 
operating system.
Compression could prove to be the way forward with regards to large volume disk 
requirements, and this schema would offer a simple and non-intrusive way of 
implementing such a system.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
The use of the word 'virus' to depict this highly virulent form of hostile program is 
very apt. Like their biological counterparts, complete eradication is virtually 
impossible. Every computer virus that has come into existence, and has been injected 
into the public domain, still exists. It may appear extinct, only to appear months or 
even years later, re-introduced from an old backup floppy, or rarely used machine or 
disk. Only when machines become resistant to them will they cease to be a threat to the 
user.
They enter the system and systematically take control, corrupt and destroy. The more 
time that passes, the greater the threat they pose : the more the infection spreads ; the 
greater the number o f new viruses ; and the more complex the new viruses become. 
Viruses cannot be considered individually as they have been in the past. Anti-virus 
methods which rely on knowledge of the virus will serve little purpose, as the rate of 
increase o f 'new virus' introduction increases and they become more and more 
armoured. Anti-virus programs will fail to keep up with virus growth and will be 
subject to attack from the viruses themselves. The odds are in favour of the virus 
writer: he has only to find one loophole to destroy a system. An anti-virus program 
must be general and provide complete protection, which is a goal which may prove 
impossible to attain.
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A system must be found which guarantees protection, reduces the virus spread, and 
detects, not just the viruses of today, but all future viruses. Only then will the user be 
safe from virus infection, and the incentive be lost to virus writers. The schema 
presented in this work goes a long way to providing just that level of protection.
The boot track, the partition information, the operating system and its associated 
utilities, all partition boot sectors, directories, and FAT tables are guaranteed protected 
against all virus, attack. This ensures that infection by 'Boot Sector* viruses is 
impossible, as is infection o f the ’COMMAND.COM’ which is a common attack point 
as infection of this file ensures that the virus will be loaded immediately on boot.
Applications that are not self-modifying may also be protected by placing them in a read 
only partition. Virus spread across a partition boundary also becomes impossible. 
Thus, a virus introduced into what we define as an active, user partition, cannot spread 
into any other partition in the system. The result is guaranteed virus containment. The 
only source of infection possible is through removable media, direct into the active 
partition.
Various floppy schemes have been presented which reduce the threat of infection via 
floppy disks. They vary in the protection they provide from merely reducing the 
likelihood to complete protection via auto-encryption methods.
With a user shell in operation, one can prevent access to certain sensitive partitions and 
prevent use of the floppy drive to less trusted users, either for removal of classified 
data or for introduction of viruses.
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With all this protection, a business user can be certain that system integrity is kept, and 
that viruses carelessly introduced into a 'games' partition, for example, cannot infect 
across into more sensitive areas. Viruses are contained, and any attempt to violate the 
protection schema will raise an alarm, giving early warnings of a virus' existence.
A fully operational system including the virus schema, a security shell, a floppy 
protection method, and even possibly a compression facility for individual partitions, 
would provide levels o f protection and versatility to a business system, which cannot 
be replicated by any combination of currently available software. Using this system 
will limit possible viral damage to the point where little to no time or money is lost, as 
viruses will be detected early and will be severely contained. No other system can make 
such guarantees if  the computer virus is to be regarded, as it rightly should, as a 
general and not a specific phenomenon.
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APPENDIX B
VIRUS SUPERVISOR VERSION 2
CIRCUIT DIAGRAM & GAL DESCRIPTIONS
SDPERVISOR PROJECT CI RCUIT  
D. 5 ,  S .  Ro bb;
•CD
{»•) »(•' r >"v■ T J . ' I  i  I i  i  1
-5 ^  5> a  R A "A«IV
TT
V
CLP?-^ 3
■ M M a i^ a ia h a A ii^ tk i
T I TLE
D EV I CE  1 6 V 8 ;
SUPERVISOR PROJECT GALl
NAME D. S . S . R o b b;
SIGNAT URE C 2 G 1 ;
STATUS_BIT 1 • '’20 vcc
Z80_READ_DATA 2 19 unused
IBM_PORTR 3 GAL 18 unusedA13 4 1 17 unusedA14 5 16v8 16 IBM_MEMR
A15 6 15 IBM_DO
A16 7 14 unused
A18 8 13 A17
A19 9 12 unused
GND 10 11 MEMR
!IBM MEMR = A19 & A18 & !A17 & !A16 S A15 & !A14 & !A13 & !MEMR;
IBM_DO.OE 
IBM DO
= !IBM_PORTR;
= ! STATUS BIT;
B2
TITLE
D E V I CE  1 6 v 8 ;  
SUPERVISOR PROJECT GAL2
NAME D. S . S . ROBB ;
S IGNAT URE C 2 G 2 ;
A4 1 • '’20 VCC
A3 2 19 IBM_PORTNW
A2 3 GAl 18 rBM_PORTW
A1 4 2 17 IBM_PORTR
AO 5 16v8 16 SCSI_IBMDMA
IBM_IOR 6 15 SCSI_IBMCS
IBM_IOW 7 14 AS
IBM_AEN 8 13 A6
A9 9 12 A7
GND 10 11 A8
SCSI IBMCS ( !IBM_IOR £ !IBM_ AEN £ A9 £ A8 £ !A7 £ !A6 £ AS £ !A4 £ !A3
£ !A2 £ !A1 £ AO) /* READ PI */
( !IBM_IOR £ !IBM__AEN £ A9 fi A8 £ !A7 £ !A6 £ AS £ !A4 £ !A3
£ A2 £ !A1 fi AO) /* READ PS */
( !IBM_IOW £ ! IBM__AEN fi A9 £ AS £ !A7 £ !A6 £ AS £ !A4 £ !A3
£ !A2 £ !A1 £ AO) /* WRITE PI */
(!IBM_IOW £ !IBM_ AEN £ A9 £ A8 £ !A7 £ !A6 £ AS £ !A4 £ !A3
£ A2 £ !A1 £ AO) /* WRITE PS * !
( ! IBM_IOW £ ! IBM AEN £ A9 £ AS £ !A7 £ !A6 £ AS £ !A4 £ ! A3
£ A2 £ A1 £ AO) /•* WRITE P7 */
) ;
SCSI_IBMDMA = ( (!IBM_AEN & A9 & A8 6 !A7 fi !A6 & A5 S ! A4 & A3 6 !A2 & !A1 & !A0)
& (!IBM_IOR t !IBM_IOW)) ;
!IBM_PORTR = (!IBM_I0R & !IBM_AEN & A 9 & A 8 &  !A7 & !A6 i A5 & !A4 S A3 £ !A2 & lAl £ AO)
!IBM_PORTW = (!IBM_IOW £ !IBM_AEN £ A9 £ A8 fi !A7 £ !A6 £ A5 £ !A4 £ A3 £ !A2 £ !A1 £ AO)
IBM PORTNW = (!IBM lOW £ !IBM AEN £ A9 £ A8 fi !A7 £ !A6 fi AS fi ! A4 £ A3 £ !A2 £ !A1 £ AO)
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TITLE
DEVICE
SUPERVISOR
1 6 v 8  ; 
PROJECT GAL3
NAME D. S. S. ROBB;
SIGNATURE C2G3;
Z80_A0 1 • 20 VCC
Z80A1 2 19 unused
Z80A2 3 GAL 18 unused
IBM_AO 4 3 17 SCSI_A2
IBM_A1 5 16v8 16 SCSI_A1
IBM_A2 6 15 SCSI_AO
IBM_PATH 7 14 unused
unused 8 13 unused
unused 9 12 unused
GND 10 11 unused
SCSI_AO 
SCSI_A1 
SCSI A2
( (!I3M_PATH £ Z80_A0) |( IBM_PATH fi I3M_A0) )
{ (!IBM_PATH £ Z80_A1) |( IBM_PATH £ I3M_A1) )
( (’IBM PATH £ 280 A2) I( IBM PATH £ IBM A2) )
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D E V I CE  1 6 v 8 ;
TI TL E SUPERVISOR PROJECT GAL4
NAME D. S. S. ROBB;
SIGNATURE C2G4;
SCSI_IBMDMA 1 * 20 VCC
SCSI_IBMCS 2 19 Z80_TEN
SCSI_Z80CS 3 GAL 18 IBM_TEN
SCSI_DRQ 4 4 17 SCSI_IOW
IBM_PATH 5 16v8 16 SCSI_IOR
IBM_IOR 6 15 SCSI_CS
1BM_I0W 7 14 DMA_CLK
Z80_RD 8 13 IO_CH_RDY
Z80_WR 9 12 DMA_NQ
GND 10 11 unused
! I O _ C H _ R D y  = (DMA_NQ fi SCSI_IBMDMA);
DMA_CLK = (SCSI_DRQ £ SCSI_IBMDMA);
!SCSI_CS = ({SCSI_Z80CS £ !ÏBM_PATH)i (SCSI_IBMCS £ IBM_PATH)) 
!SCSI_IOR = {(!Z80_RD £ !IBM_PATH)|{!IBM_IOR £ IBM_PATH));
!SCSI_IOW = ((!Z80_WR £ !IBM_PATH)|(!IBM_IOW £ IBM_PATH));
!IBM_TEN = ((SCSI_IBMCS £ IBM_PATH)!(!DMA_NQ £ IBM_PATH));
!Z80 TEN = (SCSI Z80CS £ ! IBM PATH);
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DEVICE 16v8;
TITLE SUPERVISOR PROJECT GAL5
NAME D. S . S . ROBB ;
SIGNATURE C 2 G 5 ;
Z 8 0 A 0 1 • 20 VCC
Z80_A1 2 19 Z80_ROM_EN
Z 8 Q A 2 3 GAL 18 SCSI_RESET
Z 8 0 A 3 4 5 17 Z80_D0Z80_IORQ 5 16v8 16 Z80_READ_DATA
28 0  RD 6 15 PATHCH
Z8Q_WR 7 14 Z80_WRITE_DATA
Z80_MREQ 8 13 Z80 CS
Z80_A15 9 12 u n u s e d
GND 10 11 STATUS BIT
Z80_WRITE_DATA
IPATHCH
!SCSI_RESET
iZ80_READ_DATA
Z80_D0.OE
Z 8 0 D 0
!Z80_ROM_EN
Z80 CS
!Z80_WR £ !Z80_IORQ fi Z80_A3 £ !Z80_A2 fi !Z80_A1
!Z80_WR £ !Z80_IORQ fi Z80_A3 £ !Z80_A2 £ !Z80_Al
!Z80_WR & !Z80_IORQ fi Z80_A3 £ !Z80_A2 £ Z80_A1
!Z80_RD £ ÎZ80_IORQ fi Z80__A3 fi !Z80_A2 £ !Z80_Al
!Z80_RD £ iZ80_IORQ £ Z80_A3 £ !Z80_A2 fi !Z80_A1
STATUS_BIT;
!Z80_MREQ £ !Z80_A15;
!Z80 A3 £ !Z80 lORQ;
fi Z80_A0; 
£ !Z80_A0; 
£ !Z80_A0; 
£ !Z80_A0; 
£ 280 AO;
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APPENDIX C
VIRUS SUPERVISOR SOFTWARE
IBM <-> SCSI LOGICAL ADDRESS CONVERSION 
PERMISSION LIST ACQUISITION AND DISPLAY
/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
/* PROGRAM TO CONVERT IBM CYL, HEAD AND SECTOR TO */* SCSI LOGICAL ADDRESS AND REPORT IN DEC AND HEX *
/ *  */* Copyright David S. S. Robb 1990 */ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
program ibmtolog; 
var i,N2,N3,number,Cyl,Temp,RCX^RDX : longint; Head,Sec,Cyl^upper,Cyl_lower : longint; hi,h2,h3,h4,hS,h6,t ; longint; number1,number2,number3,number4 : longint; N,hhl,hh2,hh3,hh4 : char;
const Mhd"4; Ms =17;
function c{h : longint):char; begin
if h>9 then c := chr ( (h-lO)+97) 
else c := chr(h+48);end;
/*dec 0-16 to char*/
/*number*/
/*letter*/
procedure c2{h : longint); beginwrite(c((h div 16))); write(c((h mod 16))); end;
/*takes 0-255*/ /*turns ascii*/ 
/*and prints*/
beginwriteln;
write{’Cylinder > ')/ number := 0; for i := 1 to 3 do begin 
read(N);N2 := orD(N);if N2>96 then N3:=N2-97+10 else N3:=N2-4 8;
number := {number*16) + N3; end;read(N); read(N);
/*cyl - char to dec*/
/*read a character */ /*convert to number*/ /*if letter-> 10-15*/ /*else number-> 0-9*/
/*update number*/
/♦discard CR & LF*/
write{’Head > ’); number2:= 0; 
for i ;= 1 to 2 do begin read(N);N2 := ord(N);if N2>96 then N3:=N2-97+10 
else N3:=N2-48;
/♦Head- char to dec*/
number2:= (nuraber2*16) + N3; end;read(N);read{N);
C l
y*************************************************** 
/ *  PROGRAM TO CONVERT IBM CYL, HEAD AND SECTOR TO *
/ *  SC SI LOGICAL ADDRESS AND REPORT IN  DEC AND HEX *
/ *  * 
/ *  Page 2 ★/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
write(’Sector > ’); numbers:= 0; for i ;= 1 to 2 do begin read(N);N2 := ord(N);if N2>96 then N3:=N2-97+10 else N3:=N2-4 8;
/*Sec - char to dec*/
numbers : end; (number3*16) + N3;
/♦generate logical address*/ 
writeln;
number4 : = {number*Mhd*Ms) + (number2*Ms) + number3 -1;
/♦and inform user - decimal*/
writeln (’Logical address == ’ ,number4, ' (d)');
/♦and inform user - hex
hi ; = number4 mod 256;t : = number4 div 256;h2 : = t mod 256;t : = t div 256;hS : = t mod 256;h4 : = t mod 256;
write{’Logical address = ’); 
c2(hl); c2(h2); c2{h3); c2(h4);
end.
Cl
/* PROGRAM TO CONVERT SCSI LOGICAL ADDRESS TO *//* IBM CYL, HEAD AND SECTOR VALUES & CALCULATE *//* REGISTER VALUES FOR USE IN I NT 13H CALL */
/ *  * /  /* Copyright David S. S. Robb 1990 */
/ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * y
program logtoibm; 
var
const
i,N2,N3,number,Cyl,Temp,RCX,RDX Head,Sec,Cyl_upper,Cyl_lower 
hl,h2,h3,h4,t N,hhl,hh2,hh3,hh4
Mhd = 4/Ms =17;
function c{h ; longint):char; begin
if h>9 then c := chr((h-10)+97) 
else c := chr(h+48);end;
procedure c2(h : longint); begin
write (c((h div 16)));write(c((h mod 16))); end;
longint; 
longint; longint; char;
/♦dec 0-16 to char*/
/♦number*/ /♦letter*/
/♦takes 0-255*/ /♦turns ascii*/ /♦and prints*/
procedure c3(h : longint); var tl : longint; begintl := h div 16;if tl>15 then c2(tl) else write(c(tl)); write(c((h mod 16))); end;
be ginwriteln;
write ( ’3 Byte Logical Addr > ’); number ;= 0;
for i ;= 1 to 6 do beginread(N);N2 := ord(N);if N2>96 then N3:=N2-97+10 else N3:=N2-48;
/♦takes 0-4095*/ /♦turns ascii*/ /♦and prints*/
/♦number holder*/
/♦dec from hex(asc)*/
/♦read a character ♦/ /♦convert to number*/ /♦if letter-> 10-15*/ /♦else number-> 0-9*/
number := (number*16) + N3; end;
writeln('Decimal conversion
/♦update number*/ 
',number);
/♦compute cyl,head,sec breakdown*/
CylTempHeadSec
= number div (Mhd*Ms); = number mod (Mhd*Ms); = Temp div Ms;= Temp mod Ms +1;
C3
y * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * y  
/* PROGRAM TO CONVERT SCSI LOGICAL ADDRESS TO */
/* IBM CYL, HEAD AND SECTOR VALUES & CALCULATE */
y* REGISTER VALUES FOR USE IN INT 13H CALL */
/ *  * /
/* Page 2 *y
i f  Cyl>1023 then writeln{’Max Cyl Exceeded’) 
else  
begin
/♦inform user of cyl,head,sec breakdown*/
write('IBM Address (C,H,S) : '); c3(cyl) ; write(' '); c2(head) ; write(’ ’); c2(Sec) ; writeln ( ' (h) ’);
/♦find values to place in IBM registers*/
Cyl_upper := (cyl div 256)*64/Cyl_lower := (cyl mod 256)*256/
RCX ;= Cyl_lower + Cyl_upper + Sec;RDX := head*256 + $80;
/♦convert back to ascii and inform user*/ 
writeln;hi := RCX mod 256;h2 := RCX div 256;write('RCX = ’);c2(h2);c2(hi);writeln; hi := RDX mod 256;t := RDX div 256;write(’RDX = ’);c2(h2);c2(hi);writeln;
end.
end;
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y * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
/* PROGRAM TO INTERROGATE THE SUPERVISOR */* AND DISPLAY PERMISSION LIST OBTAINED *
/ *  */* Copyright David S. S. Robb 1990 *
program prlist;
var number, val : byte;number2,length,val2,i,j,k,l,t
procedure waitforit; var temp : byte; begin 
repeattemp := port[$329] until {(temp and $02) = $02); end;
integer;
/♦wait for Superv*/ /♦to read byte*/
/* repeatedly*//♦read status*/ ' /♦until 'byte read'*/
function c(h ; longint):char; b e gin
if h>9 then c := chr((h-10)+97) else c :== chr(h+48);end;
/♦dec 0-16 to char*/
/♦number*//♦letter*/
beginport[$329] 
waitforit; $87;
number := port[$329];number2 ;= (number and $fO) div 16;length := nuraber2*20+10;
/♦banner*/
/♦send Sup 'prlist'*/ /♦pause*/
/♦RD no. of entries*/ /♦ans- upper nibble*/ /♦no.of bytes to RD*/
writeln;
writeln('There are ',number2,' partitions'); writeln('The permission table is as follows :'); writeln;
writeln('Boundary Addrs Modified BAs X SWR No.'J; 
/♦ask Supervisor for required number of bytes*/
port [$329] := length; waitforit; port[$329] := 0;
/♦read permission list and inform user*/
/♦wait - Sup to RD*/ /♦inform Sup ready*/
for i:= 1 to (length div 10) do /*for each entry*/ beginfor k := 0 to 9 do /*for each item in entry*/begin
for j := 1 to 2 do /*for each nibble of item*/begin
waitforit; /*when byte read S ready*/val := port[$329]; /*read nibble*/port[$329] := 0; /*tell S to get next nib*/
C5
y * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
/♦ PROGRAM TO INTERROGATE THE SUPERVISOR * 
/* AND DISPLAY PERMISSION LIST OBTAINED */* ♦ 
/* Page 2 *
val2 := (val and $fO) div 16/ /*ans- upper nibble*/
/*if modified address for user segment - don’t care*/
i f  ( (k>3) and (k.<8 ) and ( (i mod 2) = 1)) 
then
write(’X ’)
else
/♦else if attribute byte - binary representation*/
i f  k=8 
then 
begint : = val2;
i f  t div 8 =1 then write ( '1') e lse write('0');t : = t mod 8;
i f  t div 4 =1 then write(* 1 ’) else write(’O ’);t : = t mod 4;
i f  t div 2 =1 then write('1’) else write(’O ’);t : = t mod 2;write (t);
end
e lse
/♦else - the remainder - hexadecimal representation*/ 
write(c(val2));
/♦space between bytes*/ 
i f  (j mod 2 = 0 )  then write(’ ');
end; /*item*/
/♦spacing between columns*/
i f  (k = 3) then write (' ’);
i f  (k = 7) then write (’ ');
i f  (k = 8) then write {' ');
end; /*entry*/ writeln;
end; /*list*/
writeln;writeln ( ' "XX" = Dont Care’); 
end.
IC6 !
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  y
* SUPERVISOR ASSEMBLER ROUTINE TO SEND IBM * /
* THE PERMISSION L IS T  WHEN REQUESTED * /
* */ * Copyright David S. S. Robb 1990 */ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * V k r * * * * * * * y
/ * command 87H start point 
prlist Id a,(ramit+listlen)
loop
s 1 a a
31 a a
s la a
31 a a
o r 00001111b
out (StatusW),a
ca l l AWAIT
Id b, a
Id iy,lists
Id a, (iy)
inc iyId c, a
and 11110000b
out (StatusW),a
c a l l AWAIT
Id a, c
s la a
s la a
s la a
s la a
out (StatusW),a
c a l l AWAIT
d jnz loop
jP asklBM
/♦load in list size /♦shift to upper nibble
/♦and o/p listlen
/♦wait for IBM ready /♦and read bytes required ;♦and store - length of repeat
;*get pointer to list
/♦send upper nibble;♦update pointer;♦temp store for low nibble
;♦inform IBM nibble ready 
/♦send lower nibble
;♦inform IBM nibble ready 
/♦repeat for all bytes in list
;*return to await new command
C7
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DEVICE 1 6 v 8 ;
TITLE C o m p r e s s i o n  P r o j e c t  G A L l . 5 
NAME D. S ,  S .  R ob b ;  
SIGNATURE CO M F 1 .5  ;
A9 1 • 20 VCC
A3 2 19 FINISHED
A7 3 GAL 18 WRITE_PORTA6 4 16v8 17 LATCHA5 5 16 IC105_RESET
A4 6 15 START_GEN
A3 7 14 IC105_DONE
A2 8 13 low
AEN 9 12 CMD_GEN
GND 10 11 ICR
CMD_GEN A9 & A8 & :a 7 & ÎA6 & !A5 & I A4 & !A3 & I AEN fi CIOW 1 IIOR)
START_GEN A9 & A8 & ÎA7 & ÎA6 & IAS & I A4 & A3 & A2 & !AEN fi i lOW;
IC105_RESET = A9 & AS & !A7 & !A6 & IA5 & !A4 & A3 & !A2 & lAEN fi Î lOW;
! LATCH = A9 & A8 & IA7 & 1A6 & IA5 & !A4 & !A3 & lAEN fi !IOR;
FINISHED.OE = A9 & A8 & IA7 & !A6 & 1A5 & !A4 & A3 & !A2 fi !AEN fi ! lOR;
FINISHED = IC105 _DONE;
!WRITE_PORT = A9 & A8 & IA7 & !A6 & 1A5 & I A4 & I A3 fi ÎAEN fi HOW;
D3
DEVICE 16v8;
TITLE Compression Project GAL2.3 
NAME D. S. S. Robb; 
SIGNATURE COMP2.3;
IC105_BRD 1 • 20 VCC
A19_18 2 19 A16
A17 3 GAL 18 BRAM_WE
A12 4 16v8 17 BRAM_OE
A15 5 16 BRAM_CS
IBM_MEMR 6 15 DRAM__WE
IBM_MEMW 7 14 DRAM_OE
IC105_DWT 8 13 BRAM_A12
IC105_DRD 9 12 DRAM_CS
GND 10 11 IC105 BWT
!BRAM_CS = A19_A18 & !A17 & A16 S A15 & ( ! IBM__MEMR !^!IBM_MEMW)
BRAM_A12 = (A19_Aia fi !A17 fi A16 fi A15) fi A12)
I (A19_A18 fi !A17 fi A16 fi A15) fi IC105__BRD)
BRAM_OE = !(A19_A18 fi !A17 fi A16 fi A15 & !IBM_MEMR) & IC105_BRD
BRAM_WE = !(A19_A18 & !A17 & A16 fi A15 fi !IBM_MEMW) fi IC105_BWT
!DRAM_CS = A19_A18 & !A17 & Al6 fi !A15 fi ( !IBM_MEMR | !IBM_MEMW)
DRAM_OE = !(A19_A18 fi !A17 fi A15 fi !A15 fi !IBM_MEMR> & IC105_DRD
DRAM_WE = ! (A19 A18 fi !A17 £ A15 fi !A15 fi ! IBM MEMW) fi IC105 DWT
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APPENDIX E
COMPRESSION SOFTWARE
HUFFMAN COMPRESSION 
LZW COMPRESSION 
IC105 COMPRESSION
?* s-Algol program to calculate the Optimum Huffman Coding* ! * For a given distribution *; * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
! tree structure used to generate huffman coding tree 
s t r u c t u r e  tree ( i n t  order ; r e a l  value ; p n t r  right , left)
! number of symbols - max depth of tree = dep-1
l e t  dep := 16
! artificial distribution (sorted) of 16 symbols
l e t  vals=@0 o f  * r e a l [ @ 0  o f  r e a l  [o,  i ,  2, 3 , 4 , 5 ,  6, 7,8,  9, lo,  i i ,  1 2 , 1 3 , 14, 15] ,
@0 o f  r e a l [ 2 2 , 1 9 , 1 4 , 9 , 5 , 5 , 5 , 4 , 4 , 3 , 3 , 2 , 2 , l , l , l ]  ]
! results store
l e t  huff = v e c t o r  0 : : dep-1 o f  0
! recursively traverse tree measuring root to leaf lengths ! and storing results
p r o c e d u r e  travtree( p n t r  node ; i n t  depth) 
b e g i n
i f  node (order)~=-l 
t h e nhuff(node(order)) := depth
e l s e  
b e g i n
travtree(node(right),depth+l) travtree(node(left), depth+1) 
e n d
e n d
!if leaf ! then! store current depth with ! symbol in results ! else! recursive search right ! and left branches
procedure optihuff(int depth ; **real values) b e g i n
let vstore = vector 0 : : depth-1 of nil for i = 0 to depth-1 dovstore(i) := tree(i,values(1,i),nil/nil)
! create pointer list ! and for each symbol ! create structure
for i = depth-1 to 1 by -1 do begin ! repeat until single tree
! join two lowest entries in listlet tempval = values(l,i-l) + values(1/i)values (1,i-1) := tempval Î add frequencies ! update frequencies
let temppnt = vstore(i-1) ! store old pointervstore(i-1) ;= tree(-1/0/temppnt/vstore(i) ) ! create new pointer
! resort list by frequency let swapped := false
repeat ! repeat until no swaps in single passbeginswapped := false
for j = 0 to i-1 doif values(1,j) < values(1,j+1) do begin
'.bubble sort ! if lower freq lower ! in list then rises
El
I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
! * S-Algol program to calculate the Optimum Huffman Coding* ! * For a given distribution *
! * Page 2 ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
let to := values(0,j+1) let tl := values(1,j+1) values(0,j+1) := values(0/j)values(1,j+1) := values(1/j)values(0/j) ;= tO values(1/j) := tllet pnt = vstore(j+1) vstore (j+1) :== vstore ( j)vstore(j) := pnt swapped true endendwhile swapped endtravtree (vstore(0),0) e n d
swap
! swap in that pass
!trav tree for results- depth=no. of bits
! find optimum huffman for distribution optihuff(dep/vais)
! and print results let huffy := 0.0 let tot := 0.0 for i = 0 to dep-1 do begin
write i/" "/huff (i) / " 'n" I Bit lengths for each symbolhuffy ;= huffy + huff(i)*vals(1/i) ! Calculate Compression tot :== tot + vals(l/i) end
write " ’nThe uncompressed file required "/tot, " Bytes" write "'nThe compressed file would require ",huffy/8:2," Bytes"
RESULTS For distribution given
symbol
01
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
910 
11 
12
13
14
15
no. of bits required
2
2
3
4
4
5 
5 
5 
5 
5
5
6 
6 6 
7 
7
The uncompressed file required 251 Bytes
The compressed file would require 95 Bytes
E2
^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  * 
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *
{* David S.S. Robb *{ * ★ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{takes files and generates a distribution file}(takes a distribution file and generates a huffman coding file) (calculates the compression for a given distribution and huffman}
(Generated using Borland Turbo Pascal for the IBM PC}
(Compiler Directives}
($R-} (Range checking off}{$B+} (Boolean complete evaluation on}($S+} (Stack checking on}($1+} (I/O checking on}($N-} (No numeric coprocessor}(64k stack , 1 meg heap !}
(The Program}
program dist; 
uses crt,graph,dos;
type treeptrtree
var
holder
progfile valfile huffile name,name2 ch,ansi,j,nib,bynibanswernibble_sumbyte_sumn i bbl e__hu f f __s umnibble_di st_sumby t e_hu f f_s umglob_byte
glob_hi__nibglob_lo_nibbyte_countnibble_counthuffhuf f 2shuff2
holditcounter
= ''tree;
= recordorder 
value right left 
end;
= array[0..100
(tree structure}
integer;
real;treeptr;treeptr;
of integer;
f i l e  of 
f i l e  of 
f i l e  of 
string; 
char; 
integer; 
integer; 
array[1. 
real; 
array[1. 
array[1. 
real; 
byte; 
byte; 
byte; 
array 
array 
array 
array 
array holder; 
integer;
[ 0 .
[ 0 .
[1 .
[ 0 .
[0 ,
byte; 
real ; 
byte ;
,3] of real;
3] of real; 
3] of real;
.2,0..255] of real; 
.9,0..15] of real; 
.3 ,0 ..  15] of byte; 
.255] of byte;
.255] of holder;
procedure convert; (split byte into two nibbles) 
begin
glob_hi_nib := glob_byte div 16; glob_lo_nib := glob_byte mod 16; 
end;
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{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * J
{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  *} 
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *}
{* Page 2 *}
{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^
{create new distribution file}
procedure newfile;
var len,typ : byte;finished : boolean;
begin
write(’Please enter source filename - ');
readln(name);
assign(progfile,name);
reset(progfile);
write(’Please enter destination filename - ');
readln(name2);
assign(valfile,name2) ;
rewrite(valfile);finished := false;
while not (eof(progfile)) do
begin
read(progfile, glob_byte);byte_count[1,glob_byte] := byte_count[1,glob_byte] + 1; convert;nibble_count[1,glob_hi_nib]:= nibble_count[1, glob_hi__nib] + 1; nibble_count [ 1, glob_lo__nib] : = nibble_count [ 1, glob_lo_nib] + 1 ; nibble_count [2,glob_hi_nib] := nibble_count [2, glob_hi_nib] + 1; nibble_count E3,glob_lo__nib] := nibble_count [3, glob_lo_nib] + 1; 
end;
for i := 0 to 255 do
write (valfile,byte_count[1,i]); 
for i ;= 0 to 15 do 
begin
write(valfile, nibble_count[1,i]) ; 
write (valfile,nibble_count[2,i]); 
write(valfile,nibble_count[3,i]); 
end;
c lo se(valfile); 
c lo se(progfile); 
end;
{load in distribution file} 
procedure oldfile; 
var len,typ : byte;finished : boolean; 
begin
write(’Please enter filename - ’);
readln(name 2);
assign(valfile,name2);
reset (valfile);
for i := 0 to 255 do
read(valfile,byte_count[1,i}); 
for i := 0 to 15 do 
begin
read(valfile, nibble_count[l,i]); 
read(valfile,nibble_count[2,i]); 
read(valfile,nibble_count[3, i]) ; 
end;
c lo se(valfile); 
end;
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{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  *}
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) * }
{* Page 3 *}{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^
'(I{load a huffman coding file from disk) 
procedure loadhuff; 
var len,typ : byte;finished ; boolean; 
begin
write(’Please enter filename - ’); 
readln(name2) ; 
assign(huffile,name2); 
rese t(huffile); 
for i := 0 to 255 do 
read (huffile,huff2 [I]); 
for i := 0 to 15 do 
begin
read (huffile,huff[1,i]) read(huffile,huff[2,i]) read (huffile,huff[3, i]) end;
c lo se(huffile); 
end;
{save a huffman coding file to disk) 
procedure savehuff; 
var temp, len, typ, dl, d2 : byte;finished : boolean; 
begin
write(’Please enter filename - •); 
readln(name 2); 
assign(huffile,name2); 
rewrite(huffile); 
for i := 0 to 255 do
write(huffile,huff2[i]); 
for i := 0 to 15 do 
begin
write(huffile,huff[1, i]); 
write(huffile,huff[2,i]); 
write(huffile,huff[3,1]); 
end;
for i := 0 to 255 do 
begin
temp := lo (round (byte__count [0, i] )) ; 
writeln(temp); 
write (huffile,temp); 
end;
for i := 0 to 255 do 
begin
for j := 0 to huff2[i]-l do 
begindl := hi(shuff2[i,j]); d2 := lo(shuff2[i,j]); 
write(huffile,dl); 
write(huffile, d2) ; 
end; 
end;
close (huffile); 
readln(nib) ; 
end;
E5
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* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  *
* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *
* Page 4 *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{sort the nibble distribution counts} 
procedure simple_sort_byte; 
var tOftl : real;swapped : boolean; 
begin  
repeat 
begin
swapped := false; 
for i ;= 0 to 254 do 
begin
i f  byte_count[1, i] < byte_count[1,i+1] then 
beginto := byte_count[0,i+1]; tl := byte_count[1,i+1]; byte_count[0,i+1] := byte_count[0,i]; byte_count[1,i+1] := byte_count[1,i]; byte_count[0,i] := tO; byte_countEl,i] := tl; swapped :== true; 
end; 
end; 
end
until not(swapped) 
end;
{sort the nibble distribution counts) 
procedure simple_sort_nibble (a, b : integer); 
var t0,tl,t3,t5 : real;swapped : boolean; 
begin  
repeat 
begin
swapped := false; 
for i := 0 to 14 do 
begin
i f  nibble_count[a,i] < nibble_count[a,i+1] then 
begin
to := nibble_count[b,i+1]; tl := nibble_count[a,i+1]; nibble_count[b,i+1] := nibble_count[b,i]; nibble_count[a,i+1] ;= nibble_count[a,i]; nibble_count[b,i] := tO; nibble__count [a, i] : = tl; swapped := true; 
end; 
end; 
end
until not (swapped) 
end;
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{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  *} 
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *}
{* Page 5 *}
{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }
{sort the byte huffman codes}
procedure simple_sort_huf f (a ; integer) ;
var tO,i : integer;swapped ; boolean; 
begin  
repeat 
begin
swapped := false; 
for i := 0 to 14 do 
begin
if  huff[a, i] > huff[a,i + 1] then 
begin to := huff[a,i+1]; huff[a,i+1] := huff[a,i];huff[a,i] := tO; 
swapped := true; 
end; 
end; 
end
until not (swapped) 
end;
procedure results; 
var typ : integer;
begin {total symbols in file-nibble)
for i := 0 to 15 do 
for j := 1 to 3 do 
begin
nibble__sum[ j] : = nibble_sum[ j] + nibble__count [ j, i] ; 
end;
for i := 0 to 255 do {total symbols in file-byte}
begin
byte_sum : = byte__sum + byte_count [ 1, i ] ; 
end;
{sort results) s impl e__s o rt_by t e ; 
simple_sort_nibble (1,4) simple_sort_nibble(2,5) simple_sort_nibble(3,6)
{proportions of each symbol in the file) 
for i  := 0 to 15 do 
for j :== 1 to 3 do 
beginnibble__count[j+6,i] := nibble_count[j,i]/nibble_sum[j];nibble__dist__siam[ j ] := nibble__dist__sum[ j] +nibble_count[j,i]/nibble_sum [ j];
end;
for i := 0 to 255 do 
begin
byte_count[2,i] := byte_count[1,i]/byte__sum; 
end; 
end;
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^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^  
{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  *} 
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *}
{* Page 6 *}{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * )
{find compression - sum of frequency*huffman code length
procedure huffsum;
begin
for i := 0 to 15 do 
for j := 1 to 3 do 
beginnibble_huff_sum[ j] : ==nibble_huff_sum[ j] +
nibble_count[j,i]/nibble_sum[j] * huff[j,i];
end;
for i ;= 0 to 255 do 
beginbyte_huf f_sum: =byte_huf f_sum +
byte_count[1,i]/byte_sum * huff2[i];
end;
end;
(recursive procedure to suck info from tree - all nibble (place)} 
procedure ntravtree(node:treeptr ; depth,place : integer); 
begin
i f  node''. orderO-1 
then
huff [place,node''. order] : = depth (huffman code lengths} 
e lse  
begin
ntravtree (node''. right, depth+1, place) ; ntravtree (node''. left , depth+1,place) ; 
end;
end;
(recursive procedure to suck info from tree - byte}
procedure btravtree(node :treeptr ; depth ; integer; list : holder);
begin
i f  node''. orderO-1 
then 
beginhuff2 [node''.order] ; = depth; (huffman code lengths} shuff2 [node''. order] := list; 
end 
e lse  
begin
list[depth] ;= counter; counter := counter+1; 
btravtree (node''. right, depth+1, list) ; list [depth] := counter; counter := counter+1; 
btravtree (node''. left ,depth+1, list) ; 
end;
end;
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^
* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  *}
* version 1.0 <26/10/90) *}
* Page 7 *}* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }
procedure optihuff(A,b, c, depth : integer); {general to byte&nib! 
var arr : array[0..1, 0..255] of real;vstore : array[0..255] of treeptr;one : treeptr;bl,b2,b3: integer;t,tO,tl : real;swapped : boolean;
begin
for i := 0 to depth-1 do 
begin
case A of
1 ; begin {fill local array]arr[0,i] := byte_count[0,i]; {with ordered dist} arr[l,i] := byte_count[1,i]; 
end;
2 : begin
arr[0,i] := nibble_count[b,i]; arr[l,i] : = nibble_count [c, i ]-; ■ 
end;
end;
new{one); {tree root]one^.order := i; one''.value := arr[l,i]; 
one'', right : = nil; one'', left : = nil; vstore[i] := one;
end;
for i := depth-1 downto 1 do
begin {take bottom two and join}t := arr[1,i-1]+arr[1,i]; new(one);one''. order one''. value one''. right one''. left
= "1;= t ;= vstore[i-1] ;= vstore[i] ; vstore[i-1] := one;arr[1,i-1] := t; {put result back in array}
repeat {and resort list}
begin
swapped := false; 
for j := 0 to i-1 do 
begin
i f  arr[l,j] < arr[l,j+l] then 
beginto := arr[0,j+l] ; tl := arr[l,j+l];arr[0,j+l] := arr[0,j] ; arr[l,j+l] := arr[1,j]; arr[0,j] := tO ; arr[l,j] := tl;one := vstore[j+l]; vstore[j+1] := vstore[j];vstore[j] := one; swapped := true; 
end; 
end; 
end
until not(swapped) ; 
end; {and repeat until one entry only}
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{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  * 
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *
{* Page 8 *{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{now we have a Huffman tree}
{get huffman code lengths from trees} counter :=0 ;
i f  A=1 then btravtree(vstore[0],0,holdit) 
else ntravtree(vstore[0],0,b-3);
{sort resultant huffman code lengths} 
case A of1 : repeat {byte}
beginswapped := false;
for j := 0 to 254 do
begin
i f  huff2 [j] > huff2[j+l] then 
begin 
bl := huff2[j+1]; huff2[j+l] := huff2[j]; huff2[j] := bl; 
swapped := true; 
end; 
end; 
end
until not(swapped);2 : for i := 1 to 3 do {nibble}simple_sort_huf f (i) ;
end;
end;
procedure genhuff; 
var i ; integer; 
beginoptihuff(1,0,1,256) ; 
for i := 1 to 3 do
optihuff(2,i+3, i+6,16) ;
end;
{Byte Huffman}{and three nibbles !}
procedure banner; 
begin
writeln;
writeln(’Optimum Huffman Code Generator'); 
writeln; 
end;
ElO
^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^  
{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  *} 
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *}
{ * Page 9 *}{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }
procedure print_to_screen; (prints the Nibble distribution}
var size : real/
typ ; integer;
begin
writeln('Nibble distribution (sorted)');
for i := 0 to 15 do
begin
write(nibble_count[5,i]; 2 : 0, ' = ',nibble_count[8,i}: 3 : 2) ; 
writeln(’ - ',huff [2,i] : 2,' -
' ,  nibble_count[8,i]*huff[2,i] : 4 : 2);
end;
writeln;
writeln ( ' ' , nibble_dist__sum[l] : 3 ; 2, '', nibble__huf f_sum[l ] : 4 ; 2 ) ;
end;
procedure print_res; 
begin
writeln;
writeln(' NIBBLES . BYTES');
writeln(' All ; Upper : Lower I'); 
for i  := 0 to 15 do 
beginwrite(nibble_count[7,i]: 2 :2,' ',huff[1,i]: 2, ';'); write(nibble_count[8,i}:2:2,' huff[2,i]: 2,';');write(nibble_count[9,i]:2;2,' ',huff[3,i];2,' | ');
for j := 0 to 15 do
write(huff2[(j*16+i)]:1,* ');
writeln; 
end;
writeln ('---------------:---------------:-----------------| -------------------------------------------------------' ) ;
write ( ' ' ,nibble_huf f__sum[l] : 3:2) ;
write(' : ',nibble_huff_sum[2]: 3 :2) ;
write ( ' : ' ,nibble__huff_suin[3] : 3:2, ' I ' ) ;
write (' **(»,byte_huff_sum: 3:2,')**');
writeln; 
end;
procedure initialise__variables; 
begin
for i := 1 to 3 do {clear values in arrays}
begin
nibble_sum[i] ;= 0; {upper,lower & both sums}nibble_huff_sum[i] :=0; nibble_dist__sum[i] :=0; 
end;
byte_sum ;= 0; byte_huff_sum 0;
for i := 0 to 255 do {for each symbol represented by a byte}
begin
byte__count [0, i] : =i ; byte_count[l,i] :=0; holdit[i] := 0; 
for j := 0 to 100 do shuff2[i,j]:=0;
end;
E l l
{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
{* Works out the distribution of data in a given f i l e  * 
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *
{* Page 10 *{ * * * * * * * * * ★ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
for i ;= 0 to 15 do {for each symbol repres. by a nibble}
begin
nibble count[0,i]:=i;
for j 
for j 
for j 
end; 
end;
= 1 to 3 do nibble_count[j,i]= 4 to 6 do nibble__count [ j , i ]= 7 to 9 do nibble count[j,i]
=0
=0
=0
{Main Routine} 
begin  
banner;initialise__variables;
{generate or load a distribution for a given file}
write ('Use an existing DST file or create new one? (1/2) - ');
readln(answer) ;
i f  answer=l then oldfile else newfile; 
results;
(generate or load a huffman coding}
write('Use an existing HUF file or create & use optimum one? 
(1/ 2 ) -  ' ) ;  
readln(answer) ;
i f  answer=l then loadhuff else begin genhuff ; savehuff end;
huffsum; {calculate the resulting compression}print_res; {print results}
readln(i); {wait for keypress}
for i := 0 to 18 do 
begin
for j := 0 to huff2[i]-l do 
write(shuff2 [i, j], ' ');
writeln; 
end;
readln (i); {wait for keypress} 
end.
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{* generates huffman codes from a f i le  *} 
{* of optimum huffman code lengths *}
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *}
{* David S. S. Robb *}( * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * J
(Compiler Directives}
{$R-} (Range checking off}{$B+} (Boolean complete evaluation on}{$S+} {Stack checking on}{$!+} {I/O checking on}{$N-} (No numeric coprocessor}{64k stack , 1 meg heap !}
(The Program}
program hufgen; 
uses crt,graph,dos;
var outfile,huffilename i, j,n huff huf f 2 shuff2 lookup
f i l e  of byte;
string;
integer;
array [1..3,0..15] of byte; 
array [0..1,0..255] of byte; 
array [0..255,0..100] of. integer; 
array [0..509] of integer;
{Load file of optimum huffman code lengths} 
procedure loadhuff; 
var dl,d2 : byte; 
begin
write (’Please enter source filename - ')
readln(name);
assign(huffile,name);
rese t(huffile);
for i := 0 to 255 do
read(huffile,huff2[1, i] ) ; 
for i := 0 to 15 do 
begin
read(huffile, huff[1, i] ) ; 
read(huffile,huff[2,1]); 
read(huffile,huff[3,1]); 
end;
for 1 := 0 to 255 do
read(huffile,huff2[0,1]); 
for 1 := 0 to 255 do
for j := 0 to huff2[l,l]-l do 
begin
read(huffile, dl); 
read(huffile,d2); shuff2[l,j]:=(dl*256)+d2; 
end; 
c lo se (huffile); 
end;
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{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * J
{* generates huffman codes from a f i le  *}
{* of optimum huffman code lengths *}
{* version 1.0 (26/10/90) *}
{ * Page 2 *}
( * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }
{procedure to save resultant huffman codes} 
procedure saveres; 
var d : byte; 
begin
write('Please enter destination filename - ’); 
readln(name) ; assign(outfile,name)/ 
rewrite(outfile);
for i := 0 to 255 do write(outfile,huff2[1,i]); 
for i := 0 to 255 do write(outfile,huff2[0,i]); 
for i :* 0 to 255 do
for j := 0 to huff2[l,i]-l do 
begin
d := lo (shuff2 [i,j]); 
write(out file,d); 
end;
c lo se(outfile); 
end;
procedure gencode; 
var temp : integer;
begin
for i := 0 to 255 do
for j := 0 to huff2[l,i]-l doshuff2[i,j] ;= lookup [shuff2 [i,j]] ;
end;
procedure printres; 
var len : byte; 
begin
for i 0 to 255 do 
begin
write(huff2[l,i] , ' - '); 
for j := 0 to huff2[l,i]-l do 
write(shuff2[i,j] : 2, ’ •);
writeln; 
end;
readln(i ); 
end;
procedure initialise_variables; 
begin
for i := 0 to 509 dolookup[i] := i mod 2;
end
begininitialise_variables ; loadhuff; gencode; printres; 
saveres; 
end.
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{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{* Hufman codes a file! *{* version 1.0 (05/11/90) *{* David S.S. Robb *{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{Compiler Directives}
{$R-} {Range checking off}{$B+} {Boolean complete evaluation on}{$S+} {Stack checking on}{$!+} {I/O checking on}{$N-} {No numeric coprocessor}{64k stack , 1 meg heap !}
{The Program}
program dohuf; uses crt,graph,dos;type list = array [0..100] of byte;var outfile,infile,huffile : file of byte;name,name2 : string;i,j,n : integer;
huff2 : array [0..1,0..255] of byte,shuff2 : array [0..255] of list;buffer : array [0..2047] of byte;top ; integer;
{load in the Huffman coding} procedure loadhuf; var d : byte; begin
write('Please enter Huffman filename - ')readln(name);assign(huffile,name) ;reset(huffile);
for i ;= 0 to 255 doread(huffile,huff2[1,i]); for i := 0 to 255 doread(huffile,huff2[0,i] ) ; for i := 0 to 255 dofor j := 0 to huff2[l,i]-l do 
read(huffile,shuff2[i, j] ) ; close(huffile); end;
{dump 256 byte buffer to destination file} procedure dumpbuffer; var temp : byte;i,j : integer;begin
writeln(’dumped buffer’);for i := 0 to 255 do {put bits together}begin {and write out}temp := 0; 
for j := 0 to 7 dotemp := temp*2 + buffer[i*8+j]; write(outfile,temp); end;top := 0; {buffer empty}end;
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^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{* Hufman codes a file! *{* version 1.0 (05/11/90) *( * Page 2 *
^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(compress the file} procedure dothehuff; var address : byte;count : integer;begin count := 0; 
while not(eof(infile)) do begin
count := count +1;read(infile,address); for i := 0 to huff2[1,address]-1 do {rept for bit len. of code} beginif top=2048 then dumpbuffer;
{repeat until source read} 
(keep a byte count}
buffer[top]:=shuff2 [address, i] top top+1; end; end;writeln(count);
{if buffer full then dump} (into dest file}{dump bits of code to buff} {keep buffer fill level}
end;
procedure banner; beginwriteln;
writeln ('Hufman Compression Utility'); writeln; end;
{select source filename and destination for compressed version}procedure initialise__variables;begin
write('Please enter source filename - '); readln(name); assign(infile,name); reset(infile);write('Please enter destination filename - '); readln(name); assign(outfile,name); rewrite(outfile) ; end;
{Main Routine} begin banner;
initialise_yariables;loadhuf;
dothehuff;end.
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{* Hufman decodes a file! *}{* version 1.0 (07/11/90) *}{* David S. S. Robb *}^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^
{Compiler Directives}
{$R+} {Range checking off}
{$B+} {Boolean complete evaluation on}
{$S+} {Stack checking on}
{$1+} ( I/O checking on}
{$N -} {No numeric coprocessor}
{64k stack, 1 meg heap !}
{The Program} program dohuf;uses crt,graph,dos;type list = array[0..100] of byte;
var outfile,infile,huffilename,name2 
i,j,n huff2 shuffl buffer top,bottom 
readc fillbuff finished funk
file of byte;string;
integer;
array [0.. 1,0..255] of byte;array [0..255] of list;array [0..2047] of byte;integer;longint;integer;boolean;byte;
{load in the Huffman code} procedure loadhuf; var d : byte; begin
write(’Please enter Huffman filename - '); readln(name); assign(huffile,name); reset(huffile);for i := 0 to 255 do read(huffile,huff2[l,i]); for i := 0 to 255 do read(huffile,huff2[0,i]); 
for i := 0 to 255 do for j := 0 to huff2[l,i]-l do read(huffile,shuff2[i,j]); 
close(huffile); end;
{test for a match between the top of the buffer and a selected huffman code} |function compare( v : integer ):boolean;
var i : integer; |
same : boolean; jbegin isame := true; 1
for i := 0 to huff2[l,v]-l do 1if same then I
if shuff2[v,i]<>buffer[(bottom+i)mod 2048] then same : =  false; icompare := same; end;
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{* Hufman codes a f i le !  *}{* version 1.0 (05/11/90) *}
{* Page 2 *){ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }
{fill up the cyclic input buffer} 
procedure fillbuffer; 
var temp,temp2 : byte;i,j : integer;test, full : boolean;
begin
i f  eo f(infile) 
then finished:=true 
e lse  
begin
full := false; 
while not (full) do 
begin {test for full}
i f  (bottom<=top)or(bottom>top+8) then test:=t rueelse test:=false; 
i f  (not (eof(infile)))and(test) then {not full and still bytes in source) 
begin
readc := readc +1;
read(infile,temp); {read a byte from source}temp2 := 128; 
for j := 0 to 7 do
begin {split into bits and place in buffer}buffer[top+j]:= temp div temp2; temp := temp mod temp2; temp2 := temp2 div 2; 
end;
top ;= (top+8) mod 2048; 
end;
i f  (bottom>=top) and(bottom<top+8) then full : =true
else  full :=false;
i f  eof (infile) then full:=true; 
end; 
end; 
end;
{see if input buffer requires filling - if whole of symbol not in buffer}
function nearlyempty (v : integer) :boolean;
var test : boolean;
begin
i f  bottom<top then i f  top-bottom<=huff2[1,v]
then test:=true 
e lse  test:=false  
else i f  top+2 04 8-bottom<=huff2[1,v] 
then test:=true 
e lse  test:=false;nearlyempty:=test; 
end;
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^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(* Hufman. codes a file !  *
{* version 1.0 (05/11/90) *
{* Page 3 *{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{decompress the file} 
procedure dotheunhuf; 
var address : byte;count : integer;found : boolean;val, topy : integer;
begin
count := 0; bottom := 0; top := 0;finished ;= false;fillbuffer;
while not((finished)and(top=bottom) ) do 
begin
count := count +1; {byte count}found := false; val := -1;
while not(found) do {keep trying}
begin
val := val +1;
i f  nearlyempty(val) then fillbuffer;found := compare(val); {until huff code match}
end;
write(outfile,huff2 [0,val}); {found -write byte to dest}bottom ;= (bottom + huff2{1,val]) mod 204 8;
{and update buffer & rept}
end;
end;
procedure banner; 
begin
writeln;
writeln(*Hufman Decompression Utility'); 
writeln; 
end;
{select compressed source filename and dest for decompressed version}
procedure initialise_variables;
begin
write('Please enter source filename - '); 
readln(name); 
assign(infile,name); 
rese t(infile);
write('Please enter destination filename - '); 
readln (name) ; 
assign(outfile, name) ; 
rewrite(outfile); fillbuff := 0; 
readc :=0 ; 
end;
{Main routine} 
begin  banner;
initialise_variables; loadhuf; dotheunhuf; 
end.
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! * LZW Compression program *
!* version 1.0 *
!* D. Robb 1991 *
I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
leach entry - code/pointer to another entry 
le t  dictionary = vector 0:;819l,l:;2 of 0
! number of literals - top entries of diet 
le t  last, lit — 300
! number of bits in code word 
le t  number.of.bits := 9
le t  infile := n u l l f i le  
le t  entry.no := last.lit +1 
le t  max.entries = 8192 
le t  compressed.size := 0
I open source file to be compressed
procedure openfile
begin
write "Enter filename to compress - " 
le t  ans = read .a .line  infile := open(ans,0)
i f  in file=null£ile do (write "ERROR" 
end
leurrent entry number
openfile}
! pretty print for results output 1 prints <space> and <ret> chars as stringsI recursively travels pointers to gain full dictionary entry 
procedure get.codes(int codel -> string)
(if codel<=last.lit
then (if codel-13 then "<ret>"
else i f  codel=32 then
else++
"<space>" code(codel) )
else get.codes(dictionary(codel,1)))
(if dictionary(codel,2)=13 
then "<ret>"
else i f  dictionary(codel,2)=32 
then "<space>"
else code(dictionary(codel,2)))
1 keeps a track of compressed file length ! would output to destination file here 
procedure output.code( int code ) 
beginlet temp ;=0 
case true ofcodes > = 4  096 : temp :=13codes >=2048 : temp :=12codes >=1024 : temp :=11codes >= 512 : temp :=10
d efau lt  ; temp : =9
compressed, size := compressed, size + temp 
end
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* LZW C o m p r e s s i o n  p r o g r a m  *
* v e r s i o n  1 . 0  *
* P a g e  2 *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
! add entry to the dictionary 
p r o c e d u r e  add. entry ( i n t  code,lit) 
b e g i n
dictionary(entry.no) (1) ;= code ! code for last characterdictionary(entry.no)(2) := lit (pointer to rest of entryentry.no := entry.no + 1 
e n d
clear,output openfile
l e t  oldcode := d e c o d e ( r e a d (infile)) (read first byte
l e t  newcode := 0
l e t  input.count := 1 (have read one byte
(check if already in dictionary
p r o c e d u r e  in. dictionary ( i n t  code,lit -> b o o l )  
b e g i n
l e t  found := f a l s e
f o r  i = last.lit +1 t o  entry.no d o
i f  dictionary(i,1)=code a n d  dictionary(i,2)=lit ,do  { found := t r u e  ; oldcode := i )found
e n d
(compress file and build dictionary
w h i l e  - e o f (infile) d o
b e g i n
r e p e a t{newcode := d e c o d e ( r e a d (infile)) /
input.count := input.count + 1} (read byte
w h i l e  in.dictionary(oldcode,newcode) a n d  - e o f (infile)(repeat while in dictionary 
output.code(oldcode) (output codeadd.entry(oldcode,newcode) (add entry to disk
(dictionary entries grow in length on boundaries 
c a s e  entry.no o f512,1024,2048,4096 : number.of.bits := number.of.bits + 1max.entries : b e g i n  w r i t e  "EMPTY DICT"
entry.no := last.lit + 1 number.of.bits := 9
e n d
d e f a u l t  : {}
oldcode := newcode 
e n d
output.code(oldcode) (last byte
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j ***************************
! * LZW Compression program * ! * version 1,0 *! * Page 3 *
I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
(print out results
write "'norigional number of bits - ", input.count*8
write "'n 'ncompressed to - ", compressed.size
le t  num ;= last.lit +1
write "'nDictionary Created :- ’n"
while dictionary(num,1)-=0 do
begin
write "'n",dictionary(num,1)," : ", dictionary(num,2) 
write " = ", get.codes(dictionary(num, 1) )
write " + ",
i f  dictionary(num,2)=13 
then "<ret>"
else i f  dictionary(num,2)=32 
then "<space>"
else code(dictionary(num,2))num := num + 1 
end
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; * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
!* LZW Compression program - Example Execution * 
I* version 1.0 *
!* D.Robb 1991 *
I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
! te s t  source f i l e
This is a
! program output
Enter filename to compress - testing 
origional number of bits - 72
compressed to - 72
Dictionary Created : -
! 9 X Gbits 
!8 X 9bits
84 104 = T + h104 105 = h + i105 115 = i + s115 32 = s + <space>32 105 = <space> + i303 32 = i s + <space>32 97 = <space> + a
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* IC105 Controller Program *
* Version 1.0 *
* David S. S. Robb *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
program comp3; 
uses crt/
var infile 
filename chi,j,clusters valuetemp,buffers,leftover,size
function read__results : longint;
var vl,v2,v3 : integer;
beginvl := port[$304]; v2 := port[$305]; v3 := port[$30 6];
read_results := vl + v2*$100 + v3*$10000; 
end;
f i l e  of byte,
string;
char;
integer;
longint;
integer;
procedure pause (length : integer);
var i : integer;
begin
for i := 1 to length do begin end; 
end;
procedure compress_buf f (bytes : integer) ;
const busy = 254;
var t byte;status : byte;
begin
for i ;= 0 to bytes-1 do 
read(infile,mem[$d800:i]); 
port[$30c] := 00; {compress} status := port[$308]; 
while status=busy do
begin status:=port[$308] end; {wait until finished}
end;
procedure setup (bytes : integer);  
begin
port[$308] := 0; {reset chip}
for i := 1 to 10000 do begin end; 
port [$304] := bytes div $10000;bytes := bytes mod $10000; 
port[$303] := bytes div $100;bytes := bytes mod $100; 
port[$302] := bytes;
end;
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{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * J
{* IC105 Controller Program *}{* Version 1.0 *}{* Page 2 *}
{ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * }
begin
writeln;
writeln; writeln('File Compression'); writeln;
write{'Enter input filename - ');
readln(filename);assign(infile, filename);
reset(infile);
value := 0;size := f i l e s i z e (infile); buffers := size div 4096; clusters := buffers*2; leftover := size mod 4096;
i f  leftover>2048 then clusters := clusters+1; 
i f  leftover>0 then clusters := clusters+1; 
writeln ('File is ',size,' bytes'); 
writeln('buffers = ',buffers); 
writeln('leftover = ',leftover);
setup(size);
writeln;writeln('Compressing ...’);
for j := 1 to buffers do
begin
writeln('Compressing buffer ',]); compress_buff(4096); 
end;c omp res s_bu f f(leftover);pause(10000); {wait for registers to be valid)value := read_results;
writeln; writeln('Compressed ',clusters,' clusters'); 
writeln('It compressed to value div 2048,' clusters'); 
writeln('with ',value mod 2 04 8,' over'); 
readln(ch);
close(infile);end.
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